Decision making under pressure : a behavioural economics perspective by Savage, David A.
DECISION MAKING UNDER PRESSURE:
A BEHAVIOURAL ECONOMICS
PERSPECTIVE
David A. Savage
BIT (Data Comm), BBus (Econ), MRes (Econ)
Primary Supervisor: Professor Benno Torgler (School of Economics & Finance)
Associate Supervisor: Professor Uwe Dulleck (School of Economics & Finance)
Submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for
Doctor of Philosophy (Economics)
School of Economics and Finance
Queensland University of Technology
November, 2013
Keywords
9/11; Behavioural Economics; Communications; Decision Making; Extreme En-
vironments; Disasters; Emotions; Floods; High Pressure Circumstances; Life
and Death Events; Lusitania; Mount Everest; Natural & Quasi-Natural Exper-
iment; Prospect Theory and Risk Attitudes; Titanic; World & European Cup
Football; World Trade Centre.
i
Abstract
This research collection seeks to fill some of the gap existing in the behavioural
economics literature pertaining to the individual decision making process under
extreme environmental situations (life and death events) and in high stress or
pressure events. These works analyse the revealed behavioural preferences of
decision makers through the investigation of four di↵erent environments with
varying types of shocks. These shocks are naturally occurring within each envi-
ronment and are either exogenous or endogenous in nature. Specifically, these
works contrast and compare the penalty shootout process in World and Eu-
ropean Cup Football competitions; the change in cooperation and behaviours
of climbers in the Himalayan Mountains between 1950-2009; the e↵ect on risk
taking of individuals after a large wealth shock induced by a major flood event;
and the emotional development of communications during the 9/11 disaster.
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“The known is finite, the unknown infinite; intellectually we stand on an islet
in the midst of an illimitable ocean of inexplicability. Our business in every
generation is to reclaim a little more land, to add something to the extent and
the solidity of our possessions.”
Thomas Henry Huxley on the reception of the “Origin of Species” (1887)
”In [my] journeyings [I was] often, in perils of waters, in perils of robbers,
in perils by mine own countrymen, in perils by the heathen, in perils in the city,
in perils in the wilderness, in perils in the sea, in perils among false brethren”
2nd Corinthians, Chapter 11: Verse 26 of the King James Bible
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Chapter 1
Introduction
This body of work seeks to investigate decision making of individuals in an
extreme (high pressure) environment or under life-and-death conditions from a
behavioural economics perspective. The papers examine the factors that may
cause individuals to deviate from the standard economic model of homo eco-
nomicus (self interested) behaviour. This document contains 4 works (either ac-
cepted, published or submitted) with the expectation that they not only meet,
but also exceed the criteria for a PhD by publication. In addition to this it
is my expectation that a revised (completed) version of Chapter 2 will also be
submitted for publication soon after the final submission of this thesis. Chapter
1 briefly outlines the background for the research (see Section 1.1), as well as
its significance and how my research fits into and extends the current literature
(see Section 1.2). The common element that ties all these works together is the
empirical analysis of decision making outside of the normal everyday condition.
These include naturally occurring high pressure environments and historical life-
and-death situations. More specifically these papers investigate the factors that
may a↵ect or change the decision making process from a behavioural economics
perspective, as discussed in Chapter 2 has for the most part been overlooked (in
the case of economics) or analysed using non-rigorous statistical tools (in the
case of psychology and sociology).
It is my opinion that the further development of both behavioural economics
(in general) and that of disaster research (more specifically) will require the in-
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troduction or absorption of theories from outside of the traditional economic
viewpoint (see Chapter 2), but can often be found in the broader behavioural
sciences. Historically, the sole interest of a traditional economist in disaster anal-
ysis has been to calculate the economic costs associated with these events. This
path led to neglecting many aspects which are now closely associated with be-
havioural economics (such as altruism, emotion, helping behaviour, reciprocity,
etc.). While traditional economics was selectively focused on costs, other fields
such as psychology and sociology focused on the behaviour of individuals in-
volved in the disaster itself. This most often took the form of either a collective
action problem or as mass panic (see e.g., Aguirre et al., 1998; Quarantelli,
2001; Elster, 1985; Fehr et al., 2002a; Johnson, 1988; Kelley et al., 1965; Maw-
son, 1980; Smelser, 1963). However, both these fields have in general relied on
analysis tools that have known problems such as biased data1 or small sample
sizes, which lack predictive power. It is this aspect that is the focus of this body
of work. Such that the decision making process of individuals under extreme
pressures or high risk environments is investigated to understand how they de-
viate from those expected under normal conditions. Additionally, this work will
impose the rigorous investigative process of economics or seek to create new
methodologies to solve unique issues (see Chapter 7). This work draws on a
range of theories from across the behavioural sciences and ties them together
with some of the empirical and methodological rigour of economics. In doing so
it is hoped that the resulting research will create a multi-disciplinary viewpoint,
with a clearer understanding of theory and stronger empirical basis for the study
of the decisions making under extreme environments and pressure. By utilis-
ing such an approach, this work can provide new and important insights into
the disaster and behavioural literatures, by providing improved structural de-
sign with modern econometrical and experimental modelling methodology. The
adoption of the scientific rigours of laboratory experimentation into the world
of natural and field experimentation can provide the realistic but repeatable
1The analysis of evacuations after the 1993 bombings were restricted by survivor bias (see
e.g. Fahy and Proulx, 1998, 2002).
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results found lacking in some of the other social disciplines.
Towards these ends this research sets out to analyse the revealed behavioural
preferences of decision makers through the investigation of four di↵erent high
pressure or life-and-death environments with varying shock types. These shocks
are naturally occurring within each environment and are either exogenous or en-
dogenous events. The thesis begins with a discussion about the past, present and
future of the analysis and understanding of disaster and extreme environments,
from a behavioural economics perspective (Chapter 2). I begin the research
chapters with an overview of some of my previous works, which while not in-
cluded in this thesis, are directly related to the works contained here. This is
a comparative analysis of two maritime disasters (Chapter 3). This is an ex-
ample of an exogenous shock event where individuals (participants) are entirely
unprepared for the shock and prior to the event have no special preparation
or training to help them prepare2. However, the elite athletes observed in the
next paper (Chapter 4) are aware that a shock is possible, brought about by
their actions within the event, and are able to prepare accordingly. However,
the shock in this analysis is endogenous to the event itself, such that it is to
some degree under the control of those involved. Next, the e↵ects of endoge-
nous and exogenous shocks are examined in athlete’s operating in the extreme
mountaineering environment in Chapter 3. The e↵ect of an exogenous shock on
an individual’s willingness to accept risky gambles is investigated in Chapter
6. Finally, the e↵ect of an exogenous shock on emotion and communication is
examined in Chapter 7.
The conceptual progression of these papers follows a simple, but straight
forward line from: Chapter 3 an exogenous shock event in a life and death
environment with a time restriction treatment, where participants have no ex-
perience or preparation; Chapter 4 an endogenous shock event in a high pressure
environment, where the elite athletes can prepare; Chapter 5 a quasi-endogenous
shock event where individuals choose to place themselves in a life and death en-
2While one of the works could be included in this thesis, on advice I have opted to remove
it in favour of a summary.
3
vironment and there is a range of preparation between groups; Chapter 6 an
exogenous wealth shock and its impact on risk behaviour, where individuals
have no previous experience; and finally in Chapter 7 to the e↵ect of an exoge-
nous shock on emotion and communications. While the observed behaviours
can be viewed as the revealed preferences of individuals and that they occur
in a natural setting is clear, some questions may be raised about their advan-
tages and validity as economic experiments. However, Harrison and List (2004)
neatly encapsulate the underlying concept of experiments, “In some sense every
empirical researcher is reporting the results of an experiment. Every researcher
who behaves as if an exogenous variable varies independently of an error term
e↵ectively views their data as coming from an experiment” (Harrison and List,
2004, p.1009).
It may be useful to begin with some broad definitions to aid in the under-
standing and discussion of the terms: experiment, field experiment and natural
experiment, from which a discussion of benefits and issues can be discussed.
Laboratory experiments (or more generally just experiments) have been utilised
to test economic theory for the same reasons as the physical sciences, the abil-
ity to control confounding factors and manipulate single variables to determine
their e↵ect. However, this becomes a problem when dealing with humans who
are heterogeneous in nature and can alter their choices or behaviours dependent
upon many (some unobservable) factors. This is very di↵erent in the physical
sciences where the laws are absolute, such that an identical force applied to the
same object will always react in the same manner, which is they will always
behave in the same way when exposed to the same stimuli. This complicates
the testing of causal and treatment e↵ects in which economists are interested in
discovering. This problem has been addressed through the use of instrumental
variables and other econometric techniques. Another issue arising from labora-
tory experiments is that the subjects participating in this form of experiment
are keenly aware that they are being observed and are prone to altering their
normal behaviour because of this. Furthermore, the environments in which
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these types of experiments occur are non-natural and sterile which can evoke
non-natural responses from participants.
For this reason experimentalists sought out alternatives such as “natural
experiments”, in what Rosenzweig and Wolpin (2000) described as a random
treatment e↵ects that has occurred naturally through chance, luck or “serendip-
ity”. They go on to discuss how economists have exploited the fact that nat-
urally occurring events “provide almost perfect randomness” (Rosenzweig and
Wolpin, 2000, p.828). Participants behave in their normal manner as they op-
erate in their normal environment and are not aware their actions are/will be
observed, making their actions a behavioural reflection of their true beliefs (a
revealed preference). However, the use of naturally occurring data does come at
a cost; the random event, which created the experiment is completely outside
the control of the experimenter and may result in some of the experimental
aspects being less than desirable. These problems can include missing data,
unobservables and the simultaneous shift of multiple variables. This is where
field experiments can be of great advantage, this form of experiment falls in
between the laboratory and the natural experiment. The field experiment can
maintain the randomness of the natural data but retains a much greater level of
control for the experimenter (for an overview see Reiley and List, 2007; Levitt
and List, 2009).
Given the nature of the research questions posed in this work it is neither
possible nor ethical to replicate high-stress, life-and-death or realistic welfare
loss situations in a laboratory, which prompts the need to find alternatives.
Thus all five of the studies included in this work fall outside the traditional
laboratory experiment, but they do fit neatly into the natural experiment except
for the flood study, which would be described as a quasi-natural field experiment.
The clear advantage that these experiments present researchers which make
them vital for testing standard economic theory (homo economicus) as well as
behavioural economic theory (altruism, reciprocity, etc.), is that under such
extreme conditions they can be done in no other way and in no other place.
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Chapter 3 is a natural experiment summary, which examines the e↵ect of an
exogenous shock in two very similar life-and-death maritime events (the sinking
of the Titanic and Lusitania), examining a time treatment e↵ect on the evo-
lution of socially normative behaviours under scarcity. Individuals involved in
these events were ex-anti unaware of the forthcoming shock and as such did
not have contingency plans or preparation for such eventualities. The Lusitania
disaster is essentially a treatment for the Titanic with the inclusion of a dras-
tically shortened event horizon and its e↵ect on behaviour. The second paper,
Chapter 4, examines an endogenously generated shock event in an extremely
high pressure environment, specifically the penalty shootout process from the
World and Euro Cup competitions to investigate the relationship between stress
and performance in a winner take all sporting environment. Players in these
competitions are top professionals and are generally the best players in the
world and are aware that if no outcome is determined in the normal course of
the game then the highly stressful process of penalty shootouts is undertaken
(the endogenous shock). This endogenous event can be prepared and trained
for ex ante and should result in di↵ering behavioural outcomes than an exoge-
nous shock event. The next natural experiment, Chapter 5, investigates the life
and death environment of mountaineers climbing in the Himalayan Mountains,
into which climbers willingly enter a high risk life-and-death environment with
semi-endogenous shock events coming in the form of climbing deaths. Under
investigation is the introduction of a competing social institution on behavioural
e↵ects of death and injuries on the success of mountaineers in the Himalayan
Mountains over the last 60 years. This study searches for evidence of behavioural
shifts amongst the commercial and non-commercial expeditions through success
rates after a fatality shock. The penultimate study investigates the impact of a
large exogenous wealth shock on the risk behaviour of individuals on the margin
of the 2011 Brisbane floods. This paper analyses the di↵erence between indi-
viduals who were just a↵ected or just missed out and their propensity to accept
risky gambles in Chapter 6 testing prospect theory. Chapter 7, the final paper,
6
investigates the impact of an exogenous shock in a life-and-death situation on
development of positive (pro-social) and negative emotions and religious senti-
ment within the pager communications sent during the September 11 attacks
on the World Trade Centre. The analysis provides a side-by-side comparison of
existing methodologies and the technique we adopted for this study .
1.1 Background
This work is the logical extension of my Master’s Thesis (Savage, 2009) that
looked specifically at the decision process in a maritime setting. These works
are summarised in Chapter 3. This work expands on this concept base and
investigates the much over looked area of decision making under pressure across
multiple environments and shocks. As such the research will provide insights
into how decisions made under duress and how they di↵er from those made
under normal/everyday conditions. The answering of this research question will
require an understanding of why we observe behavioural variation in extreme
environments and conditions. Through the investigation of several di↵erent en-
vironments and situations I will attempt to understand the connection and ra-
tional of the decision making process under duress. Furthermore, it is envisioned
that through the better understanding of human behaviour under extremes we
will be better able to model and predict disaster outcomes and influence policy
design. Towards these ends this research investigates four di↵erent environments
in which the decision making process can be examined whilst under duress.
1.2 Significance, Scope and Definitions
As indicated above, there is a noticeable absence in the literature on decision
making and behaviour pertaining to those made in extreme environments or in
life-and-death situations. The existing literature has provided only some theo-
retical discussions and extrapolations about behaviour in very high cost environ-
ments based on behaviour observed in laboratory experiments under “normal”
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conditions. The nature of the events under investigation, make them unable to
be replicated in a laboratory setting, nor are the costs of one’s life able to be
su ciently represented in a dollar amount to be risked within a game3. For this
reason natural and field experiments o↵er the only viable option for testing these
research questions. These natural experiments have been specifically selected
from my research publications to form a set from which to examine the decision
making process under extreme or high pressure with various shocks and perspec-
tives. The experiments follow a nice (logical) progression from exogenous and/or
endogenous shocks. Given that the thesis is being presented as PhD via publica-
tion, it appears in a slightly non-traditional format. The document is laid out to
meet this goal in the following way: Rather than a traditional literature review,
I have provided an extended discussion on the shortcomings and problems that
I believe needs to be addressed for the advancement of behavioural economics
into the realm of disaster studies and non-standard experimental environments,
see Chapter 2. The following chapters are the full papers as published (sub-
mitted) in academic peer-reviewed journals, altered to fit stylistic and academic
requirements see Chapters 3 – 74. The final Chapter concludes the work by
tying together the works and providing some final remarks and hopes for future
research.
3It could be argued that a hypothetical approach could applied in a lab to replicate the
environment or the pose life or death questions due to the existence of the hypothetical bias
(Harrison and Rutstro¨m, 2008b) where individual overstate values and choices caused by the
need for never having to actually pay them.
4Although Chapter 3 is a summary, it is a summary of published works.
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Chapter 2
Behavioural Economics:
The Analysis and
Understanding of Disaster
and Extreme Environment1
“This awful catastrophe is not the end but the beginning. History does not end
so. It is the way its chapters open.”2
2.1 Introduction
On the morning of December 6th 1917, an unfortunate series of events and
bad luck set into motion a chain reaction that reduced the port city of Halifax
(Canada) to a freezing, wet smouldering ruin. While attempting to the harbour
the Mont Blanc, a French freighter with 2,500 tons of explosive on board bound
for the war in Europe, accidentally collided with another vessel the Imo. This
collision started a fire on board the French ship, turning it into a floating time
bomb (Ripley, 2008). The ensuing explosion was the largest in history, shatter-
ing windows up to 60 miles away and rained down fiery molten death, killing
many and setting the city ablaze. However, this was not the end of the disaster
1This work is based upon previous works such as my Masters Thesis (Savage, 2009) and
coauthored papers (Frey et al., 2010b,a, 2011b,c). Additionally, it is hoped that this section
will be further developed into an overview paper to be submitted to Journal of Economic
Surveys.
2Quote accredited to St. Augustine
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but simply how it began. The explosion was so vast it created a tidal wave that
swamped the shoreline, drowning many and all but destroyed the port. In a final
unfortunate piece de re´sistance, that night Mother Nature wracked the city with
a blizzard; the final death toll was 1,963 people. Bearing witness to this disaster
was Samuel Henry Prince, a pastor who 5 years earlier had performed burials
at sea for another world-shaking disaster, the sinking of the Titanic. Prince
was greatly puzzled by the behaviour he observed from the citizens of Halifax,
commenting on the “ . . . utter and complete social disintegration which followed
. . . Old traditional social lines were hopelessly mixed and confused . . . Rich and
poor, debutante and chambermaid, o cial and bellboy met for the first time as
victims of a common calamity. Parents did not recognise their children, even
in the morgue; individuals underwent painful surgery with little or no anaes-
thetic without complaint or outcry; and the first triage station was setup by a
troupe of actor’s not trained medical sta↵” (Prince, 1920). From this observer’s
perspective, nothing was as it should have been.
These two events became the backdrop for Prince’s PhD thesis, discussing
the behaviour of people in disasters, which until very recently languished dusty
on the shelves of libraries. The last few decades has however seen a slowly grow-
ing resurgence of analysis of individual behaviour in disaster situations. In the
wake of the September 11 and the evacuation debacle of Hurricane Katrina (see
e.g., Rosenkoetter et al., 2007; Maguire and Pearton, 2000; Back et al., 2010),
an explosion of research began, attempting to understand how individuals be-
have in disasters. Prince’s work had returned to the fore with a renewed vigour
and purpose, he foresaw the need for the continuance of his research stating
“This little volume on Halifax is o↵ered as a beginning; don’t let it be the end.
Knowledge will grow scientific only after the most faithful examination of many
catastrophes” (Prince, 1920, p.23). A full and faithful examination of catastro-
phes needs to begin with an understanding of not only how people behave but
also the why. It is in this way that we may be able to begin comprehension
of the seemingly dichotomous behaviour of individuals within a life and death
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situation. In the absence of the continued academic study desired by Prince,
comprehension and understanding were supplanted by misunderstanding and
myth, which resolved into the acceptance of (mass) panic behaviour as a norm,
contrary to any and all evidence.
Many of the modern views and beliefs about how people behave in disasters
are based upon old, misleading ideology, which unfortunately has been perpet-
uated by Hollywood and adopted worldwide by the majority of policy makers.
The disaster scenario has been a staple of the movie industry for many years,
revolving around a fairly common and oft repeated plot device. A disaster or
end of the world type event (invasion/meteor/plague etc.) ensues and the ques-
tion is raised whether or not to inform the public. If this decision is left up the
leaders and policy makers invariably the discussion follows one of two possible
lines, in the first the public is not told and in the second they are. The usual
justification for not telling the public is usually stated that the information will
only incite mass panic and anti-social behaviour. This attitude is reinforced in
a cyclical way in movies depicting the exact behaviour they cite as not inform-
ing the public in the first example. Examples of this type of behaviour can be
observed in movies such as Armageddon (Bay et al., 1998), 2012 (Emmerich,
2009), War of the Worlds (Haskin et al., 1953; Spielberg et al., 2005), Deep Im-
pact (Leder et al., 1998) or The Day After Tomorrow (Emmerich et al., 2004),
Independence Day (Emmerich, 2004). Sadly, this fictional behaviour does reflect
the commonly accepted, traditional disaster literature, where expected response
behaviours include: mass panic, usually involving chaotic and random actions.
Panic behaviour is depicted covering the full spectrum of emotive human reac-
tions, from a quiet resigned acceptance of death, immobilised panic inaction,
frenzied/unpredictable action without direction or motive, looting and random
violence, to a desperate and frenzied search for loved ones. Many theories and
conjectures have been forwarded over the years that attempt to explain what
would or does happen in these events that have included: flight or fight, indi-
vidual or mass panic, social norms and altruism, or self-interested survival of
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the fittest.
There is an amazingly broad depth of literature spanning many disciplines
on human behaviour in disasters and in circumstances of extreme stress from
which this paper draws. I attempt to put forward a cohesive discussion on
reality vs. myth with regards to human behaviour in such events. Additionally,
we present the most likely and productive way to proceed with this research,
namely experiments (natural, field and laboratory) and their advantages and
shortcomings. This discussion concludes by putting forward a path towards the
future, addressing the need for multi-disciplinary collaboration and inclusion
if we wish to change the way in which governments create policy and social
attitudes towards disaster.
2.2 Behavior, Emotions, Myth & Panic:
The Past
Many disciplines have attempted to make sense of disasters and events in
extreme or life threatening circumstances through the analysis of behaviour.
Unfortunately anecdotal evidence and poor techniques have led to the belief
that panic is the most prevalent behaviour in these situations. Panic is per-
haps one of the most misunderstood, misinterpreted and contradictive of all
human behaviours, where the traditional and common understanding of the
phenomenon is erroneous and based on myth rather than reality. The historical
basis of the word comes from the ancient Greek deity Pan, who was said to be
able to instil an irrational and unfounded fear into individuals. It is from this
mythological basis that the standard definition of individual/group behaviour
within a disaster environment has been drawn. The use of the term ’panic’
is prolific in disaster literature and has conjured up as varied definitions and
causes as the depicted behaviour. They range from: any fear, flight, or uncoor-
dinated activity (Heide, 2004), fear and/or flight behaviour that is considered
inappropriate, excessive or irrational (Mawson, 2005), a reaction involving ter-
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ror, confusion and irrational behaviour (Goldenson, 1984); to a breakdown of
social ties and social order (Johnson, 1988). The most common threads in the
popular panic mythology are those of irrationality and social breakdown. These
traditional models are predicated on the belief that the breakdown of social or-
der is commonplace and that behaviour in these events is illogical, nonsensical
and random or without reason. Research into these types of events has sug-
gested that the random/illogical behaviour may be self-preservative aggression
or flight (Brown, 1954; Cannon, 1929a,b); or flight towards objective safety and
away from danger (Smelser, 1963). Some have indicated that physical dangers
may be more disturbing than other (psychological) kinds of dangers, evoking
a greater probability of flight behaviours. Additionally, flight behaviour and
panic could be prevented or mitigated by social control, such that social norms
and other controls regulate or constrain individual’s natural tendency to flee
danger. Finally, the belief that irrationality or panic lead to random or unpre-
dictable behaviours is disproved any time a behavioural or survival pattern is
found within an event. If a pattern can be established to have been followed
during such event this would by definition remove the possibility of it being
random or illogical behaviour3. Even though it may seem irrational or illogical
from outside the event, it may not be the case when viewed from within the
event itself.
I begin by looking at economists, who have for the most part limited their
studies to the consequences of disasters, through the analysis of the short,
medium, and long term e↵ects and costs (see e.g., Albala-Bertrand, 1993; Dacy
and Kunreuther, 1969; De Alessi, 1975; Gross, 1996; Hirshleifer, 1963; Kun-
reuther and Pauly, 2005; Sorkin, 1982). Within the literature particular atten-
tion has been paid to insurance against natural disasters (Kunreuther, 1996;
Kunreuther and Roth, 1998). Alternatively, psychologists and sociologists have
3The definitional context for the term “random behaviour” would be that it occurs without
method or conscious decision; or statistically as “chosen without regard to any characteris-
tics of the individual members of the population so that each has an equal chance of being
selected” (Farlex Online Dictionary, 2013). If we observe patterns of selection based upon the
characteristics of the individuals then it cannot, by definition, be random.
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focused more on the behaviour of people during disasters, both individually
and collectively. Much of the latter literature rejects the commonly held as-
sumptions about behaviour in these types of events, which has included: the
inability to act rationally (the so-called “disaster syndrome”), or the reign of
chaos, panic, social breakdown and antisocial behaviour, such as: crime, looting,
or exploitation (see e.g., Brown, 1954; Drabek, 1986; Goldthorpe, 1998; Gwynne
et al., 2006; Heide, 2004; Howard, 1966; Johnson, 1988; Mawson, 1978; Mintz,
1951; Quarantelli, 1972, 2001). Furthermore, as much of the research rejects
the notion that in the event of a disaster, chaos, panic, social breakdown, and
antisocial behaviour, such as crime, looting, or exploitation will often occur.
Indeed, more recent empirical research has shown that morals, loyalty, respect
for law and customs, and tenets of acceptable behaviour do not instantly break
down with a disaster (see e.g., Aguirre et al., 1998; Drabek, 1986; Hancock
and Szalma, 2008; Johnson, 1988; Johnson et al., 1994; Quarantelli, 1960, 1972;
Tierney et al., 2001).
The underlying model, which economists began to apply to all human be-
haviour, was the concept of homo economicus, in which individuals achieve
utility maximisation from a set of limited resources, by assuming that individu-
als are exclusively pursuing their own self-interest. This theory has been shown
to be very useful in many cases and a self-interested reaction in a situation of
life and death has been predominantly used as a theoretical foundation. How-
ever, it became increasingly clear that this model did not adequately express
the outcomes observed in many disaster or life-and-death events. This forced
economists to question the actions of individuals in these types of events. Do
human beings behave more in line with the selfish homo economicus, where
everybody is out for themselves and possibly even puts other people’s lives in
danger, or not? Some economists argue that the tendency to act selfishly only
arises when the stakes are high, such as when survival of the individual is at
stake. Other economists are less certain and this issue has been debated and
experimentally analysed in the context of high-stakes games (see Camerer, 2003;
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Camerer and Fehr, 2006; Fehr et al., 2002b) although some attempt has been
made to extrapolate from low risk environment and costs towards in an at-
tempt to explain life or death decisions (see Howard, 1966, 1980; Shepard and
Zeckhauser, 1984; Slonim and Roth, 1998; Smith and Keeney, 2005). Lang and
Lang (1962) and Brown (1965) have indicated that in extreme situations it is
not unexpected that individuals ignore social conventions and act in a purely
self-preserving manner.
If that were the case, I would expect that physically stronger people, that is,
adult males, would have a higher probability of survival than women, children,
and older people. Alternatively, social norms are followed for intrinsic reasons,
not for self-interested motivation but because people believe them to be ’right’
(Elster, 2006), or they fear social sanctions when violating them (Polinsky and
Shavell, 2000). This is an interesting point. Do I observe self-interested sur-
vival of the fittest or pro-social helping behaviour? If I observe both, when
and under what circumstances do I observe behavioural switching? The emerg-
ing disaster literature suggests that pro-social behaviour predominates in such
contexts (Frey et al., 2010a,b, 2011c; Quarantelli, 2001). However, laboratory
experiments have shown that it is important to understand strategic incentives
and whether self-regarding or other-regarding preferences dominate (Camerer
and Fehr, 2006). When it comes to a life or death decision human beings are
capable of both unselfishness and chivalrous (altruistic) behaviour, but a ques-
tion should be raised at this point, when are they di↵erent and why? Helping
behaviour or other-regarding preferences has been shown to exist under specific
circumstances (see e.g., Amato, 1990; Batson et al., 1979; Eagly and Crowley,
1986; Harrell, 1994).
A more than substantial amount of evidence has been generated that sug-
gests motives other than self-interest, such as altruism, fairness, and morality
has a profound a↵ect the behaviour of many individuals. People are willing to
punish others who are perceived to have harmed them or reward those who have
aided/assisted them, even though to do so they need to sacrifice some of their
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own wealth (Camerer et al., 2004). Blood banks, organ donation, volunteer
services, tax compliance and voting in elections are all activities where there
is little to no direct benefit for the individual (see e.g. Elster, 2007; Torgler,
2007). All these behaviours are appear to be motivated by something other
than self-interest, and operate beyond the traditional homo economicus model.
Individuals are also willing help others in many normal, everyday situations in
the workplace and observe helping to be a key element in our work environ-
ment Drago and Garvey (1998). “Within every work group in a factory, within
any division in a government bureau, or within any department of a university
are countless acts of cooperation without which the system would break down.
We take these everyday acts for granted, and few of them are included in the
formal role prescriptions for any job” (Katz and Kahn, 1966, p. 339). Help-
ing behaviour is required within organisations for increased e ciency, flexibility,
learning and innovation: “Therefore, it has never been more important for us
to understand why people help each other at work and why they don’t” (Perlow
and Weeks, 2002, p.343). Thus, several approaches have been utilised trying to
take into account the deviations from a self-interested model by extending the
motivation structure to include motivations such as: fairness, altruism, helping
behaviour, or social and moral norms (see Andreoni and Miller, 2002; Becker,
1974b; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000; Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger, 2004; Fehr
and Schmidt, 1999; Frey, 1997; Rabin, 1993; Sobel, 2005).
In their seminal paper Kahneman et al. (1986a) explored the link between
fairness and scarcity using telephone surveys of randomly selected residents of
two Canadian metropolitan areas. They demonstrated that things other than
self-interest could motivate individuals by demonstrating that the use of prices
to eliminate the excess of demand was considered to be unfair. While this is
consistent with the observation that firms do not adjust prices and wages as of-
ten as traditional economic theory would suggest, there are competing theories
on sticky prices. Moreover, we also observe formal laws that penalise vendors
who take advantage of shortages by increasing prices for water, fuel and other
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necessities after a natural disaster (Camerer et al., 2004). This study has since
been replicated using European samples, and found similar results (Frey and
Pommerehne, 1993; Savage and Torgler, 2010). In a shortage situation an allo-
cation process in line with tradition (first-come, first-served) are perceived to be
fairest, followed by administrative allocation procedures. In many experiments
subjects have shown to care about aspects as fairness, reciprocity, and distribu-
tion. Ultimatum experiments have shown that the modal o↵er is (50, 50) and
that the mean o↵er is somewhere around (40, 60). This also demonstrates that
the smaller the o↵er, the higher the probability that the o↵er will be rejected
(Ochs and Roth, 1989; Roth, 1995). In addition to this individuals compare
themselves to their environment and care greatly about their relative position,
which can influence individual choices. Thus, not only is the absolute level of
an individual’s situation important (e.g. income), but also the relative position.
Researchers have included the concept of interdependent preferences to allow
for social comparison (e.g., see the works of Akerlof and Yellen, 1990; Becker,
1974b; Clark et al., 2008; Easterlin, 1974; Frank, 1999; Pollak, 1976; Schelling,
1978; Scitovsky, 1976). Furthermore, it has been emphasised that research pro-
vides “compelling evidence that concern about relative position is a deep-rooted
and ineradicable element in human nature” (Frank, 1999, p.145). Therefore, we
observe that individuals do care about what others think of them and this will
have an influence on actions and behaviours of individuals. Helping behaviour
is not only linked to altruism (Piliavin and Charng, 1990), but also to reci-
procity or exchange (Fehr et al., 2002a; Henrich, 2004; Oberholzer-Gee, 2007).
The basic concept of reciprocity is helping those who have helped us. Exchange
not only focuses on direct reciprocity but also on expectations that lead to soli-
darity and indirect reciprocity in more anonymous settings such as, helping lost
tourists (Rabinowitz et al., 1997). We can largely exclude that potential helping
behaviour could be motivated by future reciprocity, a key element in the helping
literature (Batson et al., 1979; Gouldner, 1960). A life-and-death situation can
be viewed as a “one-shot game”. However, previous research has shown that
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legitimacy does a↵ect helping behaviour. Legitimate need elicits more help than
does illegitimate need (e.g. own laziness) (Berkowitz, 1969; Schwartz and Fleish-
man, 1978). In the case of a disaster, people are confronted with an external
shock, which in a substantial manner helps to control legitimacy. Interestingly,
the willingness to help others in such situations is not uncommon. Shotland and
Stebbins (1983) refer to two lines of thoughts: firstly an altruism school with
the premise that people have a need (innate or acquired) to help others in need;
secondly a hedonistic base that suggests that people weigh the benefits and costs
to themselves to reach the decision to help or not (Shotland and Stebbins, 1983,
p.36). The second one is close to a traditional economic approach.
Altruistic motivation has been defined as the desire or motivation to enhance,
as the ultimate goal, the welfare of others even at a net welfare loss to oneself
(Batson, 1992; Elster, 1996). An additional definition of an altruistic act is “an
action for which an altruistic motivation provides a su cient reason” (Elster,
1996). However, altruistic behaviour is often framed described as being some-
what selfish. It is stressed that what appears to be motivated by a concern for
others is often ultimately driven by selfish motives (Piliavin and Charng, 1990).
The di↵erentiation between motivation and act is useful, as identifying altruis-
tic motivation is problematic. For example, a so-called “warm glow e↵ect” can
be observed when people give, as giving makes people feel good. Helping be-
haviour is also exhibited during common threat situations (Batson et al., 1979).
An increased level of helping behaviour may be observed during situations of
common threat that may generate we-feelings and as a consequence a concern
for the welfare of others. In other words closeness strongly correlates to helping
behaviour (Amato, 1990) and being connected during an external and shocking
event may induce closeness. Eagly and Crowley (1986) state in their meta-study
report, that traditional male gender roles may matter and encourage chivalrous
and heroic acts. The results show that men may be predisposed to being more
helpful than women during situations which women judge to be more dangerous
than men do (Eagly and Crowley, 1986).
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When people sacrifice their life or when they increase the fitness or the
survival possibility of others in a disaster, at the expense of their own survival
chances, it is very likely that we are observing altruistic behaviour4. Thus,
self-sacrifice can be seen as an extreme form of altruism. For example, altruism
has been defined as where “ . . . behaviours directed toward the enhancement
of the welfare of another increase in altruism in proportion to the anticipated
costs to self: Risking your life to save a drowning person is more altruistic than
throwing him or her a lifesaver . . . ” (Krebs, 1991, p.137). A person could
have done better for herself not helping others and therefore ignoring the e↵ects
of her choice on others (Margolis, 1982), such a notion is consistent with the
Wilson (1975) definition of altruism in social biology. Furthermore, personal
and societal norms are also implicated in altruism (Piliavin and Charng, 1990),
as altruistic motivation may be driven by norms such as sharing equitably or
helping others in distress (Elster, 2006).
Social norms are the generally accepted conditions under which society op-
erates, directing not only how individuals are expected to act or behave towards
each other but the moral and ethical compass with which to navigate a soci-
etal existence. Social norms direct both individual and group behaviours under
normal societal conditions, and can be observed in the group herd mentality.
Once members of society are observed conforming to a social norm, other mem-
bers will follow (Banerjee, 1992), given that norms are adopted and enforced
by members of that society. However, as Elster (1985) points out social norms
may not be in the best interest of any specific individual within that society
but are in general, better for the group as a whole. It is this enforcement of the
social norm by others of the group that would make it possible for individuals to
take a course of action that would not normally be in the individuals own self-
interest by either shaming or forcing them into the required action (Elster, 1989,
1998). Moral norms are unconditional whereas social norms are conditional and
4Although it could be possible that individuals simply make bad judgments of their real
survival chances and engage in behaviour that could be socially beneficial (status). While
possible, this would be unlikely as in many situations the cost of passing up on life saving
assistance is known to the individuals.
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as such are influenced by the presence and behaviour of others (Elster, 2007,
p.104). Moral norms are guided by the individuals own internal belief systems
and does not require exogenous stimuli, this means that in general it would take
less time to determine a moral course of action than it would a social one. Given
that social norms are conditional on social situation and social interaction, some
period of time would need to elapse before social norms and decisions can be
implemented (Frey et al., 2010a,b).
It can be shown that both social and moral norms have direct e↵ects on
behaviour, but how is it that social norms may arise? Helping children and
women as their caregivers serves to strengthen the chances of their survival and
thereby helps to guarantee the survival of future generations. This may explain
why the social norm of Women and children first arose as it was considered
vital for women to be rescued. These norms have been found in other areas
where people had to be evacuated or assisted. The Geneva Convention provides
special protection and evacuation priority for pregnant women and mothers of
young children (Carpenter, 2003). Humanitarian agencies have a clearly defined
charter to evacuate/help the ‘vulnerable’ and ‘innocent’ civilians such as women,
children and the elderly first. Analysis of the Titanic disaster, has provided
strong evidence in support of the social norm Women and children first (Frey
et al., 2010a,b). Other behavioural evidence reveals actions consistent with
the norm of social responsibility. For example, studies report that motorists
are more willing to stop on a busy street for a woman who is pushing a baby
carriage than for a woman who is pushing a grocery cart (Harrell, 1994).
Even though social or moral norms may dictate that a course of action be
followed, is it rational to do so in the face of a life threatening event? Models of
rational action indicate that actions are driven by the desires (values) and be-
liefs of an individual, which are in turn derived via the influence of factors such
as: moral norms; social norms; religious ideology; and political ideology (Elster,
2007). These factors directly influence beliefs systems, which in turn re-influence
the desires and values of individuals. Beliefs can skew information and knowl-
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edge assimilation, reinforcing the desires leading to action. Social norms, or the
collective consciousness, are the set of values and beliefs shared by a society’s
member’s (Elster, 2007), guiding individual actions and behaviour, which can
include selfishness (homo economicus) or deviations away from selfish behaviour
(such as other-regarding preferences). The inter-relationship amongst individ-
uals, which is characterised by each individual’s role and status, is defined as
the social structure of society. It is the interactions between structure, status
and culture that we use to define a society (Schooler, 1996). Individuals are
immersed in the social norms of society, codes of behaviour and expectations,
which are ingrained and adhered to throughout their life (Foucault, 1979). Long-
lived norms can eventually become institutionalised or internalised, which has
been used to explain some cross-national values and behaviour (Frank et al.,
1995). When social norms are internalised they become an integral part of
an individual’s personality and are used as a reference in the interactions be-
tween individuals within that society (Parsons, 1964). Internalised norms have a
stronger influence on behaviour than do normal social norms, as violations of so-
cial norms do not provoke a sense of guilt or shame, but may trigger punishment
by the enforcers of the social norm. It is the observation of the transgression,
by a third party, that triggers shame in the transgressor not the violation it-
self. Norms that are internalised become more like moral norms, such that any
transgression would automatically elicit a sense of shame and guilt in the indi-
vidual, observed or not (Elster, 1985). Additionally, once norms are identified
as being shared by other members of society they cannot be easily disregarded,
individuals will follow the prescripts of a social norm even when it is clearly
not in their own best interest to do so (Elster, 1989). It could be argued that
actions and behaviours are the observable physical manifestations of these social
norms. Furthermore, emotive state is often a precursor to action and behaviour
and as such could be very useful in eliciting preferences and intentions out of
behavioural actions and responses5.
5A prime example of this is the links between the fear emotion and that of fight or flight
behaviour, such that when an individual is scared the body prepares for action. Although,
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As discussed earlier, panic is a popular misconception, which does not ap-
pear to fit into any of the previous models of either social or moral behaviour.
Heide (2004) research concludes that there are 4 conditions that must be present
for panic to occur: 1) Victims perceive an immediate threat of entrapment; 2)
Escape routes appear to be rapidly closing; 3) Flight seems the only way to
survive; and 4) No one is available to help. He goes further to state that be-
cause this combination of conditions is so uncommon in disasters, panic is also
rare. Mawson (2005) further supported this work through his investigation into
mass panic and collective behaviour, which reinforces that some of these panic
conditions are also required for group flight to occur. He states that conditions
required for group flight include: 1) people believe that major physical danger
is present or imminent; and 2) that escape routes are either limited or rapidly
closing. He adds a caveat to this by saying that mass flight from community
disasters is uncommon and that “organised and altruistic behaviour is the rule”
(p.97). The social attachment model of human behaviour in disasters (Mawson,
1978, 1980, 2005, 2007) states that maintaining proximity to the familiar (peo-
ple and locations) is a dominant factor on behaviour. Therefore flight can be
considered an anti a liative behaviour, thus the flight-and-a liate behaviour
depends on the degree of social contact and the degree of danger, such that the
presence of the familiar influences the perception of danger and the measure of
response, where close proximity diminishes fear responses.
This is nicely summed up by the statement “The most extreme stresses,
including drowning at sea, can be calmly faced if the individual is not sepa-
rated from his fellows . . . conversely being alone in an unfamiliar environment
or with strangers heightens the response to stress and increase the probability of
flight” (Mawson, 2005, p. 100). Contrary to the expected social breakdown or
irrational behaviour we observe collective behaviour and an a liative response
to danger. This point is neatly concluded by Quarantelli (2001), that despite
major evidence to the contrary, panic remains part of the popular imagination
this link may not be direct but operates through an indirect feedback mechanism (Baumeister
et al., 2007)
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and continues to be evoked as part of disaster management plans worldwide.
This flight and a liate behaviour is more in line with socially normative be-
haviour, where individuals run to those they have etc. strongest social bond
(family, friends etc.). Panic and flight behaviours, are representative of pure
self-interest or survival of the fittest type behaviour, where the individual flees
in order to preserve their own life, possibly even at the expense of others.
This a liative behaviour was clearly observable in the group responses dur-
ing the 1993 World Trade Centre (WTC) bombings (Aguirre et al., 1998).
Where after the explosion occupants experienced numerous after e↵ects includ-
ing: power failure (computers and lighting); phone lines were cut; and the ma-
jority of people felt the explosion (which created a crater approximately 120m
wide and 7 stories deep). Over 75% of the survey respondents indicated that
they knew something serious had occurred but only 8.7% of the groups surveyed
chose to act immediately and evacuate, persons who knew each other prior to
the event formed the majority of these groups. All the remaining groups delayed
evacuation, 63% of these groups sought additional information (26% sought ad-
ditional information and advice from those in the area, 25.5% tried to phone for
help/information and 11.3% turned to the media for information ) before com-
mitting to a course of action, this information gathering cost several minutes.
The investigation also found that larger groups took much longer to organise
and to begin evacuation, on average taking over 6.7 minutes longer than smaller
groups or singles. Additionally this research concluded that familiarity with
the WTC and/or its escape routes was not a significant factor for evacuation
delays. This a liation response was again observed through investigations into
the determining evacuation factors for the elderly prior to hurricane Katrina
(Rosenkoetter et al., 2007). The findings show that living alone, being female
and fear for an individual’s own safety is the best predictors for evacuation.
This holds with the concept that individuals are more prone to flight if they are
not part of a social group and are more willing to do so if they fear for their own
safety. And yet we still observe flight, even in situations where one might expect
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a liative behaviours. The reasoning behind this comes from the evolutionary
biology of humans and is instinctual in nature. Humans, like all animals, have
an automatic biological response system that triggers to threats and danger.
When threatened the body chemistry is altered, such that they are ready to run
from danger or fight it, to better understand this instinctive behaviour process
included here are some limited biology and neuroscience theory (see e.g., Bracha,
2004; Cannon, 1929a,b, 1935; Selye, 1936). This is instinctual behaviour and
is controlled autonomously by the oldest (evolutionary) portion of the brain,
the proto reptilian cortex. Whereas all high order social/moral functions are
controlled by the newest (evolutionary) brain section, the neocortex. As danger
input only needs to pass into the first level of the brain it is by far the fastest
processed and is immediately acted upon. For fight or flight instinct to be coun-
teracted by social norms, the brain must pass the problem from the brain stem
into the limbic system, then onto the neocortex. It is within the neo-cortex that
an individual must assess the situation and either maintain the flight or fight be-
haviour or attempt to override it with cognitive reasoning from either moral or
social norms. There exists a gap in the current neuroscience literature pertain-
ing to duration of flight behaviours as well as the requirements for individuals
to overcome the fight or flight instinct. Biologically, fight or flight behaviour
has two distinctly separate stages (Vingerhoets and Perski, 1999). The short-
term response triggers a surge in adrenaline production via the hypothalamus
and can last from a few seconds to a few minutes. This response is limited to
a few minutes because adrenaline degrades rapidly and leaves the body in a
state of exhaustion (Henry and Wang, 1998). The elevated operational state
is maintained for a short period after the threat has passed, then the response
mechanism switches o↵ and the system returns to homeostasis (Everly, 2002).
The duration extends beyond the active flight response time and includes a cool
down period. It is speculated that only after returning to homeostasis, would it
appear that higher-order brain functions of the neocortex are able to begin over-
riding the instinctual responses, which may lead to a change towards pro-social
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individual behaviours. Once the first stage of flight behaviour has run its course
and exhaustion has set in Henry and Wang (1998) we may observe a change in
individual behaviours and actions due to self-awareness and the consideration
of complex social interactions (Everly, 2002). This raises both a temporal and
biological problem; social norms require interaction such that they take time to
evolve and behaviour to be enforced. It is in this void of normative action that
we observe the instinctive behaviour in the face of danger, which is to flee. This
is then divergent behaviour based upon the time horizon, where a short event
horizon promotes survival of the fittest competitions and a longer event horizon
to a more stable socially normative outcome (Frey et al., 2010a; Savage, 2009).
We can see from the breadth and cross-disciplinary nature of this discussion
that analysing and understanding human behaviour in extreme and disaster sit-
uation is more complex than just looking at any single disciplines theoretical
beliefs. We can observe biological, moral, social, and self-interested behaviour to
be at work in many disaster events and many crossovers between them. Further-
more, we observe across the many di↵erent methodological approaches, issues
of framing and survey biases create confusing and conflicting results. What is
needed is a consistent and unified approach to move forward, we believe that
this can be achieve through the use of natural, field and laboratory experiments.
In the next section we discuss the pros and cons of using such approaches to the
study of behaviour in extreme and disaster environments.
2.3 An Experimental Approach to Analysis:
The Present
The very nature of disaster analysis is inherently flawed, investigation of the
events are generally done ex post (as opposed to ex ante) and unlike laboratory
experimentation, disasters do not a↵ord the researcher the ability to formulate
questions or model the event beforehand. This means that it is not possible to
directly observe the event and any analysis must work backwards, where the
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researchers know the outcome and attempt to determine the factors that are
most likely to be responsible for it. Post disaster surveys have been used in
an attempt to understand behaviour and determine survival factors, but this
methodology has some inherent bias. By interviewing individuals post event
creates an overwhelming survivor bias, with the obvious exclusion being those
who perished during the event not being represented in the sample. This means
that at best the results will be only valid for that particular group of interviewed
survivors and in no way generalisable to population. Therefore, another way to
examine behavioural patterns in disasters is required, one that does not rely on
the patchy recollections of behaviour from a sub-group of the population under
extreme stress, but on the revealed preferences of the whole. Additionally,
given the volume of information that may be lost or missing from not directly
observing the event, complex or multivariate analysis is required to formulate
clearer pictures about what happened post event.
One way of testing models of human behaviour would be through experi-
mentation, where it is possible to create simulations and test hypothesis under
controllable conditions. Laboratory experiments (or more generally just exper-
iments) have been utilised to test economic theory for the same reasons as the
physical sciences, the ability to control confounding factors and manipulate sin-
gle variables to determine their e↵ect. This complicates the testing of causal
and treatment e↵ects in which economists are interested. This problem has
been addressed through the use of instrumental variables and other economet-
ric techniques. Another issue arising from laboratory experiments is that the
subjects participating in this form of experiment are keenly aware that they
are being observed and are prone to altering their normal behaviour because
of this, the so-called Hawthorne e↵ect, making it di cult to generalise the re-
sults (Levitt and List, 2009). The result is that the actions chosen in the lab
are not an accurate or representative reflection of that individual’s normal be-
haviour. Additionally, these experiments occur under laboratory conditions,
non-natural and sterile environments, which can evoke non-natural responses
26
from participants. Furthermore, laboratory experiments are unable to replicate
or even approximate the levels of stress and danger to provide su cient threat
of panic in test subjects needed to simulate the life and death nature of true
disasters. Both these factors result in inaccurate and often mixed reactions to
experimental modelling. Moreover, selection e↵ects in the experimental setting
are also a problem when recruiting subjects for (lab) experiments, this may be
visible through “scientific do-gooders.” Where participants volunteer for the
experiments because they wish to help the researchers get the answer they re-
quire, biasing the results. Whereas, individuals in the natural or “real world”
facing such events actually do compete in a high stakes contest (life and death),
in a very controlled environment. It is this realism that provides researchers
with a clear advantage over laboratory, self-reporting and other forms of experi-
ments while maintaining the randomness of natural data (Reiley and List, 2007).
Given the nature of the research it is neither possible nor ethical to replicate
a high-stress, life-and-death or realistic welfare loss situation in a laboratory,
which prompts the need to find alternatives.
Amato (1990, p.31) has criticised that “Researchers who value the rigour
of the laboratory have been reluctant to extend the study of pro-social be-
haviour to everyday life, where the possibility of control is minimal.” This is
where natural and field experiments can come to the fore, participants behave
in their normal manner as they operate in their normal environment and are
not aware their actions are/will be observed making their actions a behavioural
reflection of their true beliefs (a revealed preference). Natural experiments are
where a random treatment e↵ect has occurred naturally through chance, luck or
serendipity and because it a naturally occurring event it “provides almost per-
fect randomness” (Rosenzweig and Wolpin, 2000, p.828). Levitt and List (2009)
indicate that through use of natural field experiments “we gain a unique inside
view that will not only provide a glimpse into the decision-making black box,
but permit a deeper empirical exploration into problems that excite economists,
practitioners, and policymakers.” There are several great examples of these nat-
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urally occurring experiments, Go↵ and Tollison (1990) point out that “Sports
events take place in a controlled environment, and generate outcomes that come
very close to holding ‘other things equal’. In other words, athletic fields sup-
ply real-world laboratories for testing economic theories. The data supplied
in these labs have some advantages over the data normally used in economic
research . . . the economist can perform controlled experiments similar to those
performed by the physical and life scientists. Sports data a↵ord a similar op-
portunity. Although the laboratory is a playing field, the data generated are
very ‘clean.’ Most external influences are regularly controlled by the rules of the
game” (pp. 6-7). For an example of an analysis in this environment see Chapter
4. Another great example of a natural experiment are, disaster events, which
are also relatively controlled events where all participants encounter the same
environmental variables. Again this allows for a large number of the exogenous
(external) factors to be controlled and in a broad sense the environmental and
situational conditions are identical for every individual within the disaster.
However, these natural experiments are not with their limitations, by gain-
ing the randomness and natural behaviour of the participants the experimenter
loses some control over the experiment, which may result in many of the experi-
mental aspects being less than desirable. The event is impacted by an exogenous
shock that a↵ects everyone within the disaster area in the same manner, indi-
viduals are not able to abstain from or remove themselves from the e↵ects of
the event. This means that all individuals must partake (they are unable to
opt out) and those not willing to participate in the event will generally receive
the worst possible outcome, in many cases this would result in death6. Such
a life-and death-situation can be seen as a one-shot game and as such we can
largely exclude behaviour being driven by future reciprocity. Studies such as the
Titanic and Lusitania disasters fit remarkably well into this model of a natural
experiment as every individual was involved in the event (willing or not) and
the situation was enclosed, all individuals in the experiment were known and no
6For example, in a building fire those individuals not willing to attempt flight(escape) will
likely receive the worst outcome, unless external assistance is provided
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one was able to leave7. The problems that can arise come from issues of missing
data, unobservables and the simultaneous shift of multiple variables. Although
there has been criticism of the use of field data in a multiple regression context
instead of non-random experimental data, where multiple regressions are not
fully able to estimate without noise the single estimate for the e↵ect of stress
on performance as it is impossible to measure all the variables that might con-
ceivably a↵ect performance. Allison (1999, p.20) nicely points out “No matter
how many variables we include in a regression equation, someone can always
come along and say, Yes, but you neglected to control for variable X and I feel
certain that your results would have been di↵erent if you had done so.”
From an economics viewpoint, the empirical evidence on how individuals
behave under extreme circumstances is at best patchy and contradictory. The
lack of rigour and the absence of control groups for generalisation have fatally
flawed much of this research, weakening much of the excellent theoretical con-
tributions made by the non-economic social sciences. From an experimental or
behavioural economist perspective only some theoretical conjecture has been
o↵ered on the subject of how individuals would behave under extreme circum-
stances, even though a large number of laboratory experiments have been carried
out (such as ultimatum and dictator games within numerous settings). One of
the problems stems from the scalability of experimental outcomes, when a game
is played for a small sum of money the outcomes are well documented across
many repeated games. These results also hold under relatively large sums (e.g.
3 months wages) however this is where the experimentation stops and discus-
sion begins. Some economists have stated that as the results from the low sum
and moderate sum games are virtually identical, the outcomes for ultimate sum
games (life and death) should also be very similar. However, much research and
theory from other disciplines, like as psychology, indicate that under extreme
pressure human behaviour changes. This causes a problem for economists as
it conflicts with a central tenet of decision and game theory, the rationality
7Additionally, the events were close in time and were similar on many other demographic
variables such as class structures and overall percentage of survival
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assumption, where individuals are assumed to be rational when making deci-
sions and are able to correctly weigh options. Some studies have shown that
under pressure and duress this function can break down leading to ine cient,
sub-optimal outcomes (Jamal, 1984; Keinan, 1987; Meichenbaum, 2007; Schultz,
1966; Wright, 1974). Adopting a behavioural economics approach may be the
most appropriate way in which new and important insights into the disaster
and behavioural will be garnered. The improved structural design, and up to
date econometrical and experimental modelling tools could provide researchers
in all behavioural and decision fields with better, more realistic results that
more accurately reflect what is anecdotally observed in the real world.
The strengths and weaknesses of each of the experimental types are to some
degree complementary and should not be pursued independently but as a way
of verifying the findings of the others. The noise and lack of control generated in
natural experiments are compensated by its realism and randomisation, but it
remains virtually impossible to isolate single factors for causal impact. However,
for the study of any extreme or high stress situations laboratory experiments
completely lack the realism and the ability to generate the required factors (be-
lievable stress or life threatening danger) is outweighed by its ability to control
just about every other variable and isolate the factor of interest. Field experi-
ments fall in between these extreme situations but become the master of none as
a consequence; the field experiment is able to engage in a more natural environ-
ment with more rigorous control but does so in a less real way than natural with
less control than laboratory experiments. However, when it comes to testing be-
haviour in extreme environments or disasters, field experiments would be just
as unethical and impossible to run as those in the laboratory. This means that
the majority of research in this area should be focused on naturally occurring
experiments, using as much rigour as possible but including a multi-discipline
focus.
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2.4 Corporation, Collaboration and Conclusion:
The Future
There needs to be more conciliation between the social sciences if there is to
be major steps forward in the field of behavioural research, and much more e↵ort
is needed to bridge the divide between social and behavioural disciplines. To
slightly paraphrase the discussion in the book by Herbert Gintis (2009, pp. xiv-
xv) The Bounds of Reason “. . . theorists [in any discipline] act like the proverbial
man with a hammer for whom all problems look like nails, while [any one] theory
is a wonderful hammer, it is still only a hammer and not the only occupant in
the social scientist’s toolbox. Humans have a social epistemology, which means
we have reasoning processes that give us knowledge and understanding and
the ability to share it, it is this that characterises our species. The bounds
of reason are thus not the irrational but the social. The self-conceptions and
dividing lines among the behavioural disciplines make no sense, how can there
be three separate fields studying social behaviour and organisation, when their
basic conceptual frameworks have almost nothing in common?”
There are many methodological approaches used in many fields that could
find better predictions or be directly comparable to one another across the multi-
disciplinary divides if a consistent methodology were adopted. This is also true
for the field of economics, which needs to expand its vision and include new fac-
tors and concepts into its understanding of the world. This process has begun
in behavioural economics, which has moved beyond the restrictive homo eco-
nomicus model of human behaviour to adopt other regarding preference sets.
Methodological grudge matches and exclusion have for a majority of the mod-
ern era hampered inter-disciplinary collaboration and stifled the generation of
knowledge. Economists have been hesitant or even out right hostile to the the-
ory and methodology generated in some of the other social science disciplines,
usually citing their poor methodology as a reason not to accept their theory or
empirical results. Behavioural economics has begun to address this problem by
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importing outside theories and models and then testing them within their own
rigorous experiments. One such example is the possible extensions to the Ak-
erlof and Kranton (2000, 2002, 2005) identity model. One of the shortcomings
of this model (and most social theory in economics) is it does not contain any
feedback mechanisms from external sources. Clearly individuals strive to adopt
the attributes of the ideal individual from the social group that they most iden-
tify, but this is not a one-way street. This “ideal” or “stereotypical” individual
is not created in a vacuum, the ideal social identity is created and maintained
by the members of that group. So as much as the individual strives for the
ideal, that very same ideal is created in part by each and every individual who
identifies as belonging to that group. This form of social feedback loop is vir-
tually non-existent in economics, but has been the subject of much work in the
other social sciences. In this area alone economists could greatly benefit from
some multi-disciplinary interactions and research partnership with others. And
again this is also a two way street, for while there is no point in reinventing the
wheel and re-discover existing research there is also little point in maintaining
the status quo on out dated research methodology.
Disasters are an important source of study for understanding of human
behaviour. While the unfortunate and tragic loss of life is indeed sorrowful,
these events do provide an excellent source of study for the examination of the
decision-making processes of individuals under extreme pressure. We need to
heed the foresight of Samuel Prince, as it is only through repeated and faith-
ful examination of these events that allows for scientific explanation. In these
types of life and death events individuals are forced to make choices that will
a↵ect their probability of surviving. Knowing how humans behave under ex-
treme conditions allows us to gain insights about how human behaviour can
vary depending on di↵ering external conditions. Furthermore, we may observe
that by ignoring actual human behaviour and adopting more stringent safety
regulations could in fact lead to worse outcomes than less strict regulations
by crowding out intrinsically ‘right’ behaviour. The study of these events has
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demonstrated that behaviour of individuals in disaster events does not follow
the traditional mythology of mass panic; the behaviour is neither random nor in-
explicable as it can be accounted for through rigorous analysis. Recent research
has demonstrated that economic analysis can account for human behaviour in
such situations, and that traditional models of behaviour are not only wrong,
but also these models do not assist in the creation of successful disaster planning
nor maximise survival outcomes. Taken as a whole, research has without doubt
demonstrated that the supposed panic reaction of the population to be almost
exclusively a myth and a mass media invention, and that pro-social rather than
anti-social behaviours dominate (Johnson, 1988; Johnson et al., 1994; Mawson,
2005, 2007; Quarantelli, 1960, 1972, 2001; Schultz, 1966). Better disaster plans
need to be developed which take into account actual human behaviour, which
will improve the survivability of individuals and ultimately lower the economic
costs to all. To do this, society needs a better understanding of ’actual’ human
behaviour in disaster events, based upon scientific research and not on popular
myth and misconception. Only collaboration across disciplines will achieve this
better understanding and policy outcomes, without it knowledge generation will
stall and policy implementation will remain antiquated and ine cient.
Throughout my research I have attempted to reach across the divide be-
tween economics and the social and decision sciences, and include as much out-
side thought as permissible. However, while I have attempted to be inclusive in
my work I remain an outsider in these fields and do not have the expertise or
the depth of knowledge that would make these works truly inclusive. While I
recognise the need for multi-disciplinary collaboration, I have been remiss within
my own work as needs be for a thesis in economics. While collaboration with
members of the other social sciences would make these works more in-depth and
user friendly, doing so would likely exclude the publication of these works from
economic journals. I hope that in future I am able to rectify this shortcom-
ing and produce more inclusive, multidisciplinary works through collaborative
e↵orts. Economists have long been driven by the need to justify all research
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and investigation through the narrow focus of markets and limited themselves
to the mathematical tractability. This led to the exclusion of interesting ques-
tions and problems because they were not market based or unsolvable using a
standard economic approach. The knock on e↵ect of this attitude has been that
economists have often been afraid of straying o↵ the standard methodological
path and ground-breaking methodological approaches such as analytical nar-
ratives have been ignored in favour of restrictive standard approaches. These
standard approaches have also limited the research in areas that have been “dif-
ficult” to quantify, such as emotions, cultural memes or the strength of morals
and norms in the decision making process. These topics have long been in-
vestigated by the other streams of the social sciences, but have only recently
appeared on the economics radar. I believe that in future more of the intangible
elements involved in the decision making process will begin to emerge and start
filling in the gaps in our models. If this is done correctly it may also bring much
of the social sciences closer together.
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Chapter 3
To Those That Came
Before . . .
Summary of Titanic and Lusitania Papers1.
3.1 Introduction
It makes a certain sense to begin the research portion of this thesis with a
look at what preceded it, which was the study of the Titanic and Lusitania.
These studies resulted in several publications, which investigated various aspects
of behaviour and decision in these disaster environments. These publications
included: Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization; Rationality and
Society ; Journal of Economic Perspectives and The Proceedings of the National
Academy of Science, as such the following Chapter is only a cursory overview.
The selected works that follow this summary extend upon this platform and drill
1This summary includes sections from: David A. Savage (2009) Economics of Maritime
Disasters: Essays on the Titanic and Lusitania Master’s Thesis; Frey, B. S., Savage, D. A.
& Torgler , B. (2011) Behaviour under Extreme Conditions: The Titanic Disaster. Journal
of Economic Perspectives, 25(1):209-222; Frey, B. S., Savage, D. A., & Torgler, B.
(2011). Who perished on the Titanic? The importance of social norms. Rationality and
Society, 23(1), 35-49.; Frey, B. S., Savage, D. A., & Torgler, B. (2010). Interaction of
natural survival instincts and internalized social norms exploring the Titanic and Lusitania
disasters. Proceedings of the National Academy of Science (PNAS), 107(11), 48-62.
The articles (Frey et al., 2010a,b, 2011b) have been at the centre of an academic controversy,
see the note in JoEP and the editorial statement for one aspect of the discussion (Autor,
David H. (2011). Correspondence. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 25(3), 239-240).
Some comments argue that these articles should be seen as one publication, while the author
may disagree with this view, he would like to allow the reader to decide for him/herself. The
articles are used/cited here for the purpose of an overview and a motivation for the following
chapters.
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deeper into the decision making process in extreme environments and under life
and death conditions.
3.2 The Titanic
My investigations into decisions made in extreme environments of life and death
circumstances began with an analysis of the Titanic. While the study of disaster
events is not unknown to economists, the focus of such works was on the costs
associated with the event over the short, medium and long run time frames.
Thus to study the Titanic for its natural experimental qualities has reopened
this line of research for economists. This work demonstrated that such natu-
rally occurring disasters could be utilised for behavioural analysis of the human
decision making process in environments and under conditions that could not
possibly be replicated in a laboratory. By extension, this inability to study
such behaviour in the lab has resulted in there being very few studies and even
less evidence available that has explored decision making, interdependent pref-
erences, or pro-social attitudes matter in such circumstances. This first study,
entitled “Noblesse Oblige? Determinants of Survival in a Life and Death Situ-
ation” (Frey et al., 2010b), explored the determinants of survival in a life and
death situation created by an external and unpredictable shock, the shock was
of course supplied by the impact with an iceberg.
A common assumption is that in such situations, self-interested reactions
will predominate and social cohesion is expected to disappear. For example,
in an article called “The Human Being in Disasters: A Research Perspective,”
Fritz and Williams (1957, p. 42) write: “(Human beings) . . . panic, trampling
each other and losing all concern for their fellow human beings. After panic
has subsided, so the common perception would indicate, all individuals turn
to looting and exploitation, while the community is rent with conflict . . . ” As
discussed in Chapter 2, this is reflected in the works of researchers like Gray
(1988) and Mawson (2007), while movies, television and radio programs, novels,
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and journalistic reports of disasters often tend to reinforce this grim scenario.
However, empirical evidence on the extent to which people in the throes of a
disaster react with self-regarding or with other-regarding behaviour is scanty.
The sinking of the Titanic posed a life-or-death situation for its passengers, such
that failure to secure a lifeboat seat virtually guaranteed death. This issue was
brought into sharp focus because of the shortage of lifeboat seats, as a result
only a maximum of 52% of all those on board would have been able to secure a
seat2.
This study allowed us to explore not only the behavioural consequences of an
extreme event, but also provides evidence how people react in a situation where
there is an excess of demand due to the shortage of lifeboats. Additionally,
the nature of the event means we were able to rule out future reciprocity as
a motivating factor, making this a “one shot” game. The analysis allowed
us to see which determinants were responsible for increasing an individual’s
probability of survival, such as age, nationality, class, travelling group size and
status (passenger or crew). The results of this study indicate that over the 2 hour
40 minutes it took for the Titanic to sink, that social norms are strongly evident
(such as “women and children first”). There was also a strong class e↵ect, such
that passengers in 1st and 2nd class seem to have received preferential treatment
over those in steerage or 3rd class.
To sum up, this paper investigated the decision process under these extreme
conditions and to see if the survival outcomes correspond with the literature
on interdependent preferences and social norms. Helping behaviour is common
and altruism or social and moral norms seem to play a central role in such a
risky and extreme situation (Frey et al., 2010b). These social norms would only
2The scarcity of lifeboats was caused by the regulations of the period, where the number
of lifeboats was derived from the tonnage of the vessel not the capacity, and Titanic met
or exceeded all regulations of the time. It is oft believed that the shortage was due to the
idea of the “unsinkable ship,” given that it was unsinkable there was no need for additional
lifeboats. However, the term unsinkable did no appear until after the event in media articles
– the Titanic was billed as the most modern vessel afloat, with all the modern designs and
technologies such as double hulls and water tight chambers (it even had the new Marconi
radio system installed). Thus the shortage was little more that poor a regulatory oversight
where the rules did not reflect the reality of the booming maritime industry.
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be possible if agree to conform to the expected behaviour. If the much larger
male population decided not to follow the social norms it would have been very
di cult, if not impossible to stop them. Under this situation of scarcity the
behaviour of individuals were guided by the broader norms of the greater benefit
to society not that of self-interest. This event demonstrates that if the social
norm is strong enough and there is su cient time for them to develop, they are
able to control “public good” problems by limiting the anti-social self-interested
behaviours.
Beyond the direct results, it was evident that this kind of study is a very
useful tool to test the finding of laboratory and field experiments (see e.g.,
Levitt and List, 2009; List and Cherry, 2008). Where the finding has been
able to demonstrate that many occurrences of helping and pro-social behaviour.
However, all these studies are carried out under “normal” conditions and were
not clear if they would translate to an extreme life and death event. We be-
gin with some simple assumptions about human behaviour in disasters, such
as an interest in self-survival, which can be viewed as a survival of the fittest
content. Under this premise we should observe those with the greater means to
have greater survival rates (physicality and wealth), resulting in greater survival
rates for those with greater physical strength and greater wealth. Specifically,
we should observe that prime age, males and those with access to greater wealth
(proxied by class) should have increased survival. Women passengers had, com-
pared to men, with age and travelling class held constant, a 53% higher chance
of survival; it was even 64% higher for female crew members. Additionally, we
see that persons in prime age (16 to 50) had a 16% higher chance to survive
than older persons, which is consistent with the thesis that physical strength
was important in getting to the lifeboats. We also examined if social status and
class could have a significant e↵ect on survival rates. It would appear logical
that first-class passengers would be more able to secure a place on a lifeboat
than people of lesser economic means. First class passengers were used to giving
orders to the crew, and they were better able to bargain even o↵ering financial
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rewards. They were also in closer contact with the upper echelon crew members,
resulting in a possible higher rate of survival. The results show that passengers
travelling first class had more than a 40% higher chance, and those in second
class about a 16% higher chance, of survival than those in third class. Addi-
tionally, we observe that travelling in the company of friends and family did not
increase one’s chances of survival. This may have been a result of an advantage
of self-focus that came from travelling alone and that larger groups take time
to organise and mobilise.
Interestingly, the results also showed that being a crew member on the Ti-
tanic did have some benefit. The initial maritime belief is that the Captain
and the crew go down with the ship as the crew has a duty to help save pas-
sengers and only after all passengers are safe are they supposed to abandon a
sinking ship. However, in a life and death environment one would expect that
self-interest may dominate orders. This attitude is somewhat supported in the
results showing that the crew were about a 24% more likely to survive than
those in 3rd class. This result may have been a function of members of the crew
“manning” the lifeboats. Another interesting result in determining the survival
probabilities came from the nationality of the passengers themselves. While the
Titanic was built in Great Britain, operated by British subjects, and manned
by a British crew, it was actually owned by an American company, the Ocean
Steam Navigation Company. One might expect some national favouritism to-
wards British subjects. Controlling for other influences, British passengers had
about a 9% lower chance of surviving than did passengers of other nationalities
aboard.
The final and most interesting proponent of survival is that of social norms,
the common perception of maritime disaster norms is that of “women and chil-
dren, first.” However, this norm has never been institutionalised into maritime
law. He results demonstrate that women who were in the company of children
had a 65% higher survival chance than men, while females without children
had a 51% higher survival chance. If we just focused on female passengers
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we find that women with children had a 19% higher chance of surviving than
women without children. This evidence throws some strong support behind the
existence of and adherence to this social norm. This is not to infer that male
individuals were sheep or suicidal lemmings, resigned to their fate and no longer
willing to try. While social norms were followed, males did extract advantage
where possible, such that those in a position of power or authority used it to
survive (crew and 1st class).
3.3 The Titanic vs. Lusitania
The Titanic analysis was a determinant study of a single event and does come
with some limitations. There are strong advantages that can be gained from
replication and additional studies. One advantage that can be gained from
additional studies is in the form of comparative analysis, which and provide
deeper insights into motivations and what drives the results. Given the nature
of maritime disasters they are varied and often very dissimilar from each other,
either across time, environmental conditions or lack any form of scarcity issue.
The Lusitania was a most serendipitous event, it was sunk only 3 years after
the Titanic, giving a very narrow time window for which social norms to have
evolved. For intent of this study I assumed that the social and behavioural were
stable over this time frame. Additionally, many key variables are remarkably
similar for both vessels:
Table 3.1: Passenger Structure on the Lusitania and the Titanic
Lusitania Titanic
Mean Fraction survived Mean Fraction survived
Survived 0.326 - 0.32 -
Females 0.261 0.28 0.22 0.72
Males 0.739 0.343 0.78 0.206
Age (years) 31.57 - 30.04 -
First-class 0.149 0.193 0.147 0.617
Second-class 0.307 0.295 0.129 0.404
Third-class 0.189 0.325 0.321 0.253
* Table taken from Frey, Savage and Torgler (2011).
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While the time period and passenger make up was very similar, the single
biggest variation in these events was the event horizon, the Titanic sank in just
over 2 hours and 40 minutes, whereas the Lusitania sank in under 18 minutes.
If we assume that the other variables are constant (or as close as practically
possible within a natural occurring environment) the Lusitania can be used
as a time treatment for the natural experiment, which is the Titanic. While
the overall survival percentages show a very similar rate (approx. 32%), the
interesting result is the makeup of the groups survived on the Titanic vs. the
Lusitania. What we observe is a very di↵erent set of individuals who survive, the
results are almost the reverse of the social norm story observed on the Titanic.
On the Lusitania we observe that individuals in the prime age range (16-50)
had a statistically significantly higher survival rate than older people. Prime-
age males had a 17% higher survival probability than other persons aboard.
Women in their prime age had a 20% higher chance of survival, but not women
in general. This is very di↵erent to the situation on the Titanic, where we
observe that in reference to the prime age range those younger (< 16) and
older (50+) had a statistically greater chance of survival. This very di↵erent
behaviour was also visible within class survival rates. On the Titanic those in
the higher classes had a significantly better chance of survival than those in 3rd
class. However, on the Lusitania we observe no such e↵ect, such that that 1st
and 2nd class passengers did not have a significantly higher chance of survival
than 3rd class, such that first class passengers fared even worse than those in
third class. The comparison between the Titanic and Lusitania suggests that
time is a key and important factor in the survival analysis. Social norms were
strongly influential on survival in the Titanic but not in the Lusitania, this
indicates that time is needed for the deployment and adherence of social norms.
In the short run self-interested survival mechanisms, such as “fight and flight”,
appear to be more prominent resulting in the survival of those most able to
react. This would include the fittest, those in the prime age range. The various
studies have utilised di↵ering focal aspects, such as: social power, biological
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instinct versus social thinking, helping behaviour as well as determinants of
survival (which together would have been too large for a single paper). This
included Interaction of natural survival instincts and internalised social norms
exploring the Titanic and Lusitania disasters. (Frey et al., 2010a); Who perished
on the Titanic? The importance of social norms. (Frey et al., 2011c) and on the
strength of these papers an invitation from JEP to write and publish“Behaviour
under Extreme Conditions: The Titanic Disaster.” (Frey et al., 2011b).
3.4 Conclusions
What was the significance and contributions to the economics literature of these
works? I believe that there are at least two significant contributions: Firstly,
the demonstration that these types of disaster events can be viewed as naturally
occurring experimental settings. Secondly, that socially normative behaviour is
more dependent on time factors than was initially understood. What do I mean
by this?
Well, the very nature of most disaster analysis is inherently flawed, investi-
gation of the events are always done post mortem, as opposed to peri mortem
and unlike laboratory experimentation, disasters do not a↵ord the researcher
the ability to formulate questions or model the event beforehand.This means
that it is not possible to directly observe the event and any analysis must work
backwards, where the researchers know the outcome and attempt to determine
the factors that are most likely to be responsible for it. In the absence of sure
knowledge on the actions and decisions taken by individuals in these extreme
circumstances we rely on proxies to reveal preferences and decisions. Addition-
ally, the favoured tool of economists to study behaviour (the lab) is inherently
ill designed to study extreme environments or life-and-death decision making
processes. The laboratory is unable to replicate the conditions needed to elicit
decisions or responses that would be made under life-threatening circumstances
and participants inside a lab are acutely aware that that are being observed.
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These two issues result in the responses not being a true reflection of beliefs or
behaviour. Furthermore, it would be unethical to subject participants to exper-
imental conditions that are (or could be) life threatening. For this reason the
use of naturally occurring events (disasters) are of great use to the behavioural
economist. The analysis from these natural quasi-field experiment are such that
individuals within the disaster do not realise they are under scrutiny and behave
in a realistic manner reflecting their real preferences.
The generation of socially normative behaviour is currently underdeveloped
with the literature; there has been much work focused on the existence or the
evolution of norms but little on the time factors associated with norms. Even
within endocrinology there is a large black hole surrounding the switching point
between the automatic response systems of the human body and the higher
order self aware decision making processes. It is well understood that human
respond to danger in the same manner as all other animals with a “flight or
fight” instinct. However, it is also known that the higher order brain function
of humans can overcome these instinctual responses. What are unknown are
the conditions under which this switch can occur and if any other factors can
influence the switching mechanism, or even if the switch is the same for all indi-
viduals. These works demonstrated for the first time that instinctual behaviour
appears to be dominant in the short (18 minutes) time frame and that at some
time after this (less than 2 hours 40 minutes) higher order social thinking is
dominant.
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Chapter 4
Nerves of Steel? Stress,
Work Performance and
Elite Athletes
David A. Savage & Benno Torgler
Applied Economics (2012), 44(19): 2423-2435
Abstract
There is a notable shortage of empirical research directed at measuring the
magnitude and direction of stress e↵ects on performance in a controlled en-
vironment. One reason for this is the inherent di culties in identifying and
isolating direct performance measures for individuals. Additionally, most tra-
ditional work environments contain a multitude of exogenous factors impacting
individual performance, but controlling for all such factors is generally unfeasi-
ble (omitted variable bias). Moreover, instead of asking individuals about their
self-reported stress levels, we observe workers behaviour in situations that can
be classified as stressful. For this reason, we have stepped outside the traditional
workplace in an attempt to gain greater controllability of these factors using the
sports environment as our experimental space. We empirically investigate the
relationship between stress and performance, in an extreme pressure situation
(football penalty kicks) in a winner take all sporting environment (FIFA World
Cup and UEFA European Cup competitions). Specifically, we examine all the
penalty shootouts between 1976 and 2008 covering in total 16 events. The
results indicate that extreme stressors can have a positive or negative impact
on individuals’ performance. On the other hand, more commonly experienced
stressors do not a↵ect professionals’ performances.
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4.1 Introduction
On July 17 1994, at the Los Angeles Rose Bowl, Brazil attempted to secure its
4th FIFA World Cup trophy, in probably one of the most memorable shootouts
in World Cup history. One of Italy’s greatest ever players and a shining light of
the tournament, Robert Baggio, took what was to be the final shot of the U.S.
World Cup. Baggio placed the ball on the spot, while Ta↵arel, the Brazilian
goalkeeper, took his position on the line in front of 94,000 spectators. The
fascinating aspect of such a “high pressure” situation is the fact that after 4 years
of preparation, several matches before this final, 120 minutes of game time, and
8 prior penalty attempts, one single shot held the match outcome in the balance.
If Baggio misses then Italy loses the greatest prize of all in football, namely the
World Cup; if he is successful Italy still can retain a glimmer of hope of being
world champions. As many readers may know Baggio shot not only missed but
it soared meters over the crossbar, which meant that Italy lost the tournament
and Brazil became the 1994 World Cup champions. Did the pressure of the
situation contribute to Baggio making such a mistake? What factors influenced
such an outcome? Was it the crowd, the pressure of losing or just simple bad
luck or in other words a random event? If it is a random result, there is no
reason to conduct an analysis of the determinants of penalty success. In this
case, an empirical analysis should also indicate that there are no major driving
forces that a↵ect the outcome. On the other hand, it is commonly reported
that a team has been able to succeed by managing to “hold its nerve together”.
Such a statement would suggest that a penalty process is not a lottery.
In this paper we will explore penalty shootout kicks taken in the knock-out
phase of the two major international events, the FIFAWorld Cup and the UEFA
Euro Cup competitions, working with a large data set that covers the period
between 1978 and 2008 (16 events). The Baggio example used above, shows
that elite sports are so highly competitive that a single poor choice can be the
margin between victory and defeat (Driskell et al., 2001). In other words, this
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is a winner-take-all situation. Football games, as opposed to many other sports,
provide the interesting characteristic of low scoring games. This often results
in penalty kicks playing decisive roles in determining the success of a team in
important international competitions like the World or Euro Cups, for example,
not only the 1994 World Cup final was decided by penalties but also, for exam-
ple, the most recent one in 2006. Anecdotal evidence based on autobiographies
suggests that the stress associated with performing these kicks in such major
international tournaments is immense (Jordet et al., 2007), but surprisingly,
many coaches do not include specific penalty drills in their training routines
as they believe the shot success to be an entirely random process (Bonizzoni,
1988). This lack of specific training reduces players’ ability to use strategies
that help to reduce the e↵ects of stress on performance.
The ‘inverted U’ theory of stress indicates that at levels of stress greater
than an individual’s threshold, or ability to e↵ectively cope, ine cient and poor
choices are being made. It is these ‘bad’ decisions, which can be very costly in
terms of work performance and individual or team success (Driskell et al., 2001;
Epstein and Katz, 1992). In many sports disciplines considerable e↵ort is be-
ing devoted to the development and implementation of methods in an attempt
to minimise or overcome such negative e↵ects. These methods include Stress
Inoculation Training (SIT) and Decision Training (DT). SIT is based upon the
disease inoculation concept: by exposing the athlete’s to a milder form of stress
it can improve the coping mechanism. Either making the athlete immune to
or reduces the e↵ect of possible future stressors (Meichenbaum, 2007). DT is
a training regime that attempts to remove the decision element from athletic
motor skill functions via repetitive training programs. DT is derived from the
“gestalt” concept where the whole is greater than the sum of its parts. Such
that training needs to include environmental and situational stressors as part
of the system (Vickers et al., 1998). Research shows that by using this ped-
agogy it takes longer to acquire initial skill sets but display higher skill levels
under stress conditions. This training concept has also been applied to areas
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outside sport, such as training of medical practitioners on procedures and med-
ical equipment. The research has shown improvements in both skill retention
and greater ability under real stress conditions whilst using the specialist equip-
ment (Thuraisingam et al., 2006). One of the problems plaguing the empirical
analysis of the stress/performance relationship arises because of the di culty
of measuring work performance well. In many occasions performance can be
seen as a fuzzy concept that is not fully comparable among workers. If two
workers get the same work performance score, the performance should really
be the same on the underlying characteristic, otherwise the e↵ectiveness of the
statistical analysis deteriorates (Allison, 1999). Another criticism is the use of
field data in a multiple regression context instead of non-random experimental
data. Multiple regressions are not fully able to estimate without noise the single
estimate for the e↵ect of stress on performance as it is impossible to measure all
the variables that might conceivably a↵ect performance. (Allison, 1999, p.20)
nicely points out “No matter how many variables we include in a regression
equation, someone can always come along and say, “Yes, but you neglected to
control for variable X and I feel certain that your results would have been dif-
ferent if you had done so”. The question now arises whether we are able to
find work environments that are close to an experimental setting. Several re-
searchers stress that sports events come close to an experimental environment.
For example, (Go↵ and Tollison, 1990, pp.6-7) state: “Sports events take place
in a controlled environment, and generate outcomes that come very close to
holding “other things equal.” In other words, athletic fields supply real-world
laboratories for testing economic theories. The data supplied in these labs have
some advantages over the data normally used in economic research (. . . ) The
economist can perform controlled experiments similar to those performed by the
physical and life scientists. Sports data a↵ord a similar opportunity. Although
the laboratory is a playing field, the data generated are very “clean.” Most
external influences are regularly controlled by the rules of the game”.
Thus, sporting events can be seen as “quasi-natural field experiments” where
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subjects are acting in the natural environment instead of an artificial laboratory
environment (natural incentives to perform). It has been shown that experi-
ments performed in an environment where the test subjects are keenly aware
that their behaviour is being monitored are prone to change their normal be-
haviour such that it is di cult to generalise the results Levitt and List (2009).
Moreover, selection e↵ects are also visible when recruiting subjects for (lab)
experiments (e.g., “scientific do-gooders” interested in research). In addition,
real field events such as penalty kicks are numerous and are driven by large
financial incentives. Football players compete in an actual high stake contest
such as the World Cup, but in a very controlled environment (Go↵ and Tollison,
1990). This realism provides researchers with a clear advantage over laboratory,
self-reporting and other forms of experiments while maintaining the randomness
of natural data (Reiley and List, 2007). The sporting events are also relatively
controlled events where all participants encounter the same environmental vari-
ables. This allows for a large number of the exogenous (external) factors to
be controlled when exploring the relationship between stress and performance.
In addition, one should note that penalty shootouts are even more controlled
than the regular game period as team interactions (individual performance is
a↵ected by teammates’ performance directly (e.g., assists etc.)) for example, is
no longer that relevant.
Thus, in this paper we are going to explore the impact of a set of di↵erent
stress factors on players’ performance. Our hypothesis is that less predictable,
anticipated and experienced stress factors have a stronger impact on perfor-
mance than routinely experienced stress determinants. In addition, athletes re-
act to incentives. A large di↵erence between individual/team expected benefits
of success and the expected costs of failure leads to behavioural consequences. A
large positive di↵erence promotes performance (positive stress) while a negative
di↵erence reduces performance (negative stress).
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4.2 Theoretical Considerations
The last few decades has seen a major expansion into the exploration of causes
and consequences of stress or the perception of stress in the work environment
(see, e.g., Holt, 1993). As well as the physical and mental health issues, an
additional consequence of stress is the breakdown in judgment and rational
decision making and the generation of mistakes. Research into the medical
profession has shown that doctors report making serious mistakes in patient
care, directly due to the e↵ect of working under high levels of stress (Reason,
1990; Rosenthal, 1995) and not because of incompetence, lack of skill or train-
ing (Firth-Cozens and Greenhalgh, 1997). Furthermore, other experiments have
shown a clear tendency for individuals working under stressful conditions to in-
correctly weight options (Wright, 1974). Early studies explored the emergency
decision making process and found that time and pressure seemed to be major
determinants of hyper-vigilance (Schultz, 1966; Janis and Mann, 1977). The
inability to scan alternative options and the incorrect weighting of payo↵s cre-
ates a problem within traditional choice models by leading to ine cient or poor
outcomes (Keinan, 1987). As stress levels increase individuals are less able to
make rational choices, leading to larger choice impairment Meichenbaum (2007).
In these situations individuals may fall back on other non-rational methods of
making decisions. Political psychology literature has shown that under stress
individuals act as “satisficers” instead of the expected “optimisers”. In the case
of policymakers it has been found that they rely on ideological or operations
principles as decision guides rather than a detailed analysis of any particular
policy issue (George, 1980). Thus, individuals under stress have been shown to
make poor or bad decisions, however explaining how little or how much stress
is required to a↵ect decision making has been in contention (Jamal, 1984).
The literature describing the relationship between stress and performance
has generated many contradictory models (Edwards et al., 2007; Sullivan and
Bhagat, 1992). Sullivan and Bhagat (1992) illustrated four of the more common
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models which included: 1) higher levels of performance require at least some
moderate level of stress; 2) a positively correlated relationship such that only
through high stress could high performance be achieved; 3) a negatively cor-
related relationship where high stress results in low performance levels; 4) and
finally that stress and performance are totally unrelated. Instead of a linear
model, psychology has worked with a curvilinear (the inverted-U) model (see
e.g., Allen et al., 1982; Meglino, 1977; Yerkes and Dodson, 1908), where low
levels of stress spur individual performance upwards but after a threshold point
additional stress becomes detrimental to performance. Within the inverted-U
model, two post threshold stages of performance degradation have been well
discussed within psychological and sports literature (see e.g., Baumeister, 1984;
Baumeister and Showers, 1986). These have been identified as the choking and
panicking stages (Beilock and Carr, 2001; Bourne and Yaroush, 2003; Lehner
et al., 1997). Choking behaviour occurs with a shift from the normal automatic
and reactive response behaviour, to the more laborious and time consuming
step-by-step thought process. Athletes begin to second-guess the automatic
response of the highly practiced and well-learned repetitive skills. The over-
thinking of actions result in slowed reaction times and degraded performance.
The panic stage response results in further degrading of reactions and perfor-
mance. An individual’s behaviour reverts to primitive maladaptive instinctive
thinking (Epstein and Katz, 1992). Here the panicked individual obsessively
focuses on singular aspects or tasks to the neglect of all else, resulting in an in-
ability to respond to any changes outside the panic focus. It was this behavioural
reaction that was, for example, perceived to be responsible for a catastrophic
and tragic event 1988, which saw the USS Vincennes mistakenly shoot down an
Iran Air passenger flight. The investigation found that the US o cer in charge
of target identification was exhibiting the panicked obsessive state triggered by
excessive levels of stress (Collyer and Malecki, 1998).
Two distinct subsets of stressors that influence the decision making process
has been identified: task-related and ambient stressors (Cannon-Bowers and
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Salas, 1998). The task related stressors include: workload and time pressures,
uncertainty and ambiguity, or auditory overload. Ambient stressors include: au-
ditory interference, performance pressure, or fatigue and sustained operations.
Workload pressures specifically relate to number of tasks an individual is able
to successfully handle simultaneously (by increasing the number of task the lev-
els of stress increases). Whereas time pressure stressors is directly related to
the amount of perceived time remaining to complete a task, as the perceived
window shortens stress levels increase. When the number of tasks exceeds the
individual’s ability to process or the time remaining to complete a task is less
than the amount of time perceived to be required, individual performances be-
gins to wane and more mistakes are made. Uncertainty and ambiguity stresses
are generated when intent or information is lacking. For example role ambi-
guity stress occurs when the individual is unsure of the role they are supposed
to fulfil or perform (this stressor type is not expected to be observed in this
setting). Finally auditory overload occurs when too much information is being
passed to an individual, through auditory means, to be coherently received and
understood. This could include things such as receiving instructions or auditory
cues in a noisy work environment with many other auditory distracters present.
In general we would expect to observe in the penalty shootout process that am-
bient stressors are more dominant than task related. Task related stressors are
more present during normal match play.
This is quite di↵erent and separate from the ‘ambient stressor’ of auditory
interference, whereby excessive noise levels interfere with normal thought pro-
cesses, such as crowd noises or military personnel operating under gunfire. Work
performance pressure has been well documented within the sports field (see e.g.,
Beilock and Carr, 2001), where a heightened sense of self-consciousness creates
high stress levels and degraded performance. Famous examples of this can
be observed in the 1996 Masters Golf Tournament, with Greg Norman’s final
round collapse. In this stressor players know a large audience is watching their
move and awaiting possible mistakes, causing players to choke and over think
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what should be natural sporting movements and actions. Although Cannon-
Bowers and Salas (1998) investigation was done with a military focus, the stress
factors are consistent with Bourne and Yaroush (2003). They performed a re-
view of stress factors for the National Aeronautics and Space Administration
(N.A.S.A.), an equally high stress non-military setting. The extended set of
stress factors included: extremes of temperature, extreme heavy or prolonged
workloads, and social pressures. As discussed in the first section, one of the
advantages of using the sporting arena as the investigation ground is the chance
to control many exogenous factors (hold them constant), which is generally
less possible in other environments. In the case of the extended stress factors
within a penalty shoot-out situation we observe that all players are subjected
to identical environmental conditions. Thus extremes of temperature and pro-
longed workloads are the same for all players which helps to isolate the influence
of other factors, namely, for example, auditory, work performance, and social
stressors.
Research has shown that auditory stressors, which are the noise e↵ect from
large crowds, are known to have an impact on both players and referees alike
(Greer, 1983; Nevill et al., 2002; Pollard, 1986; Schwartz and Barsky, 1977).
Recent studies into the e↵ects of noise on performance have found that noise
levels appear to have a significant e↵ect on both decision-making and reaction
times (Kjellberg, 1990; Kjellberg et al., 1996; Larsson, 1989). The noise e↵ect
is driven by audience volume of attendance at matches, for this reason we use
absolute crowd size as a proxy measurement for auditory stress. Additionally
we have used the absolute crowd size divided by the stadium capacity as a proxy
for the relative crowd size. This allows for control of the perceived crowd size.
The sound generated in massive stadiums with a seating capacity of 100,000
only containing a crowd of 40,000 are perceived much di↵erent to a smaller sta-
dium filled to close to capacity with the same 40,000 individuals. In addition,
the performance is not only done in front of a large crowd at the games but
also being aware of a large television audience. It has been shown that that
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audience presence promotes task disruption, which can lead to negative per-
formance externalities due to self-consciousness (Baumeister, 1984; Beilock and
Carr, 2001). This e↵ect could be exacerbated in context of World and Euro
Cups as the viewer audience can exceed 700 million in the finals. This would
also indicate that international events like the Olympics and World Cups are
some of the most stressful environments endured by elite athletes, due in part
to the large viewing audience.
Additionally, the virtue of competitive sport and the standing of the compe-
tition itself create further work related stressors that is intrinsically linked to the
very nature/design of the work. In drawn/tied matches the penalty shootout
rules are initiated, creating a sudden death win/lose scenario. Penalty shots
are comparable to a winner-take-all situation, where the outcome of any single
kick to either win or lose, places much greater stress upon players (Jordet et al.,
2007). The more comfortable situation for a kicker is the case where his team
can win the game if he is able to achieve a goal. A successful kick will lead to
large individual and team benefits. On the other hand, missing the opportunity
means that the game is open again (“nothing is lost”). In other words, the
expected costs of missing are substantially lower than the expected benefits of
success. If individuals react positively to such incentives, one would predict that
player performance would be better in this situation (positive stress e↵ect). On
the other hand, the kicker is confronted with a high-expected cost in a situation
of a relative disadvantage (when missing means losing), while the expected bene-
fits are much smaller (team has not won yet and player has not made it happen).
This can be defined as a negative stress situation. One may predict that in such
a circumstance players may be more vulnerable to mistakes and underperfor-
mance due to stress. Thus, we would predict a higher probability of not making
a goal. The positive or negative e↵ects are even large once we also consider the
goalkeeper’s incentives that work in the opposite direction. The literature on
football has disregarded such a potential positive or negative e↵ect. McGarry
and Franks (2000) report with their simulation calculating scoring percentages
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that later kicks, are more important than early kicks. Anxiety increases with
kick importance leading to fewer goals. They stressed that the goal probability
follows an inverted-U curve (least successful kicks early and late). On the other
hand, Jordet et al. (2007) suggest a negatively linear curve with higher anxiety
progressively resulting in a poorer outcome. Our predicted positive e↵ect in
case of a relative advantage would smooth out a non-linear relationship at the
right hand side of the function, e.g., making the right hand side more linear. To
investigate kick importance or in other words positive stress (expected benefits
are substantially larger than expected costs) and negative stress (expected costs
are substantially larger than expected benefits) we have included two dummy
variables, namely a single kick that can result in an overall game win or loss
(PRESSURE TO WIN and PRESSURE TO LOSE).
In addition, the relative importance of success and the level of perceived
stress vary with the game level. As the finals series unfold and teams progress
through the varying stages, e.g. round of 16, semi-finals, finals, the opportunity
costs of losing increase. The perceived costs are higher for losing in the finals
compared to the quarterfinals, given the closer proximity to the ultimate success
of winning the competition. In this way we have encoded the varying levels in
order of importance from 1 to 4, the higher the value the greater the importance
of the match. Thus the round of 16 = 1, quarterfinals = 2, semi-finals = 3 and
the final = 4, the normal round matches are not included as the penalty process
is only used in the knockout stages. Both game level and shot outcome can
be considered as work pressure stressors, as both are inherent factors of the
tournament and rules structure. Thus we have created a proxy measures for
game level.
As a robustness test we also consider social stressors. Football tradition may
induce further pressure to players in the penalty shootout. Players of nations
with a stronger football tradition bear the additional burden of expectation
pressure. Nations that have long national football traditions and especially
those national teams with outstanding national success could have a greater
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expectation of success, thus increasing the pressure upon players to perform.
However, such players may have also a better ability to succeed. Thus, to
control for such a social stressor, we control in this case also for players’ ability.
4.3 Method
4.3.1 Design and Procedure
Explored in this paper are the penalty shootout kicks taken in the knockout
phase of the FIFA World Cup and the UEFA Euro Cup competitions. The
rules pertaining to elimination games when after normal game time and a period
of extra time has expired and team scores remain tied, penalty kicks are used
to determine a winner (the Federation Internationale de Football Association,
2008). The penalty shootout process is as follows: 5 players from each team are
selected to take a penalty shot, in alternating succession each player will attempt
to score from the penalty spot opposed by only the opposition goalkeeper; the
result is a best out of 5, a team wins by being the one to score the most goals
out of the 5 shots; if at the end of the 5 shots the score is still a draw then the
penalty shootout continues one pair at a time, where a single shooter from each
team attempts to score until the tie is broken and one team wins; players are
only allowed to shoot once until every member of the team has shot at least
once. Such process places the full weight of game’s outcome upon the shoulders
of each kicker and goalkeeper in turn, determining the stresses placed upon these
players will give a clearer picture of its e↵ects on the success of penalty shots
(isolation of an individual performance in a team sport). A penalty shootout is
therefore much more controlled than performances during the main game.
The data for this analysis has been gathered through various method and
sources including: FIFA game footage, the o cial FIFA web archives and other
football databases. The data included player, game, tournament and historical
data such as player statistics (e.g., age and years of international experience
before the start of a particular tournament), game statistics (scores, outcomes,
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crowd sizes), tournament statistics (competition, game stage, etc.) and histori-
cal statistics (e.g., FIFA association, world rank). We have calculated players’
years of international experience, as the number of years since their first inter-
national debut. We identify all the kickers’ and goalkeepers from the penalty
shootout process in World and Euro Cup tournaments cover a large time period
of over 30 years (1976-2008), resulting in 326 individual observations. This pe-
riod covers 9 Euro cups but only 7 World Cups, due to the early adoption of the
penalty shootout process in the UEFA tournaments. This results in about 43%
of the observations being taken from the UEFA tournament and the remaining
57% coming from the FIFA World Cups. A complete list of the descriptive
statistics can be seen in Table 4.1. The average age of players varies depending
on the role; we observe a clear age di↵erence (-3.3 years) with goalkeepers on
average 3 years older than the kickers (30 years and 27 years respectively). In
line with this age di↵erence we observe that goalkeepers have more international
experience (6.2 years) than the opposing kickers (4.96 years).
There are very little di↵erences in world rank position (-0.126) where the
average world rank of the national teams for kickers is (40.02) and goalkeepers
is (40.15). However, we do observe a large di↵erence in the club ranking (-31.37)
between kickers (77.6) and goalkeepers (109.06), indicating that kickers play for
clubs of much higher rank (lower number is higher rank). Moreover, we observe
very little di↵erences in regards to FIFA membership (-0.683 years). Finally, we
observe that 28% of all penalty shot are pressure shots, to either win (12.9%)
or lose (15.1%).
The world ranking for national teams in this respect has not utilised the
current FIFA Coca-Cola world ranking system, as this system was not in place
until 1993. Therefore we have utilised the points system already in place for
World Cups, in the variable NATIONAL WORLD RANK. Points are allocated
such: 3 points for wins, 1 point for draws and nothing for losing, however prior
to 1994 wins were allocated 2 points and a draw 1 point. We have accumulated
this point’s allocation over all the World Cups. Thus, teams with higher point
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accumulation at that period of time were ranked higher. Points immediately
prior to commencement of each tournament determined the ranking of each
team. This ranking system was implemented for every team over the duration
of the analysis period, such that a continually evolving world ranking system
has been used. This system allows us to demonstrate the e↵ect of prior success
in World Cups, as all matches won or drawn have an accumulation e↵ect on the
ranking. In this way our NATIONAL WORLD RANK variable, is also a proxy
for the social pressure due to expectations. We have also included players’ club
world ranking at the time of the penalty process, utilising the IFFHS world club
ranking tables such that the lower the value the higher the club ranking position
(the International Federation of Football History & Statistics, 2009). As well as
ranking statistics, we have included the variable for duration of national FIFA
membership (years). This variable is a proxy that measures the level of football
tradition within a country (Torgler, 2006, 2008).
Our data variables include not only the absolute values of variables like
age, experience, world rank and FIFA membership but we also investigate the
di↵erence of these variables (e.g., DIFF.EXP.: kicker’s experience – goalkeepers’
experience).
4.3.2 Statistical Analysis
We use a multivariate regression analysis or specifically a probit model due to the
non-linear and binary nature of the dependant variable. The dependant variable
in this analysis is a dummy variable used to indicate either success or failure
of a particular penalty shot (failure/miss = 0; success/goal = 1). Failure of a
penalty shot encompasses all eventualities where the kicker was not successful
in scoring a goal. This includes the goalkeeper saving/stopping the shot, the
shot hitting the uprights or crossbar and deflecting outwards, or the kickers shot
being o↵ target and missing the goals entirely. In other words, our dependent
outcome variable has two values, goal or miss. We therefore use a probit model
instead of a linear regression mode. As a linear regression model is unbounded,
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Table 4.1: Descriptive Statistics (Team, Club and Individual level)
Variable Observations Mean Min. Max.
KICKER
Age 325 26.917 16 35
Int.Exp. 325 4.960 0 16
Club Rank 325 77.637 1 250
Nation Rank 325 40.028 1 130
FIFA Member 325 88.797 15 143
World Cup Wins 325 0.7938 0 4
GOALKEEPER
Age 325 30.218 21 41
Int. Exp. 325 6.200 0 20
Club Rank 325 109.006 1 250
Nation Rank 325 40.154 1 130
FIFA Member 325 89.480 15 143
World Cup Wins 325 0.8031 0 4
Log Crowd Size 325 10.835 9.796 11.453
Crowd/Capacity 325 0.945 0.333 1.538
Shot to Win 325 0.129 0 1
Shot to Lose 325 0.151 0 1
DIFFERENTIALS
Age 325 -3.302 -18 12
Int. Exp. 325 -1.240 -18 13
Club Rank 325 -31.370 -249 247
World Rank 325 -0.126 -83 83
FIFA Member 325 -0.683 -97 97
World Cup Wins 325 -0.009 -4 4
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the model can produce negative predictions and predictions exceeding unity and
therefore unrealistic probabilities. It is also not possible to arbitrarily constrain
the point predictions outside the unit interval to either 0 or 1 as the error term
would not satisfy the assumption of homoscedasticity (Baum, 2006). A probit
model allows us to solve these problems implementing a non-linear function
that takes on values strictly between zero and one. Alternatively, one could
also estimate a logit model as variations of these nonlinear functions have been
suggested, but we prefer to use a model where such a function is the standard
normal cumulative distribution function.
As the estimated probit coe cients are based on a non-linear estimation
technique, we cannot interpret the coe cients readily in terms of the quantita-
tive sizes of the e↵ects. We therefore calculate the marginal e↵ects to find the
quantitative e↵ect of an independent variable. The marginal e↵ect indicates the
penalty success rate or the probability of success when the independent vari-
able increases by one unit. We compute the marginal e↵ects at the multivariate
point of means exploring therefore a marginal change of the variable x from the
average x.
To isolate the e↵ect of stress and performance, we control for individual
factors (age, experience, position, ability), team factors (team strength and tra-
dition) and tournament (dummy variables for all the events, but also in some
regressions a dummy variable between EURO and World Cup to see tourna-
ment di↵erences). Age and acclimation training have been found to be valid
mechanisms for displacing stress a↵ects (Johnston et al., 1998). Acclimation
can be achieved through experience, as individuals become more familiar with
the working environment and skills are less impacted by stressors and make
better decisions (Cannon-Bowers and Salas, 1998; Wright, 1974). However, as
we are not privy to the training regimes of teams we are unable to construct
any direct proxies in relation to any stress reduction activity like SIT or DT
directly. However, we checked the robustness of our results using team dummy
variables to take into account unobserved team e↵ects or we control for example,
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for the quality of the team through their current international ranking position
in further regressions. These team dummy variables have included every team
for the two competitions, e.g., a dummy was created for Brazil for each of the
matches in whom they participated in the dataset, in this manner we control
for team e↵ects.
4.4 Results
Table 4.2 presents the results. As can be seen, we add the stress factors sequen-
tially in the specification starting in equation (1) with the dummy variables
PRESSURE SHOT TO WIN and PRESSURE SHOT TO LOSE, and exploring
in the next also the absolute (LOG CROWD SIZE) and the relative crowd size
(CROWD SIZE/STADIUM CAPACITY) and then also the game level situation
within the tournament. In all estimations we also use time dummies to con-
trol for unobserved time e↵ects. To take into account a player’s characteristic
we control in a first step for the kicker and goalies’ age. The results indicate
that the two variables PRESSURE SHOT TO WIN and PRESSURE SHOT
TO LOSE have strong impact on the success of a penalty shot. Being in sit-
uation of a relative advantage having the chance of winning the game with a
successful penalty increases the probability of a goal by around 17%. On the
other hand, being in relative disadvantaged situation (pressure to lose) leads
to a decrease of success by around 45%. Thus, this is a quite significant e↵ect
and it is interesting to observe that the marginal e↵ects are stronger in case
of a relative disadvantage compared to relative advantage. Negative stress has
therefore a stronger impact on performance than positive stress. Looking at all
the other proxies for stress (relative and absolute crowd size, game level) we
observe that these factors have no statistically significant impact on the proba-
bility of a penalty performance. Based on our hypothesis, this is not a surprise.
Such international professional players are used to play in front of a large ab-
solute and relative audience. In addition, we observe a selection e↵ect. The
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process to become an elite athlete would include demonstration of individual
ability to handle such a stress and those unsuccessful individuals would have
left the sport prior to reaching this level. On the other hand, players might be
less used to semi-finals or final in such big international tournaments, which sug-
gest that the stress level increases and that such an increase is correlated with
a performance. However, they may experience similar important international
games at the club level (e.g., Champions League). Many of the best interna-
tional players work for Spanish, Italian, English or German clubs. Maguire and
Pearton (2000) reported that European clubs employed 62% of the players par-
ticipating in the 1998 World Cup in France. Moreover, players can adapt to
the situation insofar as they know in advance when they are going to play the
game. In other words, they can prepare themselves mentally and physically for
that event. This is di↵erent for penalty shootouts. The trainer may have some
favourites, but the process throughout the game also a↵ects trainer’s choice and
player’s willingness to shoot the penalty (e.g., fatigue, still part of the team,
injuries, bad day etc.). Studying the videos during the break before the penalty
shootout clearly indicates that the trainers are preparing or finalising the list of
penalty kickers and the strategy to conduct at that time. In addition, in many
of the cases a player does not know in advance whether he will be in a situation
of “pressure to win” or “pressure to lose”. Such a higher level of uncertainty
reduces individuals’ mental and physical preparation for such an event. In ad-
dition, we have stressed in the introduction that athletes react to incentives.
This is confirmed with our analysis. A large di↵erence between individual/team
expected benefits of success and the expected costs of failure seemed to a↵ect
players’ stress levels and therefore their performance. A large positive di↵erence
promotes performance (positive stress) while a negative di↵erence reduces per-
formance (negative stress). We also observe that age is a significant factor on
performance stress of kickers, such that as the age of the kicker increases so does
the probability of being unsuccessful thus increasing the stress levels, however
the age e↵ect does not appear to be statistically significant for goalkeepers.
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Table 4.2: Stress Determinants on Shot Success
Probit (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Shot to Win 0.817** 0.814** 0.794** 0.800** 0.796**
2.410 2.400 2.360 2.370 2.320
0.174 0.174 0.170 0.171 0.168
Shot to Lose -1.260*** -1.260*** -1.284*** -1.276*** -1.310***
-5.730 -5.740 -5.810 -5.770 -5.840
-0.441 -0.442 -0.450 -0.447 -0.456
Log Crowd Size 0.186 0.256 0.059 -0.034
0.530 0.720 0.140 -0.080
0.053 0.073 0.017 -0.010
Crowd/Capacity -2.620 -1.890 -1.578
-1.460 -0.930 -0.770
-0.742 -0.535 -0.442
Game Level 0.121 0.201
0.770 1.230
0.034 0.056
Kickers Age -0.041*
-1.740
-0.011
Goalies Age 0.039
1.540
0.011
Time FX Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 325 325 325 325 325
Prob.> chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Pseudo R2 0.1774 0.1782 0.1841 0.1857 0.2003
Notes: z- values in italics, marginal e↵ects in bold. The symbols *, **, *** represent statistical
significance at the 10% (p <0.10), 5% (p <0.05) and 1% (p <0.01) levels, respectively.
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We conduct several robustness tests. A summary of the results are reported
in Table 4.3. For simplicity, we only report the results of our key independent
variables, namely our stress factors. The results obtained with these additional
variables are discussed in the main text. The continuous age variable has been
re-coded in line with Jordet et al. (2007) into categories (22 and below: young;
between 23 and 28: medium; 28 and older (older)). The results show that even
after splitting the age variable for both kickers and goalkeepers into these three
categories we observe little variation within the stress factors (see specification
6). However, we do observe that middle age kickers are significantly less likely
to be successful (-13.7%) than their younger counterparts (statistically signif-
icant at a 10% level). Furthermore, we do not observe any significant change
for goalkeepers across the three age groupings. We also control for kickers’ and
goalkeepers’ experience using the number of years playing at the international
level as a proxy for experience (specification 7). Moreover, instead of adding the
single goalkeeper and kicker factors we also build the di↵erences in experiences.
The results show that the single factor of experience does not have a signifi-
cant e↵ect on the outcome of the penalty process). However, the di↵erence in
experience is statistically significant at 10% level, having noticeable e↵ect on
the outcome. A marginal decrease in a kicker’s relative experience advantage
by one year (from the average) reduces probability of success by around 1%.
One should note that these two specifications indicate that the quantitative ef-
fects for PRESSURE SHOT TO WIN and PRESSURE SHOT TO LOSE don’t
change substantially. The coe cients remain statistically significant. On the
other hand, the other stressor factors are still not statistically significant.
Next, one can stress that goal-scoring skills are derived from positional roles
(Jordet et al., 2007). Players with the primary task of scoring goals may per-
form di↵erently than other players in the penalty kick. We therefore control
in specification 8 for players’ position within the game with dummy variables
(forward, midfield, and defender). The results indicate that the position of a
player has ceteris paribus no influence on the penalty success. In the same
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specification we also control for the dominant foot of players (dummy, right=1).
Research into the kick selection process of players has shown that foot domi-
nance is reflected in positional bias of the kick. A right-footed kicker is much
more successful shooting to their natural side (which is to the right from the per-
spective of the goalkeeper), resulting in better rates of success (Chiappori et al.,
2002). However, this does not ensure kick direction as if the placement becomes
predictable the goalkeeper will have a much better probability of successfully
stopping/catching the ball (Leela and Comissiong, 2009). Our results show that
there are no di↵erences in success between right- and left-footed kickers.
Furthermore, we extend the previous estimations controlling in a better man-
ner for players’ ability. One can argue that experience, measured as the years
of international experience, may already help to control for players’ ability and
skills. This allows to better isolate the impact of stress on performance otherwise
one can criticise that observed performance di↵erences are driven by ability or
skills. Thus, to further control for ability or skills we also control in which club
the player is active (club world ranking). The club ranking should be strongly
correlated with players’ skills and abilities. Also here we run estimations with
the absolute values and the di↵erences between the players. As shown in spec-
ification (9) we observe little change in our main stress factors. Interestingly,
both ability/skill proxies (and the di↵erences between kicker and goalkeeper)
have no statistically significant e↵ect on players’ shot success. That might be a
reason why many trainers believe as discussed previously that penalty shots are
a random process that does not require substantial training and preparation.
Additionally the di↵erence between club ranks of kicker and goalkeeper is not
significant. These results may also be caused in part by the fact that a vast
majority of the players are playing in elite European competitions (low quality
di↵erence). Table 4.3 indicates that the results in regards to our stress factors
remain robust.
To measure also team quality in further estimations, we explore a variety
of di↵erent cases: a World Cup ranking based on past performances in World
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Cups (NATIONAL WORLD RANK, see previous discussion), the number of
World Cup wins in the past before the competition started, and the duration
of FIFA association. In line with previous estimations we explore first single
averages and then di↵erences. Besides competence, these variables may also
relate to social stress. Players are national representatives and as such bear
the additional burden of expectation pressure, driven by national pride and
tradition. Nations that have long national football traditions and especially
those national teams with outstanding national success could have a greater
expectation of success, thus increasing the pressure upon players to perform
(Torgler, 2004). However, as a player from such a team may also be better, it
is useful to control for players’ ability in such regressions. As can be seen we
control in these specifications for international experience and club a liation
(club ranking).
The results indicate that even when controlling for team quality the quanti-
tative e↵ect of our main stress factors don’t change substantially. On the other
hand, the proxies we have used to measure social stress (expectation and tra-
dition) are mostly not statistically significant. Such a result is consistent with
our hypothesis and can also be explained using the Stress Inoculation Training
(SIT) process. The high expectations are not instantaneous in nature, but build
over periods of time. Players were raised within such a football culture where
expectations are high and are in a sense used to it (socialisation process).
We also run estimations with team dummy variables to take into account
for unobserved team heterogeneity of team e↵ects (see specifications 10 to 12).
This may cover issues such as training intensity or training programs, trainer’s
strength, social cohesion, talent pool etc. It is also a proxy for historical strength
or football culture.
In sum, previously obtained findings are robust, even after subjecting the
stress factors to numerous robustness tests controlling for aspects such as indi-
vidual factors (position, skill and ability) or team factors (e.g., team strength,
football tradition). The marginal e↵ects for our two key variables (PRESSURE
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SHOT TO WIN and PRESSURE SHOT TO LOSE) hardly change and co-
e cients remain in all cases statistically significant. On the other hand, the
other stressors are consistently not statistically significant. Thus, the previ-
ous results obtained in Table 4.3 remain robust confirming our hypothesis that
less predictable, anticipated and experienced stressors have a stronger impact
on performance than routinely experienced or predictable stress determinants.
Moreover, players react to positive and negative stressors, while the e↵ect for a
negative stressor on performance is substantially larger.
4.5 Conclusions
This study builds upon prior research investigating the relationships between
work stressors and performance, through the examination of a high-pressure sit-
uation in the working environment of elite athletes. It explore penalty shootout
kicks taken in the knock-out phase of the two major international events, the
FIFA World Cup and the UEFA Euro Cup competitions, working with a large
data set that covers the period between 1978 and 2008 (16 events). Penalty
shootouts are so highly competitive that a single poor choice can be the mar-
gin between victory and defeat (winner-take-all situation). We explore di↵erent
stress factors and find that predicable, anticipated and experienced stress factors
(routinely experienced stress determinants) have no impact on performance. On
the other hand, less predictable anticipated stressors (individual final shot stres-
sors) appear to be very important in understanding performance success. In ad-
dition, athletes react to incentives. A large di↵erence between individual/team
expected benefits of success and the expected costs of failure leads to behavioural
consequences. A large positive di↵erence promotes performance (positive stress)
while a negative di↵erence reduces performance (negative stress). Being in sit-
uation of a relative advantage having the chance of winning the game with a
successful penalty increases the probability of a goal by around 17%. On the
other hand, being in relative disadvantaged situation (pressure to lose) leads
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to a decrease of success by around 45%. Thus, this is a quite significant e↵ect
and it is interesting to observe that the marginal e↵ects are stronger in case
of a relative disadvantage compared to relative advantage. Negative stress has
therefore a stronger impact on performance than positive stress. Thus, the e↵ect
of high stress on the performance of elite athletes is empirically observable in
this sporting environment. Here a poor decision can result in the elimination of
a national team from an international sporting event in the real world the result
could be much worse. A poor decision made by emergency workers, doctors,
military leaders or the CEO of multinational corporations could result in the
loss of lives, jobs or billions of dollars. The present study has limitations that
need to be acknowledged and suggest possible avenues of future research in this
area. A central concern to the future study of stress and performance is that of
measurement, successful testing of stress impacts on individuals requires good
and comparable measures of individual performance. The use of the sporting
environment to examine the stress/performance relationship has both limita-
tions and advantages. In the introduction we have discussed in the detail the
advantages. The sports environment provides the ability to observe behavioural
consequences in a control environment that allows isolation the potential im-
pact of stress on performance in a better manner. One limitation of adopting
a non-standard work environment is that translating the results back into the
traditional work environment may be di cult. In other words one should be
careful in generalising from the results of research working with sports data to
the population as a whole. For example, players’ average salary is far above the
median earnings of full-time, full-year equivalent workers. However, it has been
shown that sports athletes are motivated by similar forces that a↵ect workers in
general and sports labour markets can been seen as a laboratory for observing
whether some theoretical propositions have a chance of being correct (Kahn,
2000). Given the importance of stress in the workplace we hope that the use of
the sports environment opens future studies to a wider scope of possible research
questions.
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Chapter 5
THE TIMES THEY ARE
A CHANGIN’: The e↵ect
of institutional changes on
cooperative behaviour over
last sixty years at 26,000ft
David A. Savage & Benno Torgler
Under review in: Journal of Economic History
Abstract
This paper attempts to determine if the introduction of a competing social
institution has had a significant e↵ect and shifted the pro-social behaviour in
the extreme (life-and-death) environment of mountaineering in the Himalayan
Mountains over the last sixty years. We apply an analytic narratives approach to
empirically investigate the link between death, success and the introduced social
institution (commercialisation). We use the extensive Hawley and Salisbury
Himalayan Database of expeditions to determine if the introduction of this social
institution is responsible for the decline in pro-social and altruistic behaviours.
The results show that the change helping behaviour is strongly correlated with
the on mass introduction of commercialisation. The results show a weakening
of the pro-social behaviour in the more “traditional climbers” in the modern
period, created by a crowding out e↵ect, which may have lead to the break down
in pro-social behaviour and the rise of anti-social behaviour. Additionally, the
results indicate that the pro-social behaviour of the non-commercial groups, in
recent times, may in fact be driven by the Sherpa and not by climbers.
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5.1 Introduction
“It’s not about failure or success, it’s not about living or dying, understand
that you have come to Everest to conquer yourself.”1
Mountain climbing has never been considered a “safe” sport, as it is a test
of self against the best nature has to o↵er, to challenge and conquer not the
mountain but oneself. George Loewenstein (1999) thought it was from this
internalised struggle that climbers derive their utility and it is only through
extreme privation, discomfort and danger that they build a sense of self or as
framed by George Akerlof and Rachel Kranton (2000), their identity. The ulti-
mate destination for any climber is Mount Everest, the jewel in the Himalayan
crown adorning the Asian subcontinent, the highest point on earth and is syn-
onymous with extreme mountaineering. However, in recent times the image of
the sport and of those climbing Everest has su↵ered repeated rebukes in the me-
dia, not only from journalists but also from members of its own fraternity. The
years 1996 and 2006 are widely acknowledged as the most controversial seasons
in the history of the sport, not only because of the record death tolls, but also
because of the media storm that surrounded them (see for example Nick Heil,
2006; Margaret Neighbour, 2008; Steve Bird, David Lister and Zahid Hussain,
2008; Cole Morton, 2006a & 2006b). In 2006, 11 climbers lost their lives in
the 6-week spring window, but what shocked the world was not the number
of deaths but the manner in which some of them perished. For example, for
approximately 36 hours a mere 300 meters from the summit, David Sharp was
ignored by an estimated 40 climbers on their way to the summit, they walked
past a human being in desperate need of aid with only a few rendering any form
of assistance.
A similar drama unfolded only two days after Sharpe’s death, where Aus-
tralian Lincoln Hall only managed to descend about 100m from the summit
when he sat down and became unresponsive. Then as night closed in and the
1Quote attributed to the legendary George Leigh Mallory.
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temperature began rapidly dropping, the Sherpa who had stayed with him found
their oxygen supply fast running out, they decided to leave Hall and return to
camp in the dark freezing conditions, before they too ran out of oxygen and
died on the slopes. However, the Sherpa reported that Hall had died upon the
slopes thwarting any attempt at rescue that evening. Early the next day Hall
was found by Dan Mazur sitting on the edge of a 1,000-meter drop, sans shirt,
hat and gloves. who reportedly greeted him saying “I imagine you are surprised
to see me here” (Heil, 2008). After radioing down that Hall was alive, a large
coordinated e↵ort was put together across many expeditions and over 11 Sherpa
raced up the mountain with a stretcher and brought him down alive. Remark-
ably, Hall survived the night on the highest point on earth, in the death zone
with neither oxygen nor shelter. Unlike Sharp a massive rescue operation was
set into motion to retrieve him.
As the news exploded around the world, newspapers filled with accusations
and scathing stories of neglect, stating that people were being left behind to die
by uncaring climbers and expeditions. Joining his voice to this chorus was Sir
Edmund Hillary; he vented his disgust and contempt indicating that never in his
day never would they have left a man under a rock to die (David Fickling, 2006).
But never in his day was there so much money to be made through Contiki style
Everest expeditions. Now the only skill a client required was the ability to pay
the exorbitant climbing fees, up to an estimated USD$65,000 (Michael Kodas,
2008), violating the climbing ethic of the traditional climbing that stretched
back from Hillary to Mallory and beyond. Their objective of mountaineering
was to test one’s self in the crucible of the mountains, not for the attainment of
personal glory.
This sentiment is reflected by many of the modern traditionalist climbers,
like Juanito Oiarzabal, who held the record for the most ascents of the 8,000’ers,
said that Everest had turned into a “circus” where people are buying their way
to the summit. Few of these so-called “cheque book heroes” are real climbers
(Juanito Oiarzabal quoted in Moreton, 2006a). However, in an interview with
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the London Sunday Times, David Sharp’s own mother commented, “. . . your
responsibility is to save yourself, not to try to save anybody else” (Peter Gill-
man, 2006). This was a courageous sentiment and one to which some modern
climbers would agree. Japanese climber Hiroshi Handa echoed this when he
stated that “we climb by ourselves, by our own e↵orts, on the big mountains –
above 8,000 meters is not a place where people can a↵ord morality” (Heil, 2008).
A statement made after he was accused of bypassing stranded individuals on
Everest as he struck out for the summit. The attitude and beliefs portrayed by
Hillary are clearly incongruous with those expressed by some modern climbers;
the conflict seemed to revolve around the core beliefs and attitudes of modern
climbers being vastly di↵erent to those of the prior generations.
Had the traditions and social norms of the brotherhood of climbers vanished
or are recent behaviours attitudes isolated anomalies? While media firmly places
blame on the commercial expeditions, one must be careful in such situations not
to make judgments without proof, but the weight of anecdotal evidence would
indicate that there is a problem. Has the commercialisation of mountain climb-
ing brought about a change in behavioural attitudes towards and between fellow
climbers? For this, we need a more in depth analysis. The historical nature of
this study means that we are not provided with perfect information about events
and can only create estimates based upon the available data, which are the out-
comes of events not the event themselves. In an attempt to work around these
limitations this study uses the narrative analysis technique (Robert H. Bates,
Avner F. Greif, Margaret Levi, Jean-Laurent Rosenthal and Barry R. Weingast,
1998) which considers the impact of strategic interactions, beliefs, cultural fea-
tures and social structures on behaviour using, for example, a classical game
theoretic [or a behavioural] approach (Avner F. Greif, 1998; Avner F. Greif
and David D. Laitin, 2004). This paper investigates the historical development
and nature of the social values and norms (pre-1950s) of traditional Himalayan
climbers leading into the investigation period beginning in 1950 and their de-
velopment into the commercial period (1988-2008). Furthermore, the extent to
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which these norms were initially self-enforcing but over time has become increas-
ingly di cult to enforce. The approach is “analytic in that it extracts explicit
and formal lines of reasoning, which facilitate both exposition and explanation”
(Bates et al., 1998). The approach will be applied to demonstrate the impor-
tance of these norms to ensure altruism and cooperation between climbers in
an environment where help means the di↵erence between life and death. This
system of norms worked so well that it may have been partially responsible
for the introduction and explosion of commercial ventures to Everest and the
other Himalayan peaks. The altruistic and helping behaviours of the traditional
climbers have undoubtedly helped to save the lives of many individuals over the
years. However, it is these actions, which may have made the probability of
survival, look much better than it would have otherwise been, attracting less
qualified climbers or highly qualified climbers leading the unskilled on expedi-
tions for a large fee2. It may be that the commercialisation process introduced
a new competing social institution (order), which has inadvertently led to the
weakening or destruction of the pre-existing order within the original climbing
fraternity. In order to determine if this was the case, we use the many detailed
references and sources on mountaineering, Everest and the Himalayan Moun-
tains to “seek to understand the actors’ preferences, their perceptions, their
evaluation of alternatives, the information they possess, the expectations, they
form, the strategies they adopt, and the constraints that limit their actions”
(Bates et al., 1998). It requires that we “cut deeply into the specifics of a time
and place, and to locate and trace the processes that generate the outcome of
interest.” It allows to piece together the story where data limitations and holes
are numerous. Overall, in line with many papers using analytic narratives this
study is problem driven, not theory driven. However, it tries to understand
the mechanisms that generate events. The empirical section allows us to go
2It could be that the less experienced climbers are just hiring more Sherpa to make up for
the inexperience. However, contacting and hiring experienced guides and Sherpa is di cult
without having prior contact and experience in the sport. Additionally, the commercial ven-
tures have di↵erent packages (price and amount of hired help being negotiable). Experienced
climbers criticise “short-roped” clients being dragged by Sherpa to the summit.
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beyond narrative accounts of particular events increasing validity and therefore
complementing the narrative element. Together, they contribute to a better
completion of understanding environments where data gathering is challenging
and incomplete. Thus we are able to explore the e↵ect that the introduction of
commercialisation may have had on pro-social behaviour.
5.2 Historical Development
“Mountains are not stadiums where I satisfy my ambition to achieve; they are
the cathedrals where I practice my religion.”3
After numerous unsuccessful attempts from the first o cial British expedi-
tion (1922) to resumption of attempts after the Second World War in 1950 it
was not until 1953 that Sir Edmund Hillary and Sherpa, Tensing Norgay were
finally successful4. Even though many individuals, expeditions and nations com-
peted for success and for a place in history the rivalry was neither cutthroat nor
was it anti-social. The reality was quite the opposite. This was community of
climbers who were for the most part well known to each other and regularly
climbing through the Himalaya, all of who were tied together by a deeply felt
solidarity or shared culture, the Brotherhood of Climbers (Heil, 2008; Moreton,
2006b). Over time there have been numerous successes, such that the routes
are well mapped and plotted and the equipment and techniques have greatly
improved. All these factors have impacted upon the challenge of climbing, as
“climbing protection – has grown so sophisticated that falling has lost virtu-
ally all its terrors and consequences” (David Roberts, 2005). Such changes in
the climbing environment could lead to the belief that there is a reduction in
the need for aid and assistance for/from others. Which leads to the underlying
question, why do we help others? This is a problematic and contentious ques-
tion within nearly all areas of the behavioural and decision sciences. Do we act
3Inscription taken from the memorial plaque to Anatoli Boukreev.
4Although the first o cial summit was in 1953, speculation still surrounds the 1926 attempt
by George Mallory, who was last seen close to the summit and climbing well before being lost,
his body was discovered in 1999.
74
altruistically and help others5 from an innate sense of decency and for the com-
mon good or do we have a more primal motivation, one that only helps others
from fear of social sanction and self-interest? The modern era has projected a
very di↵erent set of attitudes and images of the climbing fraternity, than that
of the traditional climbers. Heil (2008) bluntly summed up this new attitude:
“Gone were the tweedy gentlemen climbers of yesteryear pioneering their way
across virgin landscape; this modern, commercialised Everest was overcrowded
and largely unregulated, a high-altitude playground where conga lines of novice
clients clogged the routes, where deep-pocketed dilettantes of dubious ability
were short roped to well compensated Sherpa’s and guides.” How could such
cooperative attitudes and behaviours develop to become the norm, when the
environment does not appear conductive for altruism and helping behaviour to
survive, let alone flourish?
We begin with the tweedy gentlemen and development of the social attitudes
and behaviours of the Brotherhood of Climbers. It is widely agreed that in the
early years climbers were predominately wealthy, private school educated gen-
tlemen (Dave Cook, 1978), who followed the forms of gentlemanly conduct and
sportsman like behaviour. These men exerted enormous influence over future
climbers by shaping the attitudes and norms for generations to come. At the
time the gentleman was ubiquitous within British culture and deeply engrained
in the British psyche6. Given that the majority of early climbers were the gen-
tlemen elite from Britain, their behavioural norms were systemically entrenched
within the early climbers. For the climbers this would include the attitudes and
actions of a true gentleman, such that it is neither birth nor position that makes
the man but his behaviour and actions (Richard Braithwait, 1994) This is neatly
summed up by “the appellation of Gentleman is never a xed to a man’s circum-
stances, but to his behaviour in them” (Steele, 1955). By the end of the 19th
5In line with Charlotte Phelps (1999) we define altruism as “individual behaviour that
helps another at personal cost” but there may be a di↵erence between the act and motivation
behind the act.
6Evident in literature for well over 600 years, one of the earliest literature references is the
14th century Canterbury Tales (Geo↵rey Chaucer, 1998) with the introduction of the gentil
knight.
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century the gentleman had evolved from an aristocratic pursuit to the model for
general behaviour (James A. Mangan, 1975) and the designation of gentleman
became the ultimate achievement (Christine Berberich, 2007) greater than any
title that could be bestowed by kings or queens.
The central tenet of being a gentleman was strict adherence to a code of
conduct which included: deference and courtesy towards women at all times at
any cost to self; politeness, civility and manners towards all others regardless
of class or rank; honesty, generosity and faith; and above all else never act in
any manner unbecoming to a gentleman7. Gentlemanly behaviour in this case
would be to always render all possible aid to a fellow member of your own society
when required even at the cost of one’s own life. These norms can be observed
to operate under normal conditions and have in recent research been shown to
operate under extreme as life and death environmental conditions. The norms
followed by the members of any sub-society may invariable di↵er from those
of general society, and on casual reflection can appear odd or suspect. This
di↵erence was eloquently summed up by an o↵ the cu↵ remark to the media
by George Leigh Mallory, which has become synonymous with climbing and
Everest itself: “So, if you cannot understand that there is something in man
which responds to the challenge of this mountain and goes out to meet it, that
the struggle is the struggle of life itself upward and forever upward, then you
won’t see why we go. What we get from this adventure is sheer joy” (Heil,
2008).
The assemblage of climbers was not a random set of individuals who occa-
sionally interacted. This was a group well known to each other, who interacted
often and shared goals and beliefs about mountaineering. This interaction would
inexorably be extended to include the Sherpa and locals who were also regularly
interacting with these climbers. This brotherhood is in many respects similar
to an extended family or community; individuals who are repeatedly interacting
7This gentlemanly attitude was observable during the sinking of the Titanic, where women
and children were taken to safety first at the cost of the gentlemen’s lives (Bruno S. Frey,
David A. Savage and Benno Torgler, 2010).
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with each other, hold the same passions (climbing) and follow a shared set of
beliefs. Many of models of human behaviour show that action is driven by our
desires, values and beliefs. The way in which we form our values and beliefs
are derived via the influence of such factors as: moral and social norms, reli-
gious and political ideology or social identity. For an ad hoc community such as
this, drawn from many di↵erent societies and nations, social norms and iden-
tity would be the crucial. Social norms are the set of values and beliefs shared
by societies’ members (Emile Durkheim, 1997; Jon Elster, 2007) and set the
acceptable forms of behaviour and attitudes under which the group or society
functions. This forms the social fabric of how individuals with that society are
expected to act as well as providing the moral and ethical compass with which
to navigate a societal existence without the need for force of law (Robert B.
Cialdini and Melanie R. Trost, 1998). It is the inter-relationship amongst in-
dividuals, defined by their roles and status, is the social structure of a society
and it is this that define a society (Carmi Schooler, 1996). In a sense it is the
actions we observe that are physical manifestations of the groups social system.
Over time the set of shared beliefs (social norms) become institutionalised
(David John Frank, John W. Meyer and David Miyahara, 1995) and become
more than just a set of loose common beliefs. They become the set of rules that
governs behaviour and social interactions for members of that social group,
which are passed to new members through the process of socialisation (John H.
Goldthorpe, 1998; Theodore E. Long and Je↵ery K. Hadden, 1985). By passing
on the norms of that society they perpetuate and strengthen them (Michel Fou-
cault, 1979; Caudill, 1973; Frank, 1995) and have significant impact on values
and beliefs (Axel Inkeles, 1969). These norms are self-enforced by the members
of that society, such that punishments or exclusion can be metered out to main-
tain the societal structure8. This behavioural enforcement is mostly achieved
8However, one must note that many of these norms may have been developed for the
survival of the group rather than the for the benefit of any one individual within that group,
which in extreme environments should promote pro-social over self-interested behaviour (Eek
et al., 2001). This could mean that cooperative and helping behaviours exist not because of
a truly altruistic attitude, but from a need for reciprocity. Where individuals render aid to
other not from the internal satisfaction it generates (warm glow) but from recognition that
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through either the coercion or shaming of individuals into the required action
(Elster, 1998). This is true for all societies, large and small, including all subsets
such as mountaineers. However, once norms are identified as being shared by
other members of society they cannot be easily disregarded. Individuals will
follow the prescripts of a social norm even if it is clearly not in their own best
interest to do so (Max Weber, 1930; Elster, 1989). However, Edward O. Wil-
son (1975) illustrates that when a population follows a series of social norms,
the reciprocated altruistic acts will increase group’s survival fitness. The basic
underlying concept of reciprocity is to help those who have helped us. Helping
behaviour is linked to altruism (Jane Allyn Piliavin and Hong-Wen Charng,
1990) as well as to reciprocity (Ernst Fehr, Urs Fischbacher and Simon Gchter,
2002; Joseph Henrich, 2004; Felix Oberholzer-Gee, Iris Bohnet and Bruno S.
Frey, 1997). The reciprocal of this would be to harm those who have harmed us
or to withhold assistance from those who need it, such as not rendering assis-
tance to an individual who refused to aid you in the past (“an eye for an eye”).
Furthermore, individuals who attempt to cheat or do not respond in kind, will
be treated detrimentally by all other members of that society if identified. This
behaviour is of vital importance in an environment where exogenous shocks
(blizzards, avalanches or rock falls) are prevalent and helping behaviour could
save lives.
Over time this led to the development of the brotherhood (traditional climbers).
They are most often lifelong climbers, who started climbing on their local peaks
and built up in di culty and height over time. They often seek to challenge
themselves and are likely to seek the next challenge or return to the one not yet
finished. Thus, the traditional climber will regularly return and reciprocity be-
comes an important factor, such that refusal to render assistance could provoke
retraction of aid in the future, which in such a hostile environment could be
fatal. Legitimacy has a significant e↵ect on helping behaviour; such that a le-
future aid may be dependent upon rendering assistance to others today. In the initial period
of climbing the identification of a member of your social group was an easy exercise and all
climbers were expected to adopt and follow these norms.
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gitimate need elicits more help than does an illegitimate need, such as one’s own
laziness or the lack of proper preparation (Leonard Berkowitz, 1969; Shalom H.
Schwartz and John A. Fleishman, 1978; David A. Savage and Benno Torgler,
2010). However, in the case of a natural disaster, people are confronted with an
exogenous shock (one which is outside anyone’s control), which helps to control
for legitimacy issues. However, legitimacy behaviours and attitudes are depen-
dent on the identification of group status, especially in an environment with
more than one social institution (class or caste societies). If helping behaviour
is based upon reciprocal attitudes, it is vital that individuals are able to identify
members of their own group. Additionally, enforcement or retribution of norms
is also dependent on the ability to identify an individual with a particular so-
cial group or institution. Furthermore, the awareness of the need for action is
important, but alone it is not a su cient condition to ensure an individual’s
norm for a specific type of behaviour (helping behaviour) to be turned into ac-
tion (Shalom H. Schwartz and Je↵ery A. Howard, 1982 & 1984). Within social
dilemmas, individuals take several factors into account when deciding to take
action, such as: the benefits and costs, situational framing, the behaviour of
others, need, communication as well as their own set of norms and values (An-
ders Beil and John Thøgersen, 2007). Additionally, there is a significant level
of favouritism towards members of ones own group (Jacob M. Rabbie, Jan C.
Schot and Leiuwe Visser, 1989), where the reciprocal need for aid may be more
likely given to those identified as in-group members, and less likely to others.
The development of the traditional climbers social norms was done so along-
side that of the local Sherpa’s and guides, such that nearly all of the early
successes and disasters occurred side by side the local populace. Over time
and through repeated interactions the traditional climbers have built close and
lasting relationships with many of those they hire to climb with them. For ex-
ample, not only was there a lifelong friendship9 between Sir Edmund Hillary
9Allegedly the partnership between Hillary and Tensing started the year before their epic
triumph, Hillary slipped and was potentially falling towards his death, when one of the porters
put his own life in danger to save him, the porter was Tensing Norgay.
79
and Tensing Norgay10, but Hillary displayed a love for the people and returned
many times to advance their living standards. The Sherpa were as integral to
the setup of an expedition as any other member, such that on occasion when a
particular Sherpa was not available expeditions were either delayed or cancelled.
This is not to say that all climbers build the same relationship with the Sherpa,
or react in the same way when tragedy strikes11.
The Decision to Help
The decision to provide aid is a snap (hot) decision made on the spot, a choice
that breaks down to providing aid or to ignore their plight and continue on
towards their own goals. This is by no means a simple or easy decision. Once
a decision to aid is made, then climbers need to make an additional choice on
the continuance of their expedition. Furthermore, providing aid is not a costless
act and may indeed cost the expedition their chance of success. Alternatively,
the incident or conditions that put the victims in the need of aid may indicate
that success on this day is impossible and turning back could be the better part
of valour12. If aid is not given then the victim could pay the ultimate price
and die if no other group is willing to help thereafter. This imposes a very
large weight upon the aid decision, knowing that by choosing to not help will
most likely result in the death of those in need13. An additional problem is the
10Tensing was awarded the title of Sherpa for his e↵orts with Hillary. The term Sherpa is
multi use, for while it literally means the “tiger people”, it is not limited to the description of
an ethnic group as it is also a title and job description and a title proudly worn by the Sherpa
people, much like the term “gentleman” was worn by the English.
11For example in 1986 the Everest North Ridge Expedition (non-commercial) lost “one of
[their] best loved Sherpa’s, Dawa Nuru” at 22,000ft while descending from the North Col.
The team carried him back down for the proper Buddhist service, but afterwards sought to
continue back up, only to be continually frustrated by the weather that had hampered the
entire expedition (Elizabeth Hawley and Richard Salisbury, 2007). In 1994 the Ukrainian
expedition after the death of a comrade, they immediately called o↵ the remainder of the
expedition because their climbing ethics dictated, “climbing is not to continue after the death
or disappearance of a member” (Hawley and Salisbury, 2007).
12Until recently the cost of satellite weather reports was too expensive for all but the very
well funded or state funded expeditions, this meant that climbers were not sure of condi-
tions until they physically encountered them. Additionally, conditions regarding icefalls and
avalanches were unknown until the first teams reached the areas susceptible to them. Thus
if a previous expedition had encountered icefalls or avalanches, this would then increase the
amount of knowledge the next expedition would have.
13Here we assume that all incidents that require aid result in death if not provided.
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cost of rendering aid, which could include: physical aid, such as carrying the
injured back down the mountain to lower camps, or equipment aid, surrendering
oxygen or medicines to victims. Physical aid is not only costly in terms of time
and energy to turn around and go back down, but also includes the time spent
actually getting to a stricken climber which in itself can be very dangerous and
time consuming. Material aid is costly not only in monetary term but can
have a major detrimental e↵ect on the probability of success of an expedition,
as the supplies carried by climbers are the bare minimum needed to summit
and return. As a result climbers tend not carrying spare equipment (excluding
possibly an extra oxygen cylinder) as every additional pound of weight makes
success much more unlikely. Therefore, giving away of these scarce resources
limits that climbers ability to successfully summit, under this assumption we
impose a cost to success if equipment is given away. Moreover, turn around
and walk away from their expedition to help others has consequences. The
major physical limitation is detrimental e↵ects of high altitude on the human
body AMS, HAPE and HACE are all caused by high altitude, not by a lack of
oxygen but from the lack of atmospheric pressure (United States Army Medical
Research and Development Command, 1994). The lack of oxygen causes mental
e↵ects, such as confusion but clears quickly. However, it may take several weeks
for the physical symptoms to clear. The danger of re-ascending after assisting
another climber down to safety is that the physical damage of being in the
high altitude climate has not yet had a chance to recover. Making it much more
likely that those climbers could su↵er from a serious altitude related condition14.
In addition to the physical limitations there is a limited window available for
climbers to attempt Mt. Everest. There are only two seasons in which the vast
majority of climbing occurs, spring and autumn. This is due to the bitter cold
storms that occur during winter (whiteouts, blizzards and so on) and during the
summer (the monsoon season) high winds and storms are common. Realistically
14This made Anatoli Boukreev’s re-ascent in 1996 astonishing. After making the summit
of Everest without oxygen, he descending back to camp, grabbed some oxygen cylinders and
re-ascended to rescue stranded climbers who would have surely perished without his assistance.
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this results in the prime climbing window falling in the middle to end of these
seasons, spanning about 6 weeks. If abandoned to provide aid, the time frame
for climbing makes it almost inevitable that the season is e↵ectively over.
Additionally, there is also the likelihood of a social cost associated with not
providing aid, there could be the likelihood of retribution and retaliation by
other members for those found not adhering to the social norms. This could
be in the form of retraction of future aid or even ostracism from the climbing
society15. However, there are gains that could be made from the decision to
provide aid even if the expedition is unsuccessful the climber would receive
utility from doing the right thing (or the warm glow e↵ect). There may also
be an e↵ect here for the Sherpa’s, it may be the case that by rendering aid the
Sherpa’s are able to improve their reputation with their clients or agency and
be able to secure more work in future16.
The challenge comes when with the introduction of a second institutional
group with its own social norms and attitudes, some of which may be in direct
contradiction to those of the original group (traditional climbers). Given that
they (commercial clients) do not repeatedly climb and interact, they are unlikely
to forge strong bonds or attachments with Sherpa or other climbers. This could
result in a diminishing number of instances in the modern period of pro-social
behaviour.
15An example of this was observed with the Sherpa’s working for the highly unprepared and
inexperienced 1994 Taiwanese Everest Expedition, while one of the climbers (Shih) lay dying
at 8700m the Sherpa’s went to Camp 2 to retrieve tents, not to render aid. These Sherpa were
censured by the climbing community and never to be able to enter or work in Tibet again
(Salisbury and Hawley, 2007).
16The companies and associations that govern trekking and Sherpa’s have in general fixed
(set) rates for the hire of their services. However, a well-regarded Sherpa may not be paid at
a higher rate but will be specifically requested by companies and most likely receive bigger
tips.
82
5.3 Commercialisation
“The client is trying to kill you, the client is trying to kill himself and the
client is trying to kill the rest of the clients.”17
Over the last few decades a profound shift has occurred in the basic makeup
of expeditions attempting to scale Himalayan peaks such as Everest. Prior
to the modern era, the majority of expeditions were supported either through
scientific, government or were funded out of the individuals own pocket. The
members of theses expeditions generally consisted of experienced climbers. This
changed in 1986 when amateur mountaineer Dick Bass was the first person to
complete the so-called seven summits challenge (Dick Bass, Frank Wells and
Rick Ridgeway, 1986)18. Demonstrating that it was possible to summit the
highest places on earth without years of training as long as you had the funds.
The highly experienced climbers saw this as an opportunity to climb more often,
by getting others to pay for their own expeditions through the sale of expedition
spots. The following years saw an explosion of the commercial climbing venture
(see Fig. 5.3). Even as the overall number of expeditions on Everest grew the
proportion of the commercial expeditions grew as well, which currently makes up
approximately 20% of all expeditions. This explosion was driven by experienced
and well known traditional climbers19.
Initially, these expeditions were made up of highly experienced climbers or
Sherpa’s with only one or two commercial clients and these expeditions would
have functioned and acted in a manner very similar to the traditional ones.
Eventually, rather than single spots being sold o↵ to fund an expedition, entire
17The three rules of mountain guiding (Taken from the Rannoch Mountaineering Club,
2012).
18The seven summits challenge was to climb the highest peak on each continent Mt. Everest
(Asia), Aconcagua (South America), Mt. McKinley (North America), Kilimanjaro (Africa),
Elbrus (Europe), Vinson Massif (Antarctica) and Mt. Kosciuszko (Australia).
19For example, famous American climber and guide Scott Fischer created his own com-
mercial expedition company, Mountain Madness, which advertised of a 100% success rate for
Everest summits (Anatoli Boukreev and G. Weston DeWalt, 1997). Rob Hall, a New Zealand
mountaineer founded his own commercial expedition venture called Adventure Consultants
with a charge of USD$65,000 for a summit attempt. Adventure Consultants was more expen-
sive than many others but were noted for their reliability and safety. One should note that
both Fischer and Hall died in the 1996 Everest disaster
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Figure 5.1: Growth of commercial expeditions since 1950.
expeditions were being put together for the purpose of profit. These new expe-
ditions consisted of a mix of individuals with a range of climbing experience and
training (from little to none) with only the expedition leaders and Sherpa hav-
ing any true mountaineering experience. In addition to the lack of experience,
these climbers lacked the social and emotional attachment generated through
personal interaction. Not only did they not know their fellow climbers, but they
also had no relationship with those who were leading them. By 1996 the number
of commercial expeditions was approaching 30 per year, where a decade before
the total number of commercial ventures was 1-2. The leaders and support sta↵
(Sherpa) of these commercial expeditions were mostly highly experienced and
competent climbers in their own right, which had been socialised through expe-
rience and exposure to the traditionalist view of climbing etiquette. However,
these climbers were now guiding individuals with a di↵erent set of agenda and
goals paying upwards of USD$65,000 in hope of becoming successful Everest
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summiteers. It might be easy to say that it is simply the lack of experience
that is driving the problems associated with modern climbing. However, recent
research by J. L. Westho↵, T. D. Koepsell and C. T. Littell (2012) indicated
that a lack of Himalayan climbing experience does not equate to a lower sur-
vival rate, as climbers were just as likely to die on their first expedition as any
other20.
Hillary believed that it was the commercialisation of climbing that was re-
sponsible for the degradation of pro-social norms and behaviours. While books
such as “Into Thin Air” (Jon Krakauer, 1997) and “High Crimes: The fate of
Everest in an age of greed” (Kodas, 2008) focus on the disastrous events on
Everest, they support Hillary’s view about the emergence of a seedy underbelly
in both Tibet and Nepal’s climbing communities. These views were further
supported in “Dark Summit: The Extraordinary True Story of Everest’s Most
Controversial Season” (Heil, 2008), which describes how some Everest’s worst
death tolls could be attributed to commercial cowboys and an abundance of
anti-social behaviours. Walt Unsworth (2000) also points out “Nothing has
excited as much controversy in recent years as these commercial expeditions.”
The idea that the commercial operations that are to blame for the current state
of climbing has been well supported in not only the popular press but also
by many famous and respected climbers (including Bird et al., 2008; Timothy
Eagen, 2008; Fickling, 2006; Morton, 2006a & 2006b; Neighbour, 2008; Stephen
Venables, 2006 & 2007)
If we assume that it was indeed the introduction of commercial operations
that has led to the break down in the attitudes and behaviours in the modern
climbers, how can we analyse such a resulting behavioural shifts? We can view
the introduction of widespread commercialisation as an institutional change,
with a new set of social norms and members being introduced into the previously
20However, this study only provides a survival odds ratio at the individual climber level and
does not provide a multivariate analysis at the group level (commercial vs. traditional). Nor
does it take into account the shift in the skill versus caution perception. As climbers become
more experienced they are more likely to undertake more di cult climbs believing their skill
is su cient and under value the risk (be less cautious).
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homogenous social system. What is at the heart of the institutional di↵erence
and the competing social values? The traditional climbers are interested in
testing (challenging) oneself. Reinhold Messner (1998) nicely summed up this
drive stating: “In us all the longing remains for the primitive condition, in
which we can match ourselves against Nature, have our chance to have it out
with her and thereby discover ourselves.” This means that while traditional
climbers are invested in each and every climb, they are not focused on only a
single attempt and regardless of success they are likely to return for repeated
attempts, which create a social group dynamic and focus. This is not to suggest
that the traditional climbers do not want success, but as the traditional climber
see the test of self or the challenge as the objective, to summit is a bonus to be
enjoyed but is not the sole objective (Harold Drasdo, 1978). The mountain is
the means not the goal. The results in repeated expeditions where individuals
become part of the expedition and members become well known to each other
over time.
This is di↵erent for the commercial expeditions as they are groups in name
only, as it is quite unlikely that any expedition members have met each other
before arriving in Nepal. Furthermore, we can assume that the commercial
climbers are less driven by the challenge, but by their own success and as such
prefer to be in a one shot game (not having repeated attempts and unlikely to
return once successful). This motivation can create an interesting set of inter-
nal and external group dynamics and issues. Firstly, these climbers lack the
experience and training of the traditional climbers and therefore pay premium
to forgo this ability shortfall in the hope of purchasing success. The personal
experience of (Krakauer, 1997) supports this view stating that: “It was clear to
me – that none of us in the [commercial] group had a prayer of climbing Everest
without considerable assistance from – guides and Sherpa’s.” Secondly, clients
have paid large amounts of money to join an expedition and therefore have
high expectations of success putting also pressure on the commercial operators.
Given that the success of any expedition is partly exogenous (such as weather,
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health, incidents) there is no way to guarantee success let alone survival. Ana-
toli Boukreev, a guide and famous climber, indicated some of this perception
variation in the guide’s role: “I o↵er my expertise and experience for hire in
order to help a group of people reach the summit. But am I responsible for
whether they live or die? I am not” (Boukreev and DeWalt, 1997).
There is a large di↵erence between not being responsible for the lives of your
clients and having a callous disregard for their lives. In 1996 Boukreev showed
his willingness to race back up the mountains in an attempt to rescue others
and render assistance, for which some hailed him a hero. He is credited for the
single handed rescue of three climbers stranded above 8,000m after returning
to camp after summiting without oxygen then returning to the peak for the
rescue (Krakauer, 1997). However, this sort of behaviour is not always the case,
after reaching the summit in 1999 the Polish International Everest Expedition
(a commercial venture) left behind Tadeusz Kudelski (POL) when he began
moving slowly and is assumed that without help he fell to his death somewhere
between 1st and 2nd steps. In response to this, Russell Brice (owner and oper-
ator of HimEX) said of the expedition leader Pawlowski that “? he only climbs
for himself and close friends with no thought or consideration for clients abilities
or needs” (Hawley and Salisbury, 2007). Pawlowski had limited emotional con-
nection with his climbers (and possibly hired help). This is a reoccurring theme
from some commercial operators, as in 2004 Gustavo Lisi (ARG), the leader
of a commercial expedition, abandoned his one and only client (Nils Antezana)
after he became exhausted after summiting. Lisi’s two Sherpa’s stayed with
Nils until he collapsed, where they also abandoned their charge to die alone on
the slopes. Ironically, Lisi fell into a crevasse, became buried and was forced to
call out for help. The aid he so desperately required came from the Sherpa’s of
Falvey’s (IRE) non-commercial expedition who dug him out and provided him
with their oxygen.
While the monetary cost of giving aid is the same for all individuals re-
gardless of group, the consequential costs may be vastly di↵erent. There is a
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very large energy cost to carrying any additional equipment and as such only
enough is taken to just make the journey. Every piece of equipment given away
can have a negative e↵ect on success. For traditional climbers this may be ac-
ceptable, but for commercial clients (who have paid a large fee and may not
wish to return) their perceived cost is higher. While this could result in the
clients not only having a more risk seeking attitude when it comes to climbing
decisions, but may lead to very risk averse attitudes being held towards help-
ing others21. That is, the very large sums of money being spent by the clients
makes them much more driven to succeed, as to fail is costly (dollar value). This
desire for success may also a↵ect their willingness to provide aid to others, as
any equipment given (oxygen, drugs or even guides or Sherpa’s) may result in
them not being successful. This is very much in line with the reports of an in-
crease in negative behaviours in not only the base camps but during climbs such
as: cavalier, corrupt and anti-social activities being reported in the press and
publications. Unsurprisingly the di↵erences in motivation and attitude, has re-
sulted in traditional climbers generally describing the commercial climbers quite
disparagingly22.
This attitude is summed up by Campbell (1978) in the emphatic statement
about professionals who climb for profit “do not be a mountain pimp: Do not let
the arm-chaired millions come at me.” This creates inter-group factionization
with issues of legitimacy being a problem, resulting in two possible problems;
Firstly the traditional climbers may harbour resentment and ill will towards the
interlopers, as they are perceived as not having earned the right to be there
(Heil, 2008). Prior to commercialisation a single social institution, where altru-
ism, cooperation and reciprocity was the norm and that assistance would have
been expected from any or all other climbers with the ability to render help,
governed all climbers. While only one social institution existed, members of this
group punished those who did not cooperate and behave accordingly, reinforc-
21This is also consistent with prospect theory, where a loss has a much larger negative e↵ect
on the individual than the impact of same sized gain would have.
22For a discussion on group social theory see (Hui and Triandis, 1986; Nibler and Harris,
2003; Triandis, 1988, 1994)
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ing the expected behaviour. However, as pointed out by Douglas Heckathorn
(1989), social norms that promote pro-social behaviour, such as cooperation or
helping behaviour, erode if there is no stabilising presence such as social sanc-
tions or retaliation. This creates a problem for the traditional climbers, as the
commercial clients are not in a repeated game, the traditional climbers are un-
able to punish or reinforce their norms on the commercial climbers which could
a tough situation, if clients die during climbs it has a direct e↵ect on the number
of clients in future. However, not being successful on an expedition leads to a
similar e↵ect. This leads to the situation where commercial expeditions need
to continually be successful and safe to attract more clients. When conditions
are unsafe the leaders decision whether to climb or not can both lead to bad
outcomes for the future. This can be an especially large problem for commer-
cial operations wishing to maintain an excellent safety record, for while they
may lose some clients due to a lack of success it may be o↵set through good
safety records. It is possible that the traditional climbers are willing to render
assistance to maintain their own social identity, but the commercial climbers
will likely not be in a position to reciprocate. Over time, the lack of retaliation
or sanction against commercial climbers makes it less likely for altruistic and
pro-social behaviour to be maintained23.
Contrary to the anecdotal arguments, there are many cases where commer-
cial teams and climbers have rendered aid and risked their own lives to save
others as well as traditional climbers risking themselves to rescue commercial
clients24. On many occasions Sherpa’s from other expeditions help stricken
climbers, either at their own behest or being directed by their respective teams.
This may stem from the notion that the Nepalese hold the mountains to be
23Commercial climbers are in a one shot game and as such are unlikely to be in a position
to reciprocate any positive act of altruism. Thus in a homogenous social institution we
should observe stable norms of altruism, cooperation and pro-social behaviour, but under
heterogeneity this becomes unstable and leads to break downs.
24For example in 2008 Uwe Goltz (SUI) became exhausted at the Hillary Step, his Sherpa
Mitenjen stayed with him for 2 hours then got him down to the South Summit, at which point
Jamie McGuinness, NZ (commercial expedition leader) assisted him from 8,500 meters down
to his team doctors. Here, we observe not only a commercial expedition helping others; they
sacrificed some of their own medications and utilised their team resources to provide aid.
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sacred and would rather help than to leave the dead upon the slopes. However,
there are also cases where the lack of attachment between client and Sherpa may
be part of the problem25 as there may be an incentive problem for the climbing
Sherpa’s. It is not automatically clear what the Sherpa’s motives are in these
environments, while they are hired for a specifically task (albeit a dangerous
one), are they paid to risk their lives beyond the accepted risk of doing their
job. While there is a shortage of available jobs, the dangerous trekking, guiding
and portaging employment allows for a stable level of income. An additional
factor is the relationship between the Sherpa’s and client. If the Sherpa were
just hired help, why would they risk their own life for a one shot client? There
is no emotional attachment and the only social attachment between them is an
obligation of doing the job that the Sherpa was hired for. This lack of attach-
ment may be further weakened in an environment where there is little chance
of observing any negative or anti-social behaviour from either party, weakening
the pressure to follow the social contract.
5.4 Data and Methodology
The ultimate aim of this paper is to determine if the introduction of a competing
social institution has had a significant e↵ect and shifted behavioural norms over
the last 60 years. We investigate Sir Edmund Hillary’s claim that commercial-
isation is responsible for the disappearance or at the very least a weakening of
pro-social attitudes and behaviours. To do this we have chosen to investigate if
there is a link between death, success and the introduction of a new social insti-
tution (commercialisation). Towards these ends we have utilised the data from
the Himalayan Database (Hawley and Salisbury, 2007), which is based upon
the Expedition Archives by Elizabeth Hawley. The data has covered the period
25In 2001, just before turning back Juan Benegas observed Peter Ganner (AUT) and his
Sherpa (Phinzo) going for the summit in bad weather. Later that night Phinzo told Benegas
that Ganner had slipped to his death, so no attempt at rescue was made. However, the next
day Ganner was seen just o↵ the route moving his hand, he had no external injuries, but was
su↵ering from severe frostbite, dying about 20 minutes after discovery.
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1901-2008 of which we are specifically interested in the 1950-2003 time periods,
resulting in over 47,000 individual observations and around 5000 expeditions.
For our multivariate analysis we have elected to use a probit model, due to
the non-linear and binary nature of the dependent variable, which is a dummy
variable indicating success or failure of the expedition (success = 1, failure =
0). In this analysis we are only looking at deaths and injuries that occur on the
way to the summit. In this environment we expect that incidents that occur on
the way to the summit should have an e↵ect on the likelihood of the expedition
being a success even if the death is that of a support member (Sherpa, porter
and so on) and not a mainline climber26.
We expect that there is a di↵erence in the reaction to a death and an injury
of a climber, while death is an easy and clear state to measure (one is either
dead or not) the e↵ect of an injury is much less clear. Injuries can range in
severity from a simple cut or abrasion to acute mountain sickness (AMS), high
altitude cerebral oedema (HACE), high altitude pulmonary oedemaa (HAPE)
or strokes27 and in many cases an injury does not mean that the climber must
immediately stop or turn around and descend. In many cases the injured climber
can be assisted to the next camp, where they will rest and await the return
of the rest of the expedition who would then help them descend. In other
more extreme cases the injury may be life threatening and may need immediate
assistance from others to descend. This type of helping behaviour is not as
visible and is not noted in the data or the literature as often as fatalities. A
loss of support would ultimately make the expedition much harder to succeed.
To isolate the e↵ect of death and injury on success we control for many factors
across expeditions, individuals and mountains. A list of the descriptive statistics
has been included for all variables in Table 1. Additionally we recognise that
26It is important to note that high altitude climbing is extremely taxing on the body; it is
rare that climbers make multiple attempts on the peak once in the dead zone. When climber’s
aid injured climbers back down to lower camps it is unlikely that they will then immediately
re-ascend as strike out for the peak. There are many limitations including: climbing permits
(time), equipment (out of oxygen), climber’s strength, endurance, and so on
27We were not able to explore the relevance of the severity of injury due to the lack of
information available of the degree of injury in the (Hawley and Salisbury, 2007) dataset.
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it is possible that there are unobservable (but constant) factors that occur on
each of the di↵erent mountains. To control for this we have clustered over
the individual peaks. To investigate the e↵ect of commercialisation there are
two clear periods of interest, pre- and post- commercialisation, which has been
determined by the introduction of large-scale commercial expeditions. The take-
o↵ of commercialisation is observed from 1988 onwards (see Figure 1), thus
the breakdown periods utilised in this paper is 1950-1987 (Pre) and 1988-2009
(Post).
All analysis has been performed at the expedition level. This means that
variables are expedition averages, except for age, which has been calculated as
the size of the age di↵erential (or standard deviation) within the expedition and
the average age of members. The standard deviation of age shows the distribu-
tion within the expedition, whereas the average age shows the midpoint. The
age distribution (SD) shows how similar in age the climbers within a particular
expedition are. A large spread shows that the climbers are of very dissimi-
lar ages and may not be a very cohesive group, whereas an expedition with a
very small age spread demonstrates a very tight age banding and likely a bet-
ter generational understanding and higher cohesiveness. We observe from the
descriptive statistics (see Table 1) that the non-commercial expeditions have
not only a lower average age of members but have less dispersion. This would
indicate that those climbers are younger and closer in age than those joining the
commercial groups. This result is not unexpected given the cost of the joining
a commercial venture is so expensive only those of higher means are likely to do
so (as wealth is often a function of age). However, the age e↵ect is di cult to
predict, one could take age as a negative factor such that as one gets older the
strength and agility fades, making it harder to succeed. Alternatively, another
view could be to take age as an indicator of experience, as a climber gets older
they have climbed much more often and are more likely to be more patient
when observing conditions and routes. This could be indicating a higher level
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of risk aversion even, when inexperienced28. Whether it is a loss in strength and
agility or a gain in climbing experience and knowledge, age should be a strong
candidate for impacting success. Additionally, the height of the mountain itself
could have a major impact upon success. The higher the peak the greater the
di culty, and the truly huge 8,000m peaks are well into the death zone where
the air pressure drops to levels below what humans are able to process and
survive for any extended duration.
The weather is another factor that could have a major e↵ect on the success of
an expedition. While it is virtually impossible to control for the ever-fluctuating
conditions, we can look at the seasons in which they climb. Of the four seasons
spring and autumn are the most preferable as summer brings a large number
of storms (monsoon season) and winter temperatures dramatically plummet
(blizzards and whiteouts), both making climbing extremely di cult. From this
we have create a dummy variable for prime season, such that spring/autumn
= 1. Additionally, the duration, size, make up and support of expeditions may
also have a major e↵ect on the probability of success, as each factor e↵ectively
determines the trade-o↵ between slow and steady progress and rapid setup and
ascension. Climbers need to acclimate to the condition at altitude before they
tackle a major peak, but every day spent at altitude saps strength and increases
the possibility of problems and weather. The total number of days spent on
the expedition can have a vast e↵ect on acclimation and health, which in turn
impacts success. The overall size of the expedition and the level of support
sta↵29 also directly a↵ect the ability of climbers to be successful. For example,
on average the commercial expeditions have smaller numbers that the non-
commercial groups. This means it is important to have a control variable so we
can hold the number of members constant in the analysis. Large numbers of
28However, this is not a linear relationship as there is a trade-o↵ between experience and
physical ability, while experience increases with age, physical strength and ability decreases.
29Expeditions can have a large number of support/auxiliary sta↵, ranging from: Sherpa’s
who are experienced climbers and guides usually at altitude (Sherpa’s can be included as part
of the climbing team), porters are utilised to shift equipment to upper camps and to break
down camps and bring equipment back down (porters generally are not accounted as members
of the climbing team), there are additional member found in the Base Camp and Advance
Base Camp such as doctors, cooks, medical sta↵ and so on
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support sta↵mean that the heavy loads are carried up to the advanced camps by
Sherpa’s and not by those attempting to climb to the peak, sparing the energy
and health of the climbers. Additionally, in the last phases of the climbs, when
making a final attempt on the peak, having a climbing team or partners for
support can make all the di↵erence between success and failure. Furthermore,
the size of the expedition group could have a significant e↵ect on the capacity
to provide help without having a significant e↵ect on success. That is, larger
groups might have the additional capacity to organise to go down or to send
additional members back to the previous camp while the majority of the group
continues on.
As a final set of controls, we attempt to control for modern equipment and
expedition inexperience through the use of proxies (oxygen use and rope). Every
extra kilogram of weight taken on a climb makes it exponentially harder to be
successful, as such only a minimum of rope would be taken. Teams that take
a large volume of rope could be seen as lacking in experience or wanting to
be as secure (safe) as possible. Furthermore, the use of oxygen is a proxy for
the advantages of the modern era and should mitigate some of this e↵ect. We
control for environmental factors in a yearly fixed e↵ect manner, such that the
environment (both wind and temperature), physicality (the mountain) and the
dead zone are taken into account across yearly di↵erences in weather conditions.
The model we have used in this paper was constructed to reflect the most
prominent and likely factors that would impact a successful outcome for an
expedition in the extreme sport of mountaineering.
Analysis
If we begin with a very simple descriptive analysis of the e↵ect of death on
success it shows that there may be little merit to Hillary’s comments. However,
if we limit the sample, to only include expeditions where a death has occurred
the analysis shows that after a death 58.8% of all expeditions do not succeed.
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This could indicate that the death of an expedition member has a large e↵ect
on the success of an expedition, due to either the expedition stopping to aid to
the death or it may signal bad weather or conditions. However, this is also not
the whole of the story, as we have two distinctly di↵erent groups of climbers.
Once we include these di↵erent groups into the analysis a very di↵erent picture
emerges. By splitting the data into commercial and non-commercial expeditions
where a death has occurred, we observe commercial expeditions go on to record
a successful climb in 80.6% of cases. This is not the case for the non-commercial
expeditions, where after a death they are only successful 37.8% of the time. This
rough analysis seems to indicate that a death on a commercial expedition does
not appear to have an overwhelming e↵ect on its success, whereas a death in
the non-commercial groups results in them being twice as likely to fail. These
results necessitate the need for a much more in depth analysis, utilising better
controls and period analysis, where we can control for time of death (ascending)
and for period of time (pre- and post- commercialisation).
We begin the regression analysis looking at the e↵ect of a death or injury
on success, which has been split into the two basic analytical groups, non-
commercial (1) and commercial (2) expeditions, across the entire period from
1950-2009 (see Table 2). However, specification (2) only runs from 1955-2009,
as the first commercial expedition in this time frame did not start until 1955.
Additionally, there is a long period of only a few commercial ventures during this
period and it was not until the late 1970’s that commercial ventures reappear.
Due to missing values in either the starting or ending dates of expeditions, there
are a number of expeditions for which we do not have a duration metric (about
20%). For this reason we have run the initial sequence of regressions in Table 2
with Duration excluded (1a & 2a) and with it included (1b & 2b) to check the
robustness of the results. The most noticeable and key variable here is the very
large and significantly negative e↵ect that death and injury has on success in
the first but not the second specification. This shows that a death in the non-
commercial expeditions reduces the likelihood of success by 24.3%. Conversely,
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within the commercial venture we see that not only is death not statistically
significant, its marginal e↵ect is almost 2.5 times smaller. When we compare
the non-commercial specifications including and excluding Duration (see 1a &
1b) we observe very little change in the significance levels of the variables, even
though we increase the sample size by over 100030. However, we observe the
marginal e↵ect of a death slightly reduces once we control for Duration. We
observe similar e↵ects in commercial specifications (2a & 2b) when we include
Duration. With close to an additional 100 observations we see no changes in
significance of Death on success31. Conversely, we observe an increase in the sig-
nificance and marginal e↵ect of Height with Duration controlled. Importantly,
we observe no change in significance of our primary interest variable, Death in
any of the 4 specifications (1a-2b). This could indicate that members of commer-
cial expeditions are not as concerned about team members dying, as their focus
is mainly on individual (personal) success. While this finding is interesting it is
not a complete picture, especially given that commercial expeditions were not
common until the late 1970’s and did not take o↵ until 1988 both of which are
well outside Hillary’s time. Additionally, these results do not indicate whether
the introduction of the commercial institution has had a negative impact on
the willingness of the traditional climbers to engage in helping or pro-social be-
haviour over time. While Heckathorn (1989) wasn’t specifically talking about
climbers, his belief that the inability to punish norm transgressors should lead
to a breakdown in the norms of a society should be relatable to the sub-society
of climbers. We would expect to see the positive, helping or pro-social behaviour
being crowded out by the introduction of the competing social norm, leading
to a decrease in the impact of death on success after the introduction. For this
reason we need to extend the analysis and examine the periods independently
to see if we observe the breakdown in behaviour across time. Table 3 displays
the results of this. The first three (3-5) specifications include the full sample of
30We do observe that both Prime Season and Rope move from being just outside significance
(10%) to being significant (at 10% and 5% respectively).
31We do observe a decrease in significance levels within Male, Age (SD) and Age (mean)
when Duration is included.
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climbers and Sherpa’s, whereas the latter (6-8) only includes expeditions that
reported not hiring Sherpa. Thus, in these cases death and injuries only emerge
among the climbers. As the commercial period began in earnest in 1988 we have
split the modern period in two, commercial and non-commercial. Furthermore,
as there was no real commercialisation until 1988, there is only one classification
for the 1950-1987 periods (non-commercial).
When we break up the periods, we observe very similar e↵ects to those in
Table 3. The e↵ect of a death remains robustly significant in both the 1950-1987
and 1988-2009 non-commercial specifications (3-4). Additionally, the e↵ect of a
death in (5), the 1988-2009 commercial specification does not have a significant
e↵ect on success. Next, we explore how competing social institutions can e↵ect
behaviour in specifications (3-4) and (6-7). Initially we observe no significant
changes in the size or significance of a death on success for the non-commercial
expedition between specifications (3) and (4). However, when we investigate just
the climbers in specifications (6) and (7) we observe that the e↵ect is statistically
significant. In order to verify this crowding out e↵ect, we looked only at the
non-commercial expeditions and introduce an interaction term for deaths and
period (results not shown here, but available on request). The interaction term is
statistically significant at the 5% level within the non-commercial expeditions32.
That is, we observe that the e↵ect has strongly decreased. These results indicate
that we cannot reject our hypothesis that the introduction of a competing social
norm results in a significant crowding out e↵ect of the traditional social norms
and values. The results do support the anecdotal evidence presented in the many
books and articles written about the modern climbing ethic and behaviour. This
provides indirect evidence that introduction of the commercial clients has had a
crowding out e↵ect of the helping and pro-social behaviour previously observed
in the 1950-1988 period. The results lead to the question why the crowding out
behaviour not visible in the full sample (specification 4).
32For robustness we check the results using both probit and linear probability models,
both of which report very similar results. This further suggests that the introduction of the
competing social has crowded out the pro-social behaviour in the non-commercial groups.
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In order to better understand the e↵ect that Sherpa’s have on expeditions
we extend this analysis to investigate these same variables in the expeditions
that do not use Sherpa’s33 as seen in specifications (6) and (8), and still include
the same commercial/non-commercial designations and time period splits. In
the first of these new specifications (6) we observe very little variation in the
results to the complete sample in specification (3). The most interesting results
occur when comparing the impact of a death across specifications (3-8). Between
specifications (3) and (6) we observe very little change in significance, magnitude
or sign, which would indicate that with or without the Sherpa a death in this
era has a significant impact. If we now compare and contrast the results of
specification (3-4) and then (6-7), we can observe a large decrease in the size
of the e↵ect of a death on success. In the full sample we observe no drop in
the marginal e↵ect (3-4), but in the reduced sample (6-7) we observe a drop in
significance and magnitude of about 10%. One possible reason for this could
be the presence of the Sherpa, which are included in specifications (3-5) but
not in (6-8). This could indicate that it is the Sherpa who are maintaining the
pro-social behaviour, which is in line with much of the anecdotal evidence on
Sherpa behaviour and climber attachment34. In addition to the crowding out
behaviour within the non-commercial groups, we observe that the impact of a
death on the success of a commercial expedition is non-significant on either the
full or the reduced sample (5 & 8). The results do not vary in significance levels
when we remove Duration from the regressions; there was a slight increase in
average size of the marginal e↵ects for the non-commercial specifications (3, 4, 6
and 7) of an average of 2.5%. This empirical evidence would support the notion
that the introduction of the commercial institution has indeed crowded out the
attitudes and behaviours of the traditional climbers.
Additionally, we observe a drop of significance in the e↵ect that the number
of hired members has on the probability of success, which again this makes
33This does not exclude the hiring of porters to carry equipment up to camps.
34Most high altitude rescues are carried out by the Sherpa and in many stories involving
long-standing climbing partnerships; when the climber has fallen the Sherpa refuse to leave.
Staying with the stricken climber, knowing death is certain but refuse to leave them alone.
98
perfect sense, when considered from a historical perspective. This also makes it
very clear the vitally important role that Sherpa have played in the success of
the early expeditions in the Himalaya. The modern 1988-2009 non-commercial
climbers without Sherpa support, as seen in specification (7), are very similar
when compared to the full sample (4). However, here we observe a very strongly
significant e↵ect from the number of members on the expedition. It would
appear that without the aid of the Sherpa non-commercial expeditions are more
successful if they take larger numbers, e↵ectively replacing the Sherpa with
other climbers. The e↵ect of taking away the Sherpa is most noticeable in
the commercial ventures. Rope, oxygen and mountain height no longer has a
significant e↵ect on success. The e↵ect of death is still not statistically significant
(5).
The results also reveal some other areas of interest. For example, what
we observe in the results seems to support the anecdotal evidence discussed
in the recent climbing literature in regards to the climbing ability of commer-
cial groups. In the early climbing period 1950-1987 (see specification (3)) we
observe that the height of the mountain has a strong, negatively significant ef-
fect on the probability of success35. This would mean that for every additional
1km in height attempted by expeditions, above the average (7.78km), results
in about a 21% drop in the probability to succeed. This equates to climbers
in the pre-commercial period being upwards of 34% more likely to succeed on
Annapurna Dakshin (7,219m) than they were on Everest (8,848m). Also in line
with anecdotal evidence, we observe that this e↵ect has been significant reduced
for the modern non-commercial expeditions (4), but remains strongly significant
for commercial expeditions (5). Here we observe that for each 1km in height
in the modern period above the average (7.78 for non-commercial and 7.83 for
commercial) results in a drop in success probability of 11.7% and 19.9% respec-
tively. The asymmetric result may be indicative of the lower skill levels in the
commercial expeditions, as they su↵er a more significant and greater success re-
35This early e↵ect is unsurprising as routes had not yet been mapped and equipment was
still crude.
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duction than that of the non-commercial groups. The e↵ect is robust in almost
all specifications, the exception being (7) where we observe that the modern non-
commercial climbers (excluding Sherpa) are not at all a↵ected by the mountain
height. This could be attributable to lack of knowledge (routes) and poorer
climbing equipment used in the earlier period, but this does not explain the
modern commercial expeditions. However, it may be that the climbers within
the commercial expeditions are the di↵erentiating factor here; these climbers
do not have the same levels of training and experience as their counterparts in
the modern non-commercial ventures. It would therefore make sense that the
lack of experience on the high peaks is significantly a↵ecting the success of the
commercial climbers.
Another interesting point is the e↵ect that the number of hired members
has on success in the 1950-1987 periods in specification (3). Here we see that
hired members have a significant positive e↵ect on success. The probability
of success increased in this period by 1.6% for each hired member above the
average (2.5 hired per expedition). This would mean that for every 10 Sherpa,
porters or guides hired it would on average increase the probability of success
by 16%. This result would be understandable in the early years of climbing (see
specification 3), where the expertise and knowledge of the local Sherpa’s and
support of porters was critical. We would expect that over time the importance
and significance of local Sherpa knowledge would be mitigated, as the climbers
became more knowledgeable, skilled and the technology was improved. We do
observe this in the modern period specifications, as the number of hirelings is no
longer a significant factor on success. An interesting note is that in specification
(7) without the Sherpa’s included in the sample we observe a significant, but
negative e↵ect of each additional hireling on success for the non-commercial
expeditions. This could indicate that the Sherpa’s knowledge and skill have a
large impact on the expeditions, such that hiring lower skilled or non-Sherpa
replacements is detrimental to success. This finding provides additional support
of the vital role played by the Sherpa’s in non-commercial expeditions and the
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links between the two groups. A final point of interest is the hypothesis we posed
that the use of large quantities of rope could be a proxy for poorly experienced
expeditions. What we observe here supports that idea. The coe cient Rope
is significantly negative for the modern (1988-2009) expeditions in specification
(4 & 5). For every 1km of rope taken by these expeditions above the average
(2.1km for non-commercial and 2.5km for commercial), there is a decrease in
the probability of success by approximately 4.6% and 10.5% respectively.
Overall, these results would indicate that it is the introduction of the com-
mercial institution that has led to the belief that pro-social behaviours are being
weakened. However, these results must be treated with some trepidation and
not be accepted at face value. A much more detailed investigation of attitudes
and behaviour of climbers is needed to validate these results. What we are ob-
serving are the outcomes of events in an uncontrolled environment, with little
or no eyewitness verification. This is a historical study, which is very close to a
natural experiment, given the rapid emergence of commercialisation, and while
we do not have as much controllability as a laboratory there is a distinctive
gain in environmental reality. Much more research needs to be done in this
area to extend our knowledge and understanding of the environment and the
participants themselves36.
5.5 Limitations
Analytical narratives are used to work around the shortcomings that can occur
when attempting to utilise historical data. As with the use of natural experi-
mental data the studies are performed after the fact and not all the pertinent
data may have been collected or recorded at the time, which can result in data
gaps and unobservables. However, even with the data limitations the analyti-
cal narratives approach allows the researcher to piece together the story, which
would have otherwise been impossible. The shortcomings of a narrative analysis
36Alternative explanations have been omitted due to space restrictions, for a full discussion
please refer to the working paper.
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stems from its advantage as an analytical tool, the lack of observational data
means that its analysis does not provide solid evidence that would be easier
to achieve with a stronger dataset. Our results do not reject the notion that
the introduction of commercialisation created a competing social norm that has
changed the attitude of climbers. The question remains whether this is the only
possible explanation of the results. We must acknowledge that over the span
of 60 years, there have been many knowledge and technological changes to the
sport and the region. This would include more available information on suc-
cessful expeditions, better weather forecast and better training techniques. We
would expect to see an improvement in the quality and availability of equipment
utilised by climbers. These improvements would not only improve the ability
of the climbers but also the survivability37. Just like we observe in most other
sporting fields, improvements in clothing and equipment result in the break-
ing of records and better preparation for the challenges. Additionally, these
improvements can make the di↵erence between freezing to death before help ar-
rives and staging warm enough live until aid arrives. If this were true we would
expect to see a decrease in the number of deaths for all of the modern periods
(commercial and non-commercial). What we do observe is a steady decrease
in the number of deaths per climber (or expedition) over the modern period,
but the death/success relationship remains di↵erent between commercial and
non-commercial expeditions38. Another possible change over time could be the
improvement in route information, which one would expect to only be available
to the traditional climbers, giving them an advantage. However, the commer-
cial expedition leaders, for the most part, come from the traditional group and
would have access to the same information.
In the modern era, with all the advances, it is possible that climbers choose
not to join a commercial group, but instead opt to directly hire Sherpa’s for
37However, these improvements would be equally available for both groups of climbers and
it is unclear if these factors would have a significant e↵ect on the decision to stop and help.
38This line of reasoning should also hold for advances in rescue equipment, as this should
rescue both groups of climbers equally. However, this could explain the change over time
among non-commercial groups.
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Table 5.1: Expeditions with the Death of a Sherpa
(9) (10) (11)
1950-1987 1988-2009 1988-2009
Non-Com Non-Com Com
Injury -0.182 -0.080 0.223
(-0.42) (-0.39) (0.33)
-0.070 -0.032 0.068
Height (km) -0.547*** -0.294* -0.646***
(-6.20) (-1.93) (-2.77)
-0.211 -0.117 -0.198
Primary -0.034 0.301 -0.241
Season (-0.19) (1.47) (-0.95)
-0.013 0.119 -0.068
Male 0.438 0.124 0.983
(1.26) (0.85) (1.33)
0.169 0.050 0.302
Age (SD) -0.023 0.004 0.035
(-1.12) (0.71) (1.59)
-0.009 0.002 0.011
Age (mean) 0.006 0.001 -0.029**
(0.36) (0.00) (-2.14)
0.002 0.001 -0.009
Duration 0.007 0.007* 0.013
(days) (1.53) (1.67) (1.26)
0.003 0.003 0.004
Members 0.006 0.016 0.021
(0.67) (1.44) (1.02)
0.002 0.006 0.004
Hired 0.048*** -0.005 0.041
(4.07) (-0.50) (1.04)
0.019 -0.002 0.013
O2 used 0.378** 0.939*** 1.106***
(2.13) (4.19) (4.71)
0.149 0.349 0.309
Rope (km) 0.079 -0.114*** -0.343***
(0.88) (-2.60) (-3.92)
0.031 -0.046 -0.105
Climber -0.522*** -0.543*** -0.111
Death (-3.43) (-3.33) (-0.39)
-0.186 -0.210 -0.035
Sherpa -0.695*** -0.786* -0.390
Death (-2.76) (-1.88) (-0.56)
-0.233 -0.289 -0.134
Sherpa and -0.587† 0.859 -0.320
Climber Deaths (-1.55) (1.43) (-0.52)
-0.201 0.300 -0.108
Cluster (Peaks) 127 177 38
N 717 2988 639
P> 2 0.000 0.000 0.000
Pseudo R2 0.101 0.072 0.145
Notes: t statistics in parentheses * p <0.05, ** p <0.01,
*** p <0.001. The reference group for Sherpa Death &
Climber Death is no deaths of expedition members. † The
result for Sherpa and Climber Deaths is close to significant,
but this could be driven by a small N (78) where both die.
103
themselves for a “solo” expedition. While this is possible the pricing structure
for climbing permits make this extremely expensive. While the Nepalese Min-
istry for Tourism is in charge for the fees the prices for permits fluctuate often.
The recently listed cost of a sole climber, on a common route on Everest is
USD$25,000. This cost is only for the right to climb and does not cover any
services or extra that will most definitely be needed for such an expedition.
More often than not, climbers who wish to attempt a solo climb and hire their
own Sherpa’s are most likely to do a deal with a commercial venture. They will
be included on the commercial permit (for a price) and then left to their own
devices. While this does appear to happen quite often, the consequences of a
problem arising can be quite large. There is no support team beyond the hired
Sherpa’s, if something goes wrong others do not know to look for you or where
you are supposed to be. Additionally, if the Sherpa’s dies then the climber is
left without any support at all39.
An additional and possible explanation for some of our results could come
from the nature of the relationship observed Sherpa to client and climber to
climber. One would expect that the traditional climbers should have a strong
bond with other traditional climbers, given the repeated interaction. This inter-
action creates an emotional attachment; this could result in a higher willingness
to render aid or coming to the assistance of another traditional climber. This
should also be the case with Sherpa’s who have repeated interactions with tra-
ditional climbers; they should be more likely to come to the aid of those in need,
especially those with whom they have interacted over time. Alternatively the
lack of interaction that the commercial clients have with either Sherpa’s or each
other could be a recipe for disaster if the emotional attachment e↵ect is lower.
These are less experienced climbers among the non-commercial group of moun-
taineers with no normative bond with those around them. This we see in all
of the modern commercial periods, and would be supported through the anec-
39One must be careful in the analysis of this. These are e↵ectively solo climbers and can
occasionally be listed as commercial depending on the nature of the permit they end up using
to climb.
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dotal evidence in the literature. These climbers are described as “athletically
and aesthetically unworthy” and that they have “profaned and debased” the
sacred peaks (Krakauer, 1997, p.23). It would appear that these climbers were
not adopting the traditional ethic or point of view, nor were they respecting the
homeland of those they paid to keep them alive. We find this explanation very
likely, and would fit well with the data and the collected evidence.
Towards these ends we have split the death variable into the death of a
Sherpa, a climber and the term where both a Climber and Sherpa die (see Ta-
ble 5.1). Other than this we use the same time periods and variables. We find
that all the variables remain consistent in both significance and sign, except
the new death variables. An interesting result here is the e↵ect of a Sherpa
death within the non-commercial expeditions; the e↵ect here is very strong and
significantly negative (9-10). This would indicate that the death of a Sherpa
has a significant e↵ect on a successful outcome, indicating willingness of the
expeditions to stop or at the very least has a significant e↵ect on their ability to
continue. These findings are very much in line with the emotional attachment
argument, such that the death of anyone in a non-commercial group has a sig-
nificantly negative e↵ect on success. The same cannot be said of the commercial
expeditions, the e↵ect of a death has no significant e↵ect whatsoever on that
of success, demonstrating little attachment with the Sherpa’s (see specification
11). Given the high ratio of hirelings to clients this result is completely under-
standable. It would appear that an individual Sherpa is replaceable, providing
further evidence of the low attachment and emotional bond between commercial
climbers and those they work with or hire. In line with previous results a death
of a climber is significant and negative for the non-commercial specifications (9
& 10), but is insignificant for the commercial expeditions (11). This is again
well supported in the anecdotal literature on modern climbing. In the initial
periods we have a homogenous group (traditional climbers), where acceptance
of the social norms and values is close to universal. Under these conditions it
would be relatively easy to demonstrate how repeated interaction with social
105
sanction or punishment would make this model work. However, we should also
observe a similar result without social sanction for a homogenous group and
even with a purely self-interested set of climbers we should observe cooperation
and helping behaviours. Self-interest would dictate that in such an extreme
environment, helping other by rendering aid can be viewed as a self-interested
act by rendering aid today, tomorrow when I need aid it will be extended to me
(insurance principle). Of course this principle falls down if those with whom I
am interacting with will not be around tomorrow to reciprocate. However, in
specification (9) we observe little change in the significance of either a climber
or Sherpa death from specification (10). This lack of change could indicate no
crowding out e↵ect or is evidence that it is the Sherpa’s themselves that are the
maintainers of the pro-social behaviour within the traditional non-commercial
group.
Emotional attachment and closeness between individuals is a by directional
relationship. It is not only there for the support of others individuals if they
have an accident, but also provides support for yourself if you have an acci-
dent. The extreme cost of this relationship can be seen in the actions and
reactions after the death of an individual (Sherpa or climber). There are sev-
eral very strong emotional and moral costs imposed on the remainder of the
group or those providing aid: firstly, the decision of whether or not to continue
climbing; and secondly, the costs associated with the disposal of the corpse (i.e.
funerals, burials, cremations, religious services etc.). Both of these are strongly
intertwined and are dependent on beliefs of the individual and the group40. It
may also be the case that groups without Sherpa’s might already be close-knit
groups. In the case where individuals already know each other well and have
substantial mountaineering skills, they may not require a Sherpa. Thus, in Ta-
ble 5.4 when we observe a decrease in significance and size, this may indicate
a crowding out e↵ect amongst mountaineers but the presence of Sherpa’s can
40It is very di cult to disentangle moral, religious and practical concerns when it comes to
the treatment of the dead. Depending on beliefs, circumstances and viewpoint just about any
situations could be argued as morally ambiguous.
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help to enforce pro-social norms within the group. This is further supported by
the marginal e↵ects in Table 4 between the variables Death Sherpa and Death
Climber, which are relatively similar and high, but for Death Sherpa the e↵ect
is even a little bit higher. This is also interesting taking into account that the
Sherpa’s are hired help and are not seen as part of the expedition proper41.
On the one hand the family of the deceased may wish to have the body
returned to them for a “proper” burial or service – this imposes a very large
imposition on the remainder of the expedition. Not only do they need to get
the body down but also they will most likely need (want) to attend. What is
the moral obligation at this point? Usually burials occur shortly after death
because of decomposition issues, but a frozen body will not su↵er from this
problem so this removes a possible time constraint. However, if a religious
service needs to occur within a set period of time after death, this can create a
large moral obligation on the others. Alternatively, career climbers may believe
that it is better to be buried on the mountain (forever close to the sport they
love) and for their friends to continue on as they would have wanted to. It is
not uncommon for bodies to be “buried” on the mountain (i.e. wrapped in a
sleeping bag, cloth or tent and either rolled into a crevasse or covered with rock).
This can be the default behaviour if it is too di cult or dangerous to remove the
body, which is usually the case at higher altitudes. Furthermore, this may be
the expected response if members of the expedition believe it was the deceased
wishes to be buried on the mountain. When asked about the number of dead
bodies still upon Everest, Alan Arnette stated: “The best number I have is that
approximately 233 people have died and of those, my wild guess is that 200
bodies are still there” (Quinlan, 2012). A mountain burial removes the need to
drag the body down the mountain and to some degree lowers the moral costs
if the party chooses to continue climbing. On the other hand, this becomes a
moot point if there is no emotional attachment of moral obligation placed on
41When Sherpa’s and porters are hired they are generally done on a no refund basis by
the agency, such that if the expedition is cancelled they are paid regardless of the expedition
outcome. This means that the pro-social behaviour of the Sherpa’s may not be financially
motivated, but instead by some innate cultural altruism or other-regarding preferences.
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the climbers after the death of an expedition member.
Climbers who have no relationship with each other and none with their
Sherpa’s are unlikely to expend large amounts of their own energy to drag some-
one down without a strong motivation. It may be that they could be shamed
into helping if others are in the vicinity and are o↵ering to help, but if they are
able to justify it to themselves it is likely they would not volunteer. Superfi-
cially, the actions of a traditional mountain burial and those of the unattached
climbers look very similar, as both climbers are free to continue onwards to-
wards their goals. Both result in the expedition continuing on their climb, but
the motivation for each is vastly di↵erent. Furthermore, the aim of the climbers
may be changed by the death of another person. If you have a close attachment
to the deceased you may no longer be interested in climbing. For a traditional
climber this may not be an issue, as you are likely to return for another at-
tempt. However, a commercial climber who has paid a large sum of money for
that single attempt (with no refunds for failure), there is not only the likelihood
of a lower level of attachment but as their ultimate goal is to summit and not
return the motivation to continue is greater.
However, at times the conditions and situation is just not conducive to bring
down someone who has died, especially in the high altitude “death zone.” In
1998 American climber Francys Distefano-Arsentiev was found dying at 8,500m
after summiting late in the day (see Hawley and Salisbury, 2007, EVER98107).
Initially she was found by an Uzbek expedition, the decision to provide aid
(oxygen) this close to the summit split the team. Two of the Uzbek expedition,
Fedorov and Grigotiev, stayed with her while the remainder of them continued
to the top. Additional assistance was given by passing South African Expedition
members (O’Dowd, Woodall and Zangbu). They tried to help for over an hour
by giving her water, putting her arms back into her sleeves and gloves on her
hands. Eventually Woodall and O’Dowd could do no more and returned down
camp. Francys was later found dead by the descending teams. Even though their
meeting was brief, Woodall had built an emotional attachment with Francys and
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was deeply a↵ected by being forced to leave her behind. In 2007, he returned to
give her a true mountain burial. He wrapped her in an American flag, lay her
to rest within sight of the summit she had earlier conquered and covered her
with a cairn of stones to shield her body from view (Harris, 2007). Although
weakened, it appears that the norms of the “tweedy gentlemen” still live on.
5.6 Conclusions
This paper has demonstrated that over last 60 years competing social institu-
tions have shifted behavioural norms, specifically on the e↵ect or death or injury
has on expedition success. The narrative analysis approach (Bates et al., 1998;
Greif, 1998; Greif and Laitin, 2004) has allowed us to piece together the story
where data limitations and holes are numerous to explore both formal and ex-
plicit questions (Bates et al., 1998). As such we are better able to understand
the attitudes, beliefs and preferences of the individuals, as well as the potential
constraints on actions (Bates, 1998). While the analysis is not specifically the-
ory driven, it does provide insights about the behaviour and outcomes from a
particular situation with specific characteristics.
To make such work more general further studies would need to be carried
out in a more controlled way controlling for many of the variables not obtain-
able in the initial analysis42. A recent field study carried out by Savage et al.
(2013) in Namche Bazar on the trail to Mt. Everest, elicited the attitudes and
beliefs of climbers and trekkers on their way to base camp and above. The
initial analysis of this study has shown that there appears to be a di↵erence
in the self-identification between commercial and non-commercial climbers. We
observed this clearly in individuals who identified themselves as being part of
42It would be nice to be able to identify an initial baseline level of risk seeking/aversion
and altruism within the climbers and then compare these to the observable behaviours and
actions. Additionally, in line with Akerlof and Kranton (2000) it would be helpful to be
able understand how strongly the climbers identify with either the commercial or traditional
norms or values. It may also be interesting to understand how individuals in each of the social
institutions perceive their probability of dying and that of success. Furthermore, it would be
very helpful to get an insight and understanding of the Sherpa people’s attitudes towards
climbing, given that the mountains are sacred to them and they work (climb/guide/porter)
on these peaks for a living.
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a commercial expedition and then selected the climbing types they most iden-
tified with. The commercial climbers weakly self-identified with “traditional
climber”, “mountaineer” or “alpinist” (see Figure 5.2). However, they iden-
tified very strongly with the more modern, non-traditionalist view of climbing
“adventure seeker”, “adrenaline junkie” and “someone who looks for challenges”
(see Figure 5.3)43.
Figure 5.2: Traditionalist views of climbing
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To date there has been very little evidence demonstrating shifts in social
norms, emotions or group identity over time in extreme, or life and death situa-
tions. While this and our previous works have shown that pro-social behaviour
and altruism do play a role in extreme life and death events (Frey et al., 2010a,b)
and that supportive pro-social emotions are the first and strongest to emerge
during these events (see, Savage and Torgler, 2013, in press.), much more work
is needed to understand how social norms and institutions a↵ect individual be-
43For both figures a 7 point Likert scale is used ranging from 1 = NOT AT ALL to 7 = A
LOT.
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Figure 5.3: Non-traditionalist view of climbing.
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haviour in these extreme situations and environments. We observe some truth to
Hillary’s notion that during his day the traditional climbers strongly adhered to
such pro-social behaviours as such death and injuries had a significant e↵ect on
success. When members of these expeditions die the expedition was significantly
less successful. This may be driven by the members halting and bringing the
dead and strongly injured back down. This supports the idea that a single social
institution supports and rea rms cooperative and pro-social behaviour in this
environment. Additionally, it shows that emotional attachment and closeness
to each other and the Sherpa are in part responsible for the results.
The past few decades have seen the introduction of a second (competing)
social institution and the anecdotal evidence suggested that this has eroded
helping and pro-social behaviours. This belief is indirectly supported in the
analysis, with the uptake of commercialisation reflecting the significant drop in
deaths a↵ecting the success of expeditions. It may be that the inability to pun-
ish social norm transgressions has over time weakened pro-social behaviours as
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predicted by Heckathorn (1989). But it is not only the commercial climbers that
are less likely to engage in helping behaviours, but their introduction appears to
have weakened the altruistic behaviours of the traditional climbers as well. This
result demonstrates that a competing social institution can crowd-out existing
good behaviours and support the rise of less noble anti-social ones by being a
catalyst for the weakening of the traditional institutional values. It seems that
the introduction of the competing social norm has degraded the pro-social be-
haviour of climber and only through the cultural attitudes of the Sherpa people
is the pro-social attitude being maintained in the traditional climbing group.
Without the ability to enforce the norms of the traditional climbers onto the
commercial ones, the brotherhood of the rope could fully disappear being re-
placed by climbers unwilling to stop and turn around for those in need. This
poses a disturbing question. Is this a reflection of modern society in an extreme
life and death arena being played out at 8,000 meters or are we merely observing
the attitudes and behaviours of a sub-set of society that is not transferable to
the general population?
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Table 5.2: Descriptive Statistics - Expedition Level
Variable Obs. Mean Min Max
Number of Peaks 285
Number of Expeditions 6,350
Commercial 6,350 0.121 0 1
Success 6,350 0.528 0 1
(commercial) 770 0.732 0 1
(non-commercial) 5,580 0.500 0 1
Prime Season 6,350 0.942 0 1
(commercial) 770 0.975 0 1
(non-commercial) 5,580 0.938 0 1
Death 6,350 0.084 0 1
(commercial) 770 0.062 0 1
(non-commercial) 5,580 0.087 0 1
Injury 6,350 0.030 0 1
(commercial) 770 0.023 0 1
(non-commercial) 5,580 0.031 0 1
Male 6,350 0.917 0 1
(commercial) 770 0.900 0 1
(non-commercial) 5,580 0.920 0 1
Height (Km) 6,350 7.792 5.55 8.85
(commercial) 770 7.835 5.587 8.85
(non-commercial) 5,580 7.786 5.55 8.85
Duration (Days) 4,813 28.245 1 133
(commercial) 666 27.240 1 80
(non-commercial) 4147 28.410 1 133
Total Members 6,350 6.708 1 99†
(commercial) 770 9.247 1 34
(non-commercial) 5,580 6.358 1 99
Total Hired 6,350 2.713 0 99†
(commercial) 770 4.136 0 42
(non-commercial) 5,580 2.515 0 99
O2 Used 6,350 0.245 0 1
(commercial) 770 0.394 0 1
(non-commercial) 5,580 0.224 0 1
Rope (km) 6,350 0.218 0 8.7
(commercial) 770 0.251 0 7
(non-commercial) 5,580 0.213 0 8.7
Sherpa Deaths‡ 6350 0.023 0 1
(commercial) 770 0.020 0 1
(non-commercial) 5,580 0.023 0 1
Climber Deaths 6350 0.069 0 1
(commercial) 770 0.052 0 1
(non-commercial) 5,580 0.071 0 1
Age (SD)⇤ 5756 7.384 0 31.11
(commercial) 761 9.260 0 30.4
(non-commercial) 4995 7.100 0 31.1
Age (Mean) 6271 36.280 20 75
(commercial) 769 38.760 23.67 57.59
(non-commercial) 5502 35.930 20 75
Notes: † Members & Total Hired EVER-881-01 was state sponsored with a very large number of support staff -
included were 14 Japanese, 14 Chinese & 14 Nepalese climbers, 12 support climbers, 15 Japanese TV crew, 12
additional TV crew to Lha La camp, 10 TV Sherpa’s, 5 journalists and 56 auxiliary staff (Hawley and Salisbury:
EVER-881-01). ‡ The variable for Sherpa deaths is a dummy variable the specific death of a Sherpa, the reference
group will be the death of any other individual, such as porters, aux. staff and so on. ⇤ The number of
observations in Age (SD) is reduced as SD cannot be calculated on a single value (solo or groups of two with a
missing member’s age).
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Table 5.3: Baseline Models
(1a) (1b) (2a) (2b)
Non-Comm Non-Comm Comm Comm
1950-2009 1950-2009 1955-2009 1955-2009
Death -0.718*** -0.645*** -0.257 -0.322
(-7.43) (-5.71) (-1.30) (-1.53)
-0.271 -0.243 -0.086 -0.109
Injury -0.219 -0.035 0.333 0.318
(-1.27) (-0.23) (0.56) (0.45)
-0.087 -0.014 0.103 0.098
Height (km) -0.244** -0.306** -0.451** -0.630***
(-1.99) (-2.38) (-2.12) (-2.65)
-0.097 -0.122 -0.140 -0.194
Prime 0.205 0.267* -0.166 -0.256
Season (1.30) (1.65) (-0.58) (-1.00)
0.082 0.105 -0.048 -0.072
Male 0.186 0.164 1.456** 0.968
(1.51) (1.33) (2.10) (1.34)
0.074 0.065 0.451 0.298
Age (SD) 0.001 0.001 0.046** 0.038*
(0.10) (0.23) (2.16) (1.77)
0.001 0.001 0.014 0.012
Age (mean) -0.002 0.003 -0.041*** -0.028**
(-0.56) (0.71) (-3.16) (-2.00)
-0.001 0.0013 -0.013 -0.009
Duration 0.005 0.012
(days) (1.17) (1.18)
0.002 0.004
Members 0.014 0.001 0.029 0.025
(1.55) (0.11) (1.43) (1.23)
0.006 0.001 0.009 0.008
Hired 0.004 0.007 0.039 0.038
(0.70) (0.62) (0.95) (0.92)
0.002 0.003 0.012 0.012
O2 used 0.895*** 0.909*** 1.071*** 1.141***
(5.37) (4.79) (4.95) (4.95)
0.333 0.343 0.298 0.317
Rope (km) -0.049 -0.0001** -0.296*** -0.001***
(-1.38) (-2.02) (-3.77) (-3.87)
-0.020 -0.001 -0.092 -0.001
Cluster 270 277 52 52
N 4838 3705 746 647
P< 2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Pseudo R2 0.064 0.066 0.138 0.145
Notes: t statistics in parentheses * p <0.05, ** p <0.01, *** p <0.001.
Commercial expeditions did not begin until 1955 and were scarce until
the late 1970’s.
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Table 5.4: Period Breakdowns
(3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
1950-87 1988-09 1988-09 1950-87 1988-09 1988-09
Non-Com Non-Com Com Non-Com Non-Com Com
Inc. Sherpa Yes Yes Yes No No No
Death -0.625*** -0.552*** -0.326 -1.006*** -0.307* -0.359
(-4.93) (-3.63) (-1.54) (-3.22) (-1.93) (-0.60)
-0.221 -0.213 -0.11 -0.254 -0.115 -0.14
Injury -0.227 0.077 0.270 -0.348 0.457* 1.49
(-0.53) (0.38) (0.39) (-0.63) (1.69) (1.15)
-0.088 0.031 0.083 -0.120 0.179 0.594
Height -0.543*** -0.294* -0.648*** -0.428*** -0.250 -0.655***
(km) (-6.24) (-1.93) (-2.76) (-4.20) (-1.46) (-2.93)
-0.21 -0.117 -0.199 -0.147 -0.098 -0.261
Prime -0.038 0.300 -0.250 -0.113 0.343* 0.075
Season (-0.21) (1.46) (-0.98) (-0.43) (1.78) (0.100)
-0.015 0.119 -0.070 -0.040 0.128 0.030
Male 0.462 0.122 1.018 0.543 0.308* 0.933
(1.33) (0.83) (1.39) (1.25) (1.76) (0.93)
0.179 0.049 0.313 0.187 0.120 0.372
Age -0.024 0.004 0.035 -0.028 -0.009 0.004
(SD) (-1.19) (0.68) (1.59) (-1.34) (-1.20) (0.08)
-0.009 0.001 0.011 -0.010 -0.003 0.002
Age 0.008 0.001 -0.028** -0.002 0.012* 0.005
(mean) (0.44) (0.03) (-2.01) (-0.11) (1.70) (0.23)
0.003 0.001 -0.009 -0.001 0.005 0.002
Duration 0.008* 0.007* 0.013 0.009* 0.005 0.034**
(days) (1.73) (1.69) (1.32) (1.86) (1.01) (2.13)
0.003 0.003 0.004 0.003 0.002 0.014
Members -0.008 0.016 0.023 0.005 0.021** 0.032
(-0.96) (1.48) (1.06) (0.31) (2.21) (1.14)
-0.003 0.006 0.007 0.002 0.008 0.013
Hired 0.042*** -0.004 0.039 (0.005) -0.090*** -0.036
(3.64) (-0.39) (0.93) (-0.24) (-3.26) (-1.06)
0.016 -0.002 0.012 -0.002 -0.035 -0.014
O2 use 0.402** 0.936*** 1.108*** -0.347 0.604*** 0.0252
(2.28) (4.22) (4.95) (-1.58) (3.93) (0.06)
0.158 0.348 0.309 -0.109 0.237 0.01
Rope 0.083 -0.114*** -0.341*** 0.119 -0.100 -1.168*
(0.92) (-2.61) (-3.93) (1.17) (-1.28) (-1.86)
0.032 -0.046 -0.105 0.041 -0.039 0.466
Cluster 127 177 38 98 144 29
N 717 2988 639 426 1747 167
P< 2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Pseudo R2 0.093 0.072 0.144 0.08 0.04 0.101
Note: t statistics in parentheses * p <0.05, ** p <0.01, *** p <0.001.
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Chapter 6
Variation in Risk Seeking
Behaviour in a Natural
Experiment on Large Losses
Induced by a Natural
Disaster
Lionel Page, David A. Savage & Benno Torgler
Under review in: Review of Economics and Statistics
Abstract
This study explores people’s risk attitudes after having su↵ered large real-world
losses following a natural disaster. Using the margins of the 2011 Australian
floods (Brisbane) as a natural experimental setting, we find that homeowners
who were victims of the floods and face large losses in property values are 50%
more likely to opt for a risky gamble - a scratch card giving a small chance
of a large gain ($500,000) - than for a sure amount of comparable value ($10).
This finding is consistent with prospect theory predictions of the adoption of a
risk-seeking attitude after a loss.
6.1 Introduction
One ongoing challenge in behavioural economics is to understand the variations
observed in risk attitudes as a function of their context. Of particular interest
is the e↵ect of changes in wealth on risk attitudes. The research in this area,
however, has faced at least two constraints. First, it is in practice di cult to
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study experimentally the e↵ect of large changes in wealth on risk attitudes.
Second, even in the case of small changes in wealth, it is in practice very hard
to study the case of real losses.1 This paper addresses this double limitation
by providing evidence of the variation in risk attitudes following large losses
induced by a natural disaster (the Brisbane floods).
Experimental economists have developed many techniques to elicit risk atti-
tudes in both the laboratory and the field (see e.g. Hey and Orme, 1994; Holt
and Laury, 2002; Harrison et al., 2007a; Abdellaoui et al., 2008). The use of
controlled experiments to study risk attitudes have however in-built limitations
which raise potential concerns relative to the external validity of their results.
First, budget constraints usually mean that stakes are small, so risk attitudes
are typically measured only on a limited range of small stakes. Although in
theory the estimation of risk attitudes on small stakes in the laboratory could
be used to extrapolate behaviour for large stakes in the field, recent develop-
ments have questioned the possibility to use the measurement of risk attitudes
on small stakes to credibly predict risky behaviour for large stakes.2 Second,
because of ethical constraints, it is almost impossible to induce real losses for
experimental participants, so the experimental study of risky behaviour in the
loss domain is more tentative than that when participants are faced with gains
1The research also faces other di culties such as the extent to which individuals subjec-
tively combine current changes in outcome with their overall wealth (asset integration) when
making choices Andersen et al. (2011). More fundamentally, there is no consensus on how to
define wealth itself conceptually and operationally: should it be the current level of financial
assets? Should it be the expected wealth over the life cycle?
2Cox and Sadiraj (2008) show that the most widely used decision models, expected util-
ity and rank dependent expected utility (which includes prospect theory as a specific case),
face either the Rabin (2000) paradox when the utility function on outcomes is bounded (es-
timation of risk aversion on small stakes give implausible risk aversion level for large stakes)
or generalised St. Petersburg paradoxes when the utility function is unbounded (they are
predicted to be willing to pay an infinite amount to play some gambles). As pointed out by
Cox and Sadiraj (2008), these problems may be inconsequential as the paradox mentioned
might only exist for ranges of income, which individuals only rarely face (in particular is the
case of generalised paradoxes which involve infinite expected values). In addition, a reference
dependent model can explain Rabin?s paradox where the risk attitude is not primarily driven
by the curvature of the utility function but by the loss aversion relative to a reference point
Rabin (2000); Wakker (2010). De facto, experimental studies, which study risk aversion as-
suming that individuals have a utility on the income earned during the experiment assume
implicitly a reference dependent model where the reference point is the status quo at the start
of the experiment (Wakker, 2010, p. 244). As pointed by (Harrison and Rutstro¨m, 2008a,
pp.95–98) a proper study of individual risk attitude would require to take into account that
the individual reference point may di↵er from the status quo and could in particular be close
to the earning participants expect to get in the session.
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Harrison and Rutstro¨m (2008a, pp. 111–115) and Wakker (2010, pp. 264–265).
Third, the laboratory is an ill-designed setting for studying the e↵ect of changes
in wealth on risk attitudes. Rather, wealth e↵ects are most often considered
noise in the analysis of experimental data. The latter has led to the widespread
adoption of the random lottery incentive by which participants, who make sev-
eral choices during the experiment, are in the end only paid for one of their
choices (Harrison and Rutstro¨m, 2008a).3
In the present paper, we provide new evidence on the e↵ect of recent changes
in wealth on risk attitude. Specifically, by exploring individual risk attitudes
following the 2011 floods in Brisbane (Australia), we investigate the e↵ect of
large losses shortly after the loss was incurred. We are therefore using a natural
disaster as a natural experimental setting in which random wealth shocks can
be observed in a population. The a priori random limit of the flood serves
as a strategy by which to compare the reaction of very similar populations of
homeowners facing a large di↵erence in wealth shock; that is, homeowners who
have just been a↵ected by those floods versus those who were not a↵ected. Our
methodology is close in spirit to a regression over discontinuity, although the
equivalent of a treatment – the subjective perception of the loss incurred by the
flood – is not directly observable.
Following the January 2011 floods, we sampled 220 residential homeowners
in a↵ected Brisbane areas and o↵ered those selected the opportunity to choose
between a fixed sum – $10 – and a risky gamble, a lottery scratch card potentially
worth $500,000 (with a $10 face value in retail shops). These participants, drawn
from each side of the margin of the flood peak in 15 suburbs across the city,
completed a raft of survey questions on the impact of the flood and their opinion
of the reaction by national and local authorities. The survey also collected a
range of demographic and personal background information on the homeowners
and their families. Specifically, participants were asked about their beliefs about
the value of their houses (before and after the flood) and whether they were
3See also (Wakker, 2010, p. 136) and Harrison and Swarthout (2012) for a critique of the
use of this incentive scheme in experiments.
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insured against flood damage and their level of coverage.
Our main finding is that individuals whose properties were directly a↵ected
by the floodwaters were much more likely to accept a risky gamble - the scratch
card - than their una↵ected immediate neighbours. This outcome supports
prospect theory predictions of the adoption of risk-seeking attitudes after a
large wealth loss. We also contribute to the literature on decision making under
risk by providing the first (quasi) experimental evidence on the change in risk
attitudes induced by a large negative wealth shock. Most particularly, our study
provides supporting empirical evidence that individuals who have incurred a
negative wealth shock are much more likely to accept a risky gamble.
6.2 Background
In his 2002 Nobel Laureate lecture, Daniel Kahneman explains how one of the
key principle behind Prospect Theory (PT) is the rejection of what he calls
the “Bernoulli’s error” Kahneman (2002). By this term, he means the widely
stated hypothesis in applied economics that the carrier of utility is the total
level of wealth. Although this hypothesis is not part of the expected utility
(EU) theoretical framework as such, it has long been embraced by economists
as a natural assumption. However, in their 1979 paper, Kahneman and Tversky
put forward another hypothesis: that the carrier of utility is the change in wealth
(or more generally, the changes in outcomes) relative to a particular reference
point (typically, but not necessarily, the status quo). Within this framework,
Kahneman and Tversky posited that people are likely to adopt a more risk
adverse behaviour when faced with choices involving gains but become more
risk seeking when faced with choices involving losses. This pattern, termed
the “reflection e↵ect”, is modelled by a utility function that exhibits di↵ering
curvature for gains (concave = risk aversion) and for losses (convex = risk
seeking).4
4Formally, in prospect theory, risk attitudes are defined jointly by the curvature of a utility
function on the outcomes (often called “value function”) and a probability weighting function.
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Most applications based on PT assume the current level of wealth as the
reference point. However, this may not be the case; for instance, because read-
justment to a new level of wealth takes time Rayo and Becker (2007). It is in
this spirit that Kahneman and Tversky (1979) suggested that: “a person who
has not made peace with his losses is likely to accept gambles that would be
unacceptable to him otherwise” (p. 287). That is, following a loss, individuals
using their previous situation as a reference point consider their present situa-
tion to be a loss. This suggestion is supported by the notion that gamblers take
on too much risk to “chase their losses”.
Studying risk behaviour after losses in a laboratory setting is di cult, be-
cause an individuals’ willingness to take risks is a↵ected by the fact that (1) they
are paid to participate and (2) they face no real possibility of losing their own
money because ethical rules prevent experimenters from creating situations in
which participants could face real losses.5 Hence, to date, experimental studies
have either focused on individual behaviours in the face of small losses following
an initial gain (endowment) or relied on hypothetical losses (see e.g. Harrison
and Rutstro¨m, 2008a). These two strategies, however, are subject to important
limitations. On the one hand, the framing of a situation as a loss relative to
the initial endowment assumes that participants consider the endowment and
the loss separately. Given the short duration of most experiments, this assump-
tion is questionable. Experimental research on risk attitudes has shown that
recently earned money like an endowment may lead to the taking of more risk,
a phenomenon known as the “house money e↵ect” (Thaler and Johnson, 1990).6
One explanation is that the newly acquired sum has not yet been adopted as
“personal property” but rather is considered a new gain that can be gambled
without fear of loss. On the other hand, the use of hypothetical losses raises
The reflection e↵ect is however traditionally attributed to a curvature of the utility function,
which is assumed to di↵er across the loss and gain domains. We discuss the possible role of
the weighting probability function in section 6.4.3.
5See Etchart-Vincent and l’Haridon (2011) for a rare case of an experimental study using
small real losses.
6See Etchart-Vincent and l’Haridon (2011) for a presentation of the empirical evidence and
a discussion of its relevance for the study of loss aversion in the laboratory.
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a question of the validity of the preference(s) elicited. A lack of incentives, for
example, may lead to a hypothetical bias, one whose importance has clearly
been established (Harrison and Rutstro¨m, 2008a, pp.123–124).
Outside the laboratory, only a few studies have looked at changes in risky
behaviour after a change in wealth. One significant strand is the literature on
the “disposition e↵ect” in finance, which indicates that shareholders are more
likely to hold on to losing shares after a drop in price (Odean, 1998). This
disposition e↵ect is compatible with an increase in risk behaviour after a loss
predicted by PT. Nevertheless, the non-experimental nature of these studies
does not allow for the elimination of other confounding explanations (Barberis
and Xiong, 2009).
In addition, two recent studies have examined risk attitudes after a natu-
ral disaster, although, reporting conflicting results. On the one hand, Eckel
et al. (2009) studied the risk attitudes of refugees after the Hurricane Kat-
rina. They identified an evolution of risk attitudes among the di↵erent waves
of post-hurricane refugees, with the first refugee wave being more risk seeking.
Unfortunately, the lack of a control group does not ensure that these observed
di↵erences are due to the causal impact of the hurricane as such. Refugee char-
acteristics changed across waves, creating a possible confounding factor in the
explanation of the observed di↵erences in risk attitudes. On the other hand,
Cameron and Shah (2011) examined risk attitudes in areas a↵ected by floods
and earthquakes in rural Indonesia a few years after the disaster. They found
that populations in a↵ected areas exhibited higher levels of risk aversion. They
attributed this di↵erence partly to an increase in the belief that possible future
disasters might create a background risk, an attitude that has been shown to
lead to a higher risk aversion under some conditions (Gollier and Pratt, 1996;
Guiso and Paiella, 2008). They also attributed part of the di↵erence to the e↵ect
of the incurred loss in income under the assumption of decreasing absolute risk
aversion utility functions. Their study, however, was unable to fully control for
possible post-disaster migrations, which can lead to specific characteristics of
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the population deciding to stay in areas, which have been a↵ected by disasters7.
6.3 Method and data
6.3.1 Quasi-experimental design
In this paper, we find a solution to the limitations of laboratory and non-
experimental field studies by using the peak of an unexpected urban flood in
Brisbane (the capital and most populous city of Queensland, Australia) as a
natural experimental setting. This 2011 flood, an extreme event that inundated
approximately 78% of the state (an area larger than that of France and Germany
combined), a↵ected over 2.5 million people (Queensland Floods Commission of
Inquiry, 2011) and caused an estimated $5 billion in flood damages. Against
this backdrop, we investigate whether people may be more prone to take risky
gambles shortly after experiencing a large loss in an attempt to return them to
their initial reference point. This natural experiment provides the first evidence
of a change in risk behaviour caused by a large negative wealth shock.
One critical identification assumption of our study is that the population
of homeowners is comparable on both sides of the flood limit, a reasonable
hypothesis given that the flood limit was a priori unpredictable. Before this
event, the last serious flood had been over 35 years earlier (1974), and over the
10-year period before the flood, Queensland had undergone a drought. Home-
owners, therefore, had no relevant information ex ante to anticipate the 2011
flood line at the time they purchased their homes. In fact, the risk assessment
performed by the Brisbane City Council (Department of Environment and Re-
source Management, 2011), which is available to residents online, showed no
statistically significant di↵erence (p=0.90) in the risk of flood over a 20-year
7It is also worth mentioning the theoretical paper by Palacios-Huerta and Santos (2004)
on the formation of endogenous preferences. Using information on household consumption
and returns on assets from 47 villages, they provide indirect evidence that suggests a greater
level of risk aversion among households just after the 1988 flood in Sri Lanka compared with
four years later (1992). As is the case for the previously mentioned studies, the data does not
allow them to control for possible changes in the population sample over time.
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time frame between the properties of participants just above and just below the
flood limit. Hypothetically, homeowners could have used the limits of the 1974
flood peaks in their decision to buy a house. In practice, however, 30 years after
the 1974 floods, such concerns were likely to be limited, and casual information
suggests that the peak of the 1974 flood limit was only imperfectly known by
residents.8 In addition, it was generally believed that the construction of the
Wivenhoe Dam after the 1974 floods would prevent future disasters of this sort
(Humphries, 2011). Nevertheless, in theory, the 1974 flood peak could have
provided salient information leading risk adverse homeowners to avoid prop-
erties below this line. Fortunately for our analysis, however, the level of the
1974 flood peaks was significantly higher than in 2011: 5.5m versus 4.46m. We
can therefore be fairly sure that any significant di↵erence in behaviour observed
within 1m of the 2011 flood line is not due to home owner selection around the
1974 flood limit. Moreover, most of the e↵ect we observe takes place within the
range of 1m around the flood line.
To ensure that our identification hypothesis is as valid as possible, we fo-
cus our analysis on a sample of residents very close to the flood limit. We
also provide evidence that homeowners around the flood line are similar on the
observable characteristics collected in our survey.
6.3.2 Data
The data in this study consist of the choices and responses of 220 individual
homeowners surveyed over the weekends of March 12-13 and 19-20, 2011, only
a few weeks after the flood reached its peak on January 13-14, 2011. These
study participants answered a survey questionnaire and chose to be rewarded
for their participation either with a fixed sum of $10 (all amounts are in Aus-
tralian dollars) or with a lottery scratch card worth $10 at local newsagents
but having a maximum prize of $500,000. This choice between a sure amount
8No regulation compels it to be included in the description of properties when they are
bought.
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and a scratch card is, to our knowledge, new in field experimentation to elicit
di↵erences in risk attitudes.9 In our context, the scratch card presents signif-
icant advantages. First, it is a perfectly ecologically valid situation of choice.
That is, because the scratch cards used are readily available from newsagents
all around the city, even individuals who have never bought a card are likely to
have seen them and considered whether or not to buy one. Therefore, unlike the
laboratory experiments so often criticised for presenting subjects with unusual
situations that can lead to atypical behaviour, we can be reasonably sure that
our participants understood the choice proposed to them. A second advantage
is that a scratch card is a simple choice, easily inserted into a survey. Because
participants were met on their doorsteps, a minimalist and simple experimental
protocol was necessary to minimise the cost of participation and ensure reason-
ably high response rates. A third key advantage is that the choice o↵ered can
appear to be a natural choice between two rewarding options for completing
the survey. We are thus likely to minimise the risk of a “Hawthorne e↵ect” by
which participants try to modify their behaviour as a function of their beliefs
about what the experimenters expect. In our context, given the short time span
between the flood and the experiment, a set of questions that stressed the mea-
surement of risk attitudes could have raised concerns. That is, recent victims of
the flood could have self-consciously perceived that we were trying to elicit their
risk attitudes because of the flood and could have modified their behaviour as
a result, which would have prevented any analysis of the flood’s causal e↵ect
on risk attitudes. Overall, our use of a scratch card to infer di↵erences in risk
attitudes toward losses is not too di↵erent from the literature on the “disposi-
tion e↵ect”, which looks at trader decisions between a sure prospect (selling at
a loss) and an uncertain prospect without known distribution of probabilities
9A scratch card, in contrast to standard risk elicitation procedures, has no known outcome
probabilities for the participant. The study of risk attitudes is usually made with experiment
proposing risky choices with clear probabilities (Hey and Orme, 1994; Holt and Laury, 2002).
Studying risk attitudes under uncertainty is possible but more di cult (Abdellaoui et al.,
2011). In the context of our study, we chose not to elicit utility functions of probability
weighting function but to study variations in risk attitudes with a choice between a certain
prospect and a risky prospect.
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(holding the asset).
Three screening questions were used to exclude non-homeowners from the
experiment. First, participants were chosen from specifically targeted houses
and streets from across 16 suburbs, with every property selected through an
identical process: selection of streets on the margin of the peak, using visual
analysis of aerial/satellite (Nearmap) photos taken after the flood peak (Jan-
uary 14). To limit variation in income/wealth and property value, the target
areas were limited to single streets, one of whose sides was flood a↵ected and
the other not. This criterion was expanded to include flooding across rather
than along the street, to localise and maintain the marginal nature of cross
flooding, a limited number of houses were selected on each side of the flood
line. After a comparison of topological maps (PDOnline Interactive Mapping)
and satellite photos, the houses selected were sorted into control and treatment
groups. Surveys were administered only if the resident was home on the day of
the visit and chose to participate in the study. Given the relatively low height
of the floodwaters around the houses at the margin, a↵ected homeowners were
in most cases still residing in their houses, producing a relatively high response
rate on both sides of the margin: 21% for non-a↵ected houses and 20.6% for
a↵ected houses (di↵erence: p=0.89).
Because the same flood level may a↵ect houses di↵erently depending on
whether their doorsteps are at street level or on stilts (very common in Bris-
bane), we estimated the distance to the flood limit using the lowest habitable
level of the house. We relied first on Brisbane City Council contour plot maps
to estimate the height of the lowest part of the house and compared it to the
height of the flood in the area, as estimated by the Brisbane City Council. We
also asked homeowners to give an estimation of the vertical height of the flood
relative to the lowest habitable level of the house. We used homeowner esti-
mates of the height of the flood when it reached the house (in many cases, very
precise because of measurements made by an insurance company). In cases in
which the flood did not reach the house, we used mostly map information but
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also looked at the homeowners’ survey responses, which often revealed a sig-
nificant di↵erence from the map estimate because the house was on stilts. In
case of a discrepancy between the map estimate and the homeowner response,
we checked the architectural disposition of the house using the street view tool
from Google Maps and retained the homeowner estimate when the house was
on stilts.
In an explicit e↵ort to avoid researcher bias, the researchers administered
none of the survey questionnaires, rather, a team of 22 research assistants (RAs)
first underwent a training session prior to being placed in the field and were at
no time told the objectives or purpose of the survey. These RAs were provided
with a set script so that all questionnaires could be administered in as similar
a manner as possible, creating a consistent approach across all surveys and
reducing extraneous noise. The RAs were also randomly allocated to houses
within each street to ensure that each RA interviewed houses on both sides of
the flood limits in each street.
6.3.3 Empirical methodology
Our experimental design takes advantage of the fact that around the flood limits,
homeowners experienced very di↵erent fates in terms of their wealth evolution.
First, homeowners that were directly a↵ected faced costly floodwater-caused
damage to houses and their contents. Second, house values changed markedly
around the new flood limit, with a↵ected houses incurring a large negative
risk premium (at least for some time after the flood). Hence, although our
methodology is in spirit close to a regression over discontinuity design, it di↵ers
in two important ways. First, because the treatment of interest is homeowners’
feelings of loss following the floods, the “treatment” is not observable. Second,
this treatment will di↵er among homeowners for a given distance to the flood
limit not only because homeowners may update their beliefs about their property
value loss di↵erently, but because architectural di↵erences can have a critical
impact on the monetary e↵ect of floods for homeowners. In flooded areas, many
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ground-based houses are adjacent to houses on stilts whose habitable rooms are
3m above ground. Likewise, the amount of personal valuables located in the
flooded portions of the home may vary, as might the propensity of the insurance
company to reimburse the flood damage (e.g., in the 2011 Brisbane floods, one
company decided to reimburse all cases, while another dismissed some cases as
not covered by the insurance policy).
As a result, the characteristics of the observed data do not allow precise es-
timation of a regression discontinuity model. Nevertheless, within the carefully
selected sample of close neighbours around the flood limits, we can assume that
the conditional expectation of the subjective feeling of loss changes markedly
as a function of the distance to the flood limits. We can also assume that this
variation can be considered exogenous relative to homeowner characteristics for
homeowners “close enough” to the flood line, an assumption borne out in the
results for our sample (see Section 6.4.1). Equally important, participant re-
sponses were collected only 8-9 weeks after the devastating flood, which ensured
that the impact of the event was likely to be very fresh and very real in the
minds of the participants (lack of habituation).
To estimate the impact of the floods on risk attitude, we place each ob-
servation on one dimension that represents the vertical distance between the
estimated height of the house doorstep and the flood height in the area, as esti-
mated by the Brisbane City Council (Department of Environment and Resource
Management, 2011). We then use a nonparametric local linear regression to es-
timate the proportion of risk takers in our sample as a function of their location
relative to the flood line (in vertical distance). Because our observations are
concentrated around small positive and negative distances from 0, we opt for
a nearest neighbour estimator that adapts the smoothing window to the local
density of observations. This choice allows our estimator to be more precise
around the flood limit (zero) but have less variance away from the flood limit
where observations are scarcer.
The dependent variable in our analysis is a dummy indicating whether an
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individual chose to accept the risky gamble or not (accepted=1). The analysis
relies on the identification assumption that homeowners located near the flood
limits have similar characteristics. To ensure the credibility of this identification
assumption, we only use observations from homeowners whose houses were lo-
cated within 2.5m (vertically) of the flood line, a boundary outside of which very
few observations were collected in the field experiment. The resulting sample
consists of 201 observations (94 a↵ected participants and 107 non-a↵ected).
6.4 Results
6.4.1 Flood level, monetary losses and risk seeking
Figure 6.1 depicts the result of the local estimation of the proportion of risk
takers as a function of their distance to the flood lines. Our results show a
marked increase in risk taking around the point at which the flood limits reach
the habitable part of the house. Most notably, the greatest amount of change
in risk taking occurs within 1.5 meters around the height of the house. Risk
taking increases by 50% between homes where the flood was 0.75m below the
house level and homes where it reached 0.75m above.
Our hypothesis is that this change is induced by the loss provoked by the
flood. Figure 6.2 displays the declared loss in house value expected by home-
owners. The expected loss as a function of the distance to the flood line mirrors
the evolution of risk taking, which suggests that most of the subjective loss
experienced by homeowners occurs within this range. On average, we observe
an estimated jump in losses of $70,000 between -0.75m and +0.75m, the range
in which most of the variation in risk attitude takes places. This subjective
estimate, however, does not include the losses from personal property, which
are also likely to jump around the flood limit.
To check the validity of our assumption that homeowners on both sides of
the flood limits do not systematically di↵er in characteristics, we use question-
naire responses to test for di↵erences across the two groups on such variables
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Figure 6.1: Proportion of Risk Takers around the flood line.
as income, house value before the flood, level of content and house insurance,
age, gender, and religiosity of the respondent. We also use the Brisbane City
Council’s estimate of the flood risk for each property in the Brisbane area (De-
partment of Environment and Resource Management, 2011). As clearly shown
in Table 6.1, there are no significant di↵erences between homeowners below and
above the flood line over a range of di↵erent windows, which supports our as-
sumption that the flood margins provide a natural experimental setting that
allows us to study the e↵ect of the floods on risky behaviour in a population in
which the treatment and control groups have identical characteristics.
The confidence interval displayed in Figure 6.1 clearly suggests a statistically
significant shift around the flood line in terms of risk attitude. We run a probit
model to measure the impact of the flood level on the propensity to take the
risky gamble around the flood limit. To ensure robustness, we vary the window
of observations around the estimated flood limit between 1m and 2.5m on each
side, Table 6.2 shows the results. Despite the smaller sample of observations,
the shift in risk attitude is robustly significant around the flood line even when
the window is only 1m on each side. Hence, the smaller the window, the more
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Table 6.1: Tests of Pre-Existing Di↵erences.
Distance window (on each side)
1m 1.5m 2m 2.5m
Income 1.18 -0.15 -2.77 -3.23
(11.21) (10.23) (9.35) (8.79)
House value 9.73 -33.38 -68.84 -60.39
(before the floods) (114.06) (100.17) (91.00) (85.64)
Content insurance 48.12 35.54 29.36 27.30
(33.66) (26.76) (23.27) (21.67)
House insurance -4.10 -11.19 -13.68 -17.80
(65.24) (54.54) (47.78) (44.79)
Age -0.52 -0.68 0.61 1.00
(2.39) (2.22) (2.06) (2.00)
Male 0.03 0.00 -0.03 -0.04
(0.09) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07)
Religious -0.02 0.07 0.07 0.07
(0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06)
Flood risk 5 years 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01
(ex ante) (0.00) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
Flood risk 20 years 0.26 0.06 -0.00 -0.04
(ex ante) (0.35) (0.32) (0.29) (0.29)
Flood risk 50 years 0.29 0.02 -0.08 -0.11
(ex ante) (0.51) (0.46) (0.41) (0.40)
Flood risk 100 years 0.33 0.02 -0.11 -0.14
(ex ante) (0.58) (0.53) (0.46) (0.46)
Nb of observations 125 155 187 201
Differences estimated by OLS, robust SE in brackets. Monetary variables in thousand
dollars. The flood risk is estimated as the expected maximum flood height in meters
over the period for the house. It was publicly available on the Brisbane City Council
website before the floods.
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Figure 6.2: Subjective Property Loss Values around the flood line.
compelling the assumption that the populations of homeowners are similar on
both sides of the flood line.
To estimate the link between loss in property and the tendency to choose the
risky gamble, we estimate an IV probit using the flood height around the flood
limit as an instrumental variable for the incurred loss in property value. Ar-
guably, the answers to our survey questions on the value of the owner’s property
before and after the flood are likely to be characterised by some significant mea-
surement error, thereby creating an attenuation bias in the regressions. When
running a simple probit to explain the e↵ect of property values loss on risky de-
cisions, the coe cient is positive, but not significant. Instrumentation by flood
level corrects for a possible downward bias under the assumptions that the flood
level is not correlated with either observed or unobserved characteristics in our
sample and that the flood only has an e↵ect via its impact on home owners’
losses.10
Table 6.2 displays the results of the IV estimations. Overall, the e↵ects are
10Home owners’ losses are not limited to property losses. We can consider property losses
as a proxy for the total losses incurred.
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strongly significant and suggest that the loss of $10,000 in property value –
around a loss of $100,000 – increases the likelihood of homeowners taking the
risky gamble by 6 to 8%.
Table 6.2: E↵ect of the Wealth Loss on Risk Attitude.
Probit
1m 1.5m 2m 2.5m
Flood level 0.63⇤⇤⇤ 0.50⇤⇤⇤ 0.35⇤⇤⇤ 0.32⇤⇤⇤
(0.20) (0.13) (0.09) (0.08)
Nb of observations 125 155 187 201
IV Probit
1m 1.5m 2m 2.5m
Loss in property value 0.07⇤⇤⇤ 0.08⇤⇤⇤ 0.06⇤⇤⇤ 0.06⇤⇤⇤
(AUD10,000s) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
Nb of observations 107 133 162 171
Standard errors in brackets. ⇤⇤⇤ denotes significance at the 0.001 level.
6.4.2 The possible role of background risk
In their study of risk attitudes in areas a↵ected by floods and earthquake in
Indonesia, Cameron and Shah (2011) found that concerned populations have
higher risk aversion, a finding they suggest is largely due to the “background
risk” of future disaster. The potential role of such additional risk in the back-
ground of a given decision on a decision maker’s risk attitude has been stressed
in several theoretical works. Research has also shown that in the expected
utility framework, if the absolute risk aversion index of the utility unction is
decreasing and convex, a background risk will lead a decision maker to be less
likely to opt for a risky option (Gollier and Pratt, 1996; Eeckhoudt et al., 1996).
The necessary link between background risk and more risk aversion has been
contested by Quiggin (2003) who showed that for generalised EU theory, such
as Yaari’s 1987 dual theory, background risk can actually lead to the opposite
e↵ect of that suggested in the EU framework, thereby increasing the propensity
of a decision maker to opt for a given risky option. Recent empirical evidence
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seems to support the link expected from the EU theory (Harrison et al., 2007b).
In our setting, although increased belief in the risk of future flooding could
create background risk in participants’ minds, this factor cannot explain the
observed pattern – that homeowners are actually more risk seeking when they
have been a↵ected by the floods – within an EU framework. Moreover, it seems
to us unlikely that homeowners felt a significant background risk at the time of
the study and that such a feeling would have been significantly higher below the
flood limit. At the time of the survey collection, the wet season was at its end
in Queensland so homeowners would not be expecting any new floods before the
following year. Moreover, many psychological studies have found that people
have a tendency to believe that the probability of an event is lowered when
this event has recently occurred, the so-called “gambler’s fallacy” (Tversky and
Kahneman, 1974). Given the rarity of widespread floods in Brisbane, such a
psychological bias would lead residents to believe that a new flood is unlikely
so soon after the last one.
We can, however, further check the credibility of background risk as an
explanation for the pattern of observed risk attitudes using responses to a survey
item that asked our participants to rate the likelihood of their home being
flooded in the next 15 years. When we regress these responses, measured on
a 7-point Likert scale from “extremely likely” to “extremely unlikely”, on the
flood level around 2.5m from the flood limit, we do find some evidence that
homeowners a↵ected by the flood are more likely to expect their home to be
flooded again within the next 15 years (p=0.04). However, answers to this
question do not predict the risky choices in the experiment. Using a probit with
the choice of the scratch card as the dependent variable, the distance to the
flood limit as a first explanatory variable and the belief in the risk of future
flood as a second explaining variable, we find that while the distance to the
flood is a highly significant predictor (p<0.001), the belief in future floods is
nowhere near significant (p=0.55). This suggests that di↵erences in feelings of
background risk are unlikely to be the factor driving the observed variations in
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risk attitude around the flood limit.
6.4.3 Other possible explanations
Given the prominence of prospect theory in economics of decision, studies look-
ing at di↵erences of risk attitudes in the loss domain and in the gain domain
usually interpret the result only in relation to prospect theory predictions with-
out discussing other possible explanations. Our results clearly support prospect
theory predictions. What about other possible explanations? First, it is impor-
tant to stress that our results can be reconciled with expected utility if the utility
function is not assumed homogeneously concave or convex. The classical paper
by Friedman and Savage (1948) propose a utility function on wealth which is
convex for mid-range of wealth and concave for small and large ranges of wealth.
With such a utility function, one could suggest that our results come from a fall
from a high range of wealth associated with risk aversion to a lower range of
wealth associated with risk seeking. This explanation seems implausible to us.
Besides the fact that it is widely considered as an unlikely description of risk
attitudes11, this explanation would require for the average level of wealth to be
significantly di↵erent on both sides of the flood limit. However, taking prop-
erty values as a proxy of wealth12, the initial wealth levels are widely di↵erent
on both side of the flood line. As a consequence, even with the loss following
the flood, the distribution of wealth of a↵ected and una↵ected households are
largely overlapping. As a consequence the di↵erence in estimated property val-
ues on both side of the flood line is not significant (p=0.74 within 1.5m of the
flood line; p=0.48 within 2.5m). Overall, the wealth levels of our respondents
are too heterogeneous on both side of the flood line to drive our result. There
is a sharp di↵erence in losses around the flood line, but not so much in average
property values.
11In particular, Markowitz (1952) showed how the variations in concavity of the utility
function leads to predictions which contradict common observations of individual behaviour
under risk.
12Our argument holds a fortiori if present and/or future income is included in the calculation
of wealth as these are a priori not a↵ected by the floods.
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Within the prospect theory framework, it is also possible to consider other
explanations. For instance, as our scratch card involves a very small probability
of a large gain, our result could be driven by a change in likelihood sensitivity
(for a formal definition see Wakker (2010, pp. 222–230)) with homeowners being
more prone to overestimate small probabilities after large losses (less likelihood
sensitive). However, the empirical literature on the probability weighting func-
tion does not suggest that this is a likely explanation. Studies tend to find that
“behaviour for losses is closer to expected value maximisation” (Wakker, 2010,
p. 264). In practice, the probability weighting function is most often assumed,
in empirical studies, to be the same in both the gain and loss domain.
Finally, as in the literature on the disposition e↵ect, our study is about the
choice between a certain option (here the $10) and an uncertain one (scratch
card) where the exact probabilities on outcomes are unknown (in the disposition
e↵ect literature the uncertain option is to keep the losing asset). One possible
explanation in such a situation is that individuals’ ambiguity aversion can di↵er
over both loss and gain domain. Indeed, the literature on ambiguity aversion,
although not unanimous, tends to find that individuals are ambiguity averse
in the gains and ambiguity seeking in the losses (Wakker, 2010, p. 354). It is
in our opinion an interesting explanation, which has mostly been absent from
the literature on the disposition e↵ect and would warrant further examination.
While this endeavour is beyond the realm of the present study, we can note
that the traditional explanation and the ambiguity aversion explanation are not
necessarily exclusive. Klibano↵ et al. (2005) modelled ambiguity aversion as
arising from the curvature of a second order utility function on the expected
utility of the possible lotteries (which have a probability to be the one being
played). In this framework, an ambiguity seeking behaviour in the loss domain
would arise from a convex second order utility function, much in the spirit of
prospect theory.
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6.5 Conclusions
Although rare, choices made in situations in which large variations in wealth are
at stake can have critical and long-lasting consequences in an individual’s life.
Yet, the e↵ects of large variations in wealth are almost impossible to study using
experimental techniques. We are able to use a natural disaster as the setting for
a natural experiment that provides support for the prospect theory prediction
that individuals become more risk seeking after a loss. Specifically, our results
demonstrate that individuals who have su↵ered the large wealth shock of flood-
waters in their houses are approximately 50% more likely to accept a gamble
than their immediate neighbours who remained una↵ected. As the flood tran-
sition point (around zero) is approached, we observe a distinct increase in the
proportion of homeowners willing to accept a risky gamble with a high potential
prize that could allow them to make up for their initial losses. This result is
reflected in homeowner beliefs about the loss of wealth (house value) caused by
the flood, in which the average cost of being a↵ected in the floods resulted in
a loss of approximately $70,000. No significant di↵erences in observable char-
acteristics emerge, however, between homeowners across the flood line, which
supports our identification hypothesis that homeowners did not sort themselves
ex ante around the realised 2011 flood limits when they bought their houses.
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Chapter 7
The Emergence of
Emotions and Religious
Sentiments During the
September 11 Disaster
David A. Savage & Benno Torgler
Motivation and Emotion (2013), 37(3), 586-599
Abstract
Analysing emotional states under duress or during heightened, life-and-death
situations is extremely di cult, especially given the inability of laboratory ex-
periments to replicate the environment and given the inherent biases of post
event surveys. This is where natural experiments, such as the pager communi-
cations from September 11th can provide the kind of natural experiment emo-
tion researchers have been seeking. We demonstrate that positive and pro-social
communications are the first to emerge followed by the slower an lower nega-
tive communications. Religious sentiment is the last to emerge, as individual
attempt to make sense of event. Additionally we provide a methodological dis-
cussion about the preparation and analysis of such natural experiments (the
pager message content) and show the importance of using multiple methods to
extract the broadest possible understanding.
7.1 Introduction
Humanity’s greatest gift is communication, it allows for the sharing of culture
or history and the transmission of knowledge over generations. In common
everyday settings, one would observe that most communication is fairly pro-
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saic and at times even banal. However, the communication that takes place
when one anticipates the end is di↵erent matter. The death bed confession,
the condemned prisoner’s final words before execution or the desperate hurried
words exchanged as one expects to die (say in a plane crash or burning build-
ing) take on extra significance. The communication that takes place in these
life-threatening situations or under great pressure can reveal a vast amount of
information on individuals’ emotional state, their preferences and the way in
which they evolve over time. However, analysing emotional states under duress
or during heightened, life-and-death situations is extremely di cult, particu-
larly in a setting where a large number of individuals are simultaneously faced
with the same situation. Thus far, the research on the behaviour of individ-
uals during extreme events or disaster has only provided limited insights into
interpersonal connections (Mawson, 2007; Frey et al., 2010a). Furthermore, the
chronology of emotional development during a disaster is under-developed in
literature. While research has shown that both positive and negative emotions
coexist in stressful circumstances (Folkman and Moskowitz, 2000; Fredrickson
et al., 2003) the literature has been unable to show how emotions and sentiments
evolve. Furthermore, it has not been able to demonstrate the relative rate or
scale with which di↵erent emotions change. One possible exception is the Cohn
et al. (2004) analysis of web logs spanning a 4-month period, 2 months either
side of the 9/11 event1. Therefore, if we wish to comprehend human behaviour
at such times, it requires us not only to understand how people act but also
some (intuitive) knowledge of their desires, some of which can be garnered from
communication. Recent research has illustrated that while the written word can
indeed reveal much, it is very di cult to find natural behavioural evidence to
test it (Pennebaker et al., 2003). In this study we take the Back et al. (2010,
2011) and Pury (2011) studies of pager text messages sent during the September
11 attacks (made publicly available by Wiki Leaks in 2009) as a starting point.
In order to gain a di↵erent perspective and a deeper understanding of the emo-
1While this research does show the change in emotion over time, the one week block sizes
only provides a coarse analysis and does not specifically look at the event as it is occurring
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tional responses during this event, we compare their analytical methodology in a
side-by-side approach. We attempt a simultaneous analysis of both positive and
negative emotional development and the uptake of religious sentiment. Addi-
tionally, we undertake a discussion about the importance of dataset preparation,
the methodology under which it is analysed and how this ultimately impacts
the study of emotional content.
It is well understood that communication analysis can reveal a vast amount
of information about an individual’s emotional state; this is especially true for
communications that occur during heightened, life threatening or life and death
situations. It was Freud (1901) who pointed out that “it is the inner conflict that
is betrayed to us through the disturbance in speech and that the viewpoints and
observations should hold true for mistaken reading and writing as for lapses in
speech . . . [given] the inner relation of these functions” (pp. 126 & 142). Lacan
(1968) goes further to dissociate language selection and the conscious mind stat-
ing that the unconscious is that part of the discrete discourse that is not at the
disposal of the subject in re-establishing the continuity of his discourse (Lacan,
1968, p. 49). Taken together the spoken word is as prone to communicating
emotional state as the written language and is done so without conscious direc-
tion from the individual. The literature pertaining to the use of SMS and text
style messaging has shown that while it is deemed a hybrid style of communica-
tion, it is closest in nature to face-to-face communication(Thurlow, 2003; Ling,
2003). H˚ard Segerstad (2005) asserts that as this form of communication tends
to be between friends, family and loved ones and because of technology param-
eters (limitations) these individuals tend to express themselves more concisely
and openly (p. 38). For the most part, this should result in a written form of
communication, which is very close in nature to private conversations between
close individuals. Therefore, this would indicate that during natural conver-
sation an individual’s unconscious mind cannot only betray emotion through
error but through the very selection of language (words) emotive content can
be asserted. Both the Final Report on the Collapse of the World Trade Centre
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Towers (the Federal Building & Fire Safety Investigation of the World Trade
Center Disaster, 2008) and the 9/11 Commission Report by Kean and Hamilton
(2004) refers to communication in and out of the World Trade Centre Towers to
friends, family and loved ones as events unfolded on the morning of September
11. For example, one individual recalls: “I ran to my desk and made a couple
of phone calls. I dialled about five times trying to reach my (spouse) . . . I also
called my sisters to find out more information” (Ripley, 2008, p. 9).
To date a limited number of studies have explored the September 11 attacks
using a content analysis approach. The first to do so was Back et al. (2010)
who utilised frequency count analysis using the Linguistic Inquiry and Word
Count (LIWC) software. Their initial analysis focused on negative emotional
aspects and showed that individuals did not react primarily with sadness but
displayed some elevated levels of anxiety that disappeared quickly. In contrast,
the level of anger continually escalated throughout the day. These findings
were questioned by Pury (2011) who showed that these initial findings were er-
roneous citing the inclusion of automatically generated (non-human) messages
into the analysis. These messages were mistakenly classified by LIWC as anger,
but lacked contextual emotional meaning and showed a clear non-random time
course. In response to this Back et al. (2011) adjusted their results using au-
tomatic algorithms and some human judgment (anger-rating analysis) which
removed the anger escalation. These two analytical methods revealed distinct
time lines, although they were positively correlated (r=0.50), in both cases the
authors observed that the dramatic rise in anger disappeared. The authors con-
cluded that “in the absence of more intelligent technical solutions, automatic
data preparation and analysis will probably need to be augmented by an ad-
ditional (burdensome) source of data: the human observer” (Back et al., 2011,
p. 2). Thus, as with the analysis of any natural data, one must be wary of
and alert to potential confounds which may be hidden within the data and use
human subjectivity for the furtherance of automatic analysis. One needs to be
able to qualify as accurate as possible the emotive content without biases (e.g.
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isolate automatic (non-human) responses) to get a measure for the relative im-
portance of emotions over time without inter-temporal noise. For this reason we
will adopt a parallel analysis approach to give a fuller and more comprehensive
picture of the results.
While Folkman and Moskowitz (2000) have shown that both positive and
negative emotions co-occur in stressful circumstances, there is very little litera-
ture about the chronological evolution of emotions in a crisis or disaster. There-
fore, it is valuable to go beyond the investigation of just negative emotions, as
positive emotions could facilitate superior coping and survival outcomes. These
coping and survival outcomes could be achieved by reducing levels of stress and
easing the mind of individuals under duress, not only by o↵ering a distraction
but also allowing the individual to maintain a cardiovascular state more con-
ducive to coping with elevated stress levels. The positive e↵ects could include:
changing people’s mode of thinking, broadening their (visual) attention, their
momentary thoughts and their behavioural repertoires impacting cognitive and
coping skills (Fredrickson et al., 2003). Laboratory experiments have shown that
positive emotions can improve attention, focus, and the processing of important
information (Aspinwall, 1998). Furthermore, research has indicated that not
only can positive communication have a strong correlation with emotion dur-
ing stressful events, but religiosity has been shown to provide individuals with
strategies for making sense of and coping post-event (see, e.g., Park, 2005; Hogg
et al., 2010; Pargament et al., 2005).
In recent times studies of the human response to crises have been criticised
for neglecting the religious dimension (Pargament et al., 2005) and empirical
work on emotion, within a religious context, has lagged behind theory, which
has been largely speculative (Emmons and Paloutzian, 2003). Emmons (2005)
criticized that a literature search using PsyINFO database for the period 1988-
2002 returned only five citations when terms religion and emotion was included
jointly, which has increased to fourteen for the period 2003-2011. This is un-
fortunate as there is a large body of research evidence that supports the notion
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that social norms (which include religious values) can have a profound e↵ect on
the behaviour of individual’s (Andreoni and Miller, 2002; Becker, 1974b; Bolton
and Ockenfels, 2000; Camerer, 2004; Drago and Garvey, 1998; Dufwenberg and
Kirchsteiger, 2004; Elster, 2007; Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Frey, 1997; Martos
et al., 2011; Rabin, 1993; Savage and Torgler, 2010; Silberman, 2005; Sobel,
2005; Tix and Frazier, 2005; Torgler, 2007). Silberman (2005) supports this line
of reasoning indicating that an individual’s idiosyncratic meaning systems may
be of particular importance in predicting coping outcomes (p. 645). Religion
influences the generation of emotions and helps to regulate emotional responses
(Emmons, 2005). Emotion-focused coping plays a role in situations where one
perceives that the circumstances can’t be modified in the hope that turning to
prayers and religious methods make things changeable. Faith in times of di -
culty helps to deal with the problems faced and emotions (Hood et al., 2009).
In our case people have a need for meaning, control or comfort and search for it
through religion. However, as pointed out by Pargament et al. (2005) “di↵erent
people look to religion for di↵erent ends. The extraordinary staying power of
the world’s religions may have much to do with the fact people of di↵erent tem-
perament, need, and situation can find one of the many niches for themselves
in these living systems” (p. 59).
Any study of the relationship between emotion and religion is, at the best
of times, complicated, but becomes more complex when trying to source its
impact during periods of high stress such as 9/11. It is problematic when
trying to isolate the e↵ect as there are two possible avenues through which
religion could operate: Firstly, religion could be directly impacting upon the
behaviour of individuals during the event by regulating (calming) the emotions
of individuals. Where situations are not solvable or di cult to solve, religion
may have a great impact by helping to restore an individual’s belief that the
world is safe and controllable (Park, 2005, pp. 711-712) and could bestow a more
positive emotional outlook. As discussed in the previous section these e↵ects
are able facilitate superior coping and survival outcomes (Fredrickson et al.,
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2003). Secondly, religion could have a delayed e↵ect, which occurs after such a
traumatic event, where individuals turn to religion to provide comfort and help
make sense of such events (Hood et al., 2009, pp. 459-460). US polls indicated
that in the week following the tragedy church attendance increased from 6 to
24%, a trend that continued till November. People searched for immediate
support and comfort to cope with this tragedy. However, after three months
church attendance dropped to the original pre-September 11 levels. The use of
prayer was a central primary copying mechanism to reduce negative emotional
e↵ects created by the event. We therefore attempt to reduce some of these
shortcomings by exploring the chronological development of how emotions and
language evolve during the event and the emergence of religious language during
the crisis and compared against that of positive and negative emotive language.
It is our belief that the current standard of content analysis by frequency and
needs to be used in conjunction with count analysis in settings where the content
is uncontrolled (i.e., an open microphone setting). The count methodology is
able to show the di↵erent speeds at which positive and negative emotions (and
religious sentiment) developed. Moreover, the methodology used, the manner in
which data was prepared, and the dictionaries used to analyse the data would
have a significant impact upon the analytical outcomes.
7.2 Methods
7.2.1 Participants
This study utilises two datasets created from the same initial source, the of
pager text messages sent during the September 11 attacks (made publicly avail-
able by Wiki Leaks in 2009). For this analysis, one data set was prepared by
the authors (Savage and Torgler) and the other by the authors of the original
studies (see Back et al., 2010, 2011). The captured communications form a
relatively clean quasi-natural experiment for the analysis of emotive content,
where the participants are interacting within their normal environment (rather
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than in an artificial laboratory setting). The two great advantages of natural
experiments over laboratory experiments are randomisation and realism, where
the realism of the event prompts natural behavioural responses while maintain-
ing the advantages randomness of natural data. The pager messages capture
the participant’s responses in their own native voices: the sender’s unconscious
selection of words and language reveals their true emotions and sense of urgency
as events unfold (for a methodological overview, see Pennebaker et al. 2003).
It is this natural, native selection of communicative language that allows for
the study of emotional and behavioural aspects by utilising word count analysis
common to psychological studies (see, e.g., Foltz et al., 1998; Popping, 2000).
Such behavioural evidence is valuable as unbiased information about individ-
ual’s emotional states throughout the event is di cult to obtain by interviewing
survivors at a later stage. Such post event results are inherently biased as only
the emotional states of survivors are obtained.
7.2.2 Research Design
In this study we adopt a variation on the normal methodological approach for
content analysis (as used in the previous studies). More than just a shift we
include a comparative analysis of the datasets and the dictionaries used in the
analysis. We adopt this comparative approach as we believe that there is an
advantage to be gained from a parallel approach, using both frequency analysis
and absolute count methodologies, as neither one provides a complete picture
alone. According to Hart (2001), the two word analysis methodologies (aggre-
gate count method and frequency analysis) are analogous to city views from a
helicopter and the street, both valid but vastly di↵erent. The view from the
air is broad rather than narrow, looks at totalities rather than instances and is
not dazzled by context or close space observations: “We need to count words
simply because words come to us in quantities. It is time, that is, for [us] to
take a helicopter ride” (Hart, 2001, p. 58). Clearly, information is lost reducing
the chance of getting a relative measure of emotive responses due to inabil-
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ity of controlling the overall individual information flow (for a methodological
overview see Weber, 1990). This is especially true in an environment where full
control of the type of message tra c and participants is not possible such as in
an “open microphone” setting where all passing tra c is captured regardless of
its relationship or context to the question under investigation.
This is not a problem from a frequency analysis perspective when content
collection is from focused sources such as speeches, newspaper articles or web
blogs - where content is much more likely to be focused on a single topic or
area (e.g., a re-election speech, a news story or a conversation). These types of
environments would be considered a “closed microphone” setting, such that all
content captured for analysis is on topic and restricted to a set number of par-
ticipants. The “open microphone” setting captures all conversation regardless
of topic and has an unknown number of participants who can enter and leave
the setting at any time. This can create a problem in this context, if we do not
control for these aspects we do not know if the change in emotional content is
from an increase in the emotion of those initially in the system or from a large
number of new entrants or some combination of both. To adequately control for
word capture in such a setting, it is vital to understand the shape (distribution)
of a normal day’s message tra c. In this way variations to the norm can be
attributed to the event, not to the underlying noise in the signal tra c, creating
a much better control for the use of frequency analysis. In essence this is a com-
parative study of two preparations of an original dataset, utilizing two di↵erent
dictionaries with a side-by-side analysis of both methodologies. Additionally,
we perform statistical tests on both the data and dictionary’s to demonstrate
the strengths and weaknesses of the each.
Several problems arise in the modern era where we see non-human or au-
tomatically generated messages and the possibility of multiple recipients of a
single message being captured. While automatically generated messages do not
contain any human emotive content, as non-human participants send them, the
same may not be true for multiple messages, which do come from human partici-
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pants. Therefore, it is important to understand the nature of the communication
medium and the way in which it is utilised by its users prior to analysis prepa-
ration. One needs to be able to isolate and remove automatic (non-human)
responses to get a measure for the relative importance of emotions over time,
whilst preserving the human (emotive)) correspondence. For example, during
September 11 the volume of message tra c over time increasingly contained
event updates or network news broadcasts, consisting of little to no emotive
content, which leads to noise in an inter-temporal analysis. The inclusion or
exclusion of news feeds into content analysis needs to be carefully considered.
While a single news bulletin could indeed be considered to contain valid emotive
content and be in context for the analysis the same may not be said about the
following repeats. Given the nature of modern technology driven news feeds, a
single feed is pushed across the network with a highly frequent rotation. The
question now arises about the validity of the subsequent feed pushes. Do these
repeats contain human emotive communication (making them valid) or are they
computer generated non-emotive informative messages (making them invalid)?
Are these messages information or communication (background noise)? At
this point in the analysis a decision would have to be made concerning the use of
such feeds, either to completely drop the repeated news feeds (on the grounds
there are information and not valid), include the first message and drop of
the repeats (on the grounds that the first may contain communication and the
repeats only information) or accept all the messages (on the belief that they all
contain communication and not information). A further issue arises from the
way in which the communication technology itself is utilised. While it is normal
to observe one-to-one message relationships (e.g., between two individuals), in
the modern era it is not uncommon for one-to-many style links to exist. This
can be true for individuals who belong to large clubs or organisations with
a focal individual or hub (e.g., religious or community organisations). It is
especially important that this one-to-many communication is not confused with
computer generated or non-human message tra c just because of its repetitive
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nature. A modern equivalent is observed in the Twitterverse, where tweets
from one individual are followed by many and result in a single tweet being
pushed across multiple recipient accounts. In the context of 2001, we observe a
number of identical text messages being sent out from a religious leader to call
followers to a vigil (or prayer). This message in particular represents a group
of individuals who have given numbers to their religious organisation for the
purpose of contact in exactly these types of circumstances. The content in these
messages are important and relevant human emotional communications and the
removal of such may create biased or unrepresentative analytical outcomes.
7.2.3 Procedure
The study of emotional content in communication is complex and at times needs
to come under subjective interpretation for context. When doing word content
analysis it is important that the lexicons are consistent, but it is more important
that they are meaningful and are used in context of not only the general meaning
of the term but also in line with the meaning of the communication itself. To-
wards these ends we have utilised the Back, Ku¨fner and Eglo↵ (BKE) prepared
dataset as well as our own (S&T). As a comparison measure we demonstrate
how di↵erent data set preparation can give vastly di↵erent results. In addi-
tion to using the LIWC, we also use the Word Frequency Counter (WFC) by
Hermetic Systems (version 12.77) and STATA (version 12) for all further statis-
tical analysis. Additionally, we provide a comparison of both datasets using the
LIWC dictionary and our own truncated set (S&T). In line with the comments
by Pury (2011) we have attempted to reduce the false positives by removing au-
tomatically generated computer messages. However, our approach to the issues
raised by Pury (2011) was to remove problematic terms from our dictionary
and lists. Additionally, to keep the work in line with previous studies the S&T
dictionary was crosschecked against the LIWC dictionaries to ensure category
consistency. We present the original S&T dictionary list in this paper (see Table
7.1) as well as the words we have omitted from the adjusted dictionary lists (see
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Table 7.2).
Table 7.1: Original S&T Dictionary
Positive Emotion Negative Emotion Religion
accept* deer honey abandon desperate risk afterlife
agree defy* hope alarm* di cult sad bless
apologize deny hopefully alert di culties scare* chaplain
appreciate denying hug alone emotion scary christ*
awe deserve* keepalive alrm failures selfish church*
believe* devote kiss* alrt farewell shit confess
best endures life angry fear* sorely faith*
bond feel* love* attack* forget sorrow forgive*
brave* fine marriage attk frustrat* sorry god
bravo forgive* marry avenge fuck stress grace
bye future plz beg hate sympathy heaven
calm* good relation* broke* loss tears hell
care* grace sweet cries lost terror islam*
caution happi* sweetheart cry meaning underst* jesus
compreh* happy sweetie dam miss* warn* mass
concern* health together* damage* oh-shit why muslim
cooperate heart truelove damm panic worried religi*
darling hon well damn plead worry repent
dear hone dang remorse rest
deeply honee service
temple
Table 7.2: Adjusted Dictionary Sets
Category LIWC S&T
Positive Emotion please -
Negative Emotion hit, attack attack
Religion - service
This then leads to the need for some correction of the dictionaries to make
them consistent and ensure they are in line with the context of the messages.
We initially started with an author-generated list of words, specifically selected
to represent positive, negative and religious emotive words. We then compared
this list with the LIWC dictionary to ensure categorical consistency (all of which
coincided with the LIWC definitions). While the dictionary is without doubt ad-
hoc and smaller in nature they do strictly follow the category conventions. In the
initial phase of the analysis we performed a complete word count analysis, where
we generated complete count lists for each period. From these lists we were
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able to identify any anomalies or words that could have been driving category
counts - these were then investigated on a random selection basis to check for
contextual validity. For example in the Negative Emotion Category, we see the
need for the words ‘Attack’ and ‘Hit’ to be dropped from the count analysis as
the context in which they are used is incorrect for a negative emotional term. In
this context neither word is used as to describe an action to a person, such as to
hit or to attack someone, but is used as a descriptive to describe an event (e.g.,
a plane has hit the WTC). Further checking the usage of these terms within
the messages, shows that these terms are inflating the Negative category and
should not be included in this category count. Figure 7.1 displays the overall
count for the Negative Emotion category using the LIWC dictionary on the
BKE prepared dataset. The adjusted line excludes these terms which results in
a large peak shift to the right and a slight decrease overall. We can see that
inclusion of these terms is having a significant e↵ect on the distribution of the
LIWC category to an early peak (9-10am), but their removal has a distributional
e↵ect on the peak (shifting it to the right) but only a minor e↵ect on the shape
of the remainder of the graph leading to a new peak (11-12pm). This could
also be said for the term ‘war’ which appears in both the Death and Negative
Emotional categories. When examined within the context of this event, war is an
understandable reaction in the negative sense to the event. However, in context
of Death it is not in general talking about death but for the need for vengeance
and revenge against the perpetrators of the disaster. ‘War’ is the single biggest
contribution to the Death category and creates a strong peak (11-12pm) for
brevity these results are not shown here. Finally, the term ‘service’ should
be checked for any missed automatically generated messages. After the initial
attack computer generated messages began to appear as systems experiences a
loss of service, this e↵ect escalated after the second attack and the collapse of
the towers, which can artificially inflate the Religious Category results.
This demonstrates that the datasets and the way in which they are prepared
for analysis are in need of additional attention. There are some major variations
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Figure 7.1: Negative Emotion Category (BKE Dataset)
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between the BKE dataset and the S&T, which are driving some the result
variation. This is most observable within the Religion Category, between 2-
3pm where “church” appears 182 times in S&T but only 7 times in BKE. This
is directly caused by the automatic dropping of repeated messages, e.g., in
the original data set there is a message telling parishioners that there will be
a vigil being held at the church, which is dropped under the methodological
preparation process for repetition in the BKE dataset. It is understandable
from a purely mechanical methodological viewpoint, that repeated messages
should be dropped. However, one must pause to think about its significance in
relation to the event and the analysis of religious communication. Rather than a
random and/or sporadic attempt at gathering parishioners to come to prayers,
a single but powerful call was issued via the use of communication technology
for all parishioners of this church to attend. This call is being dropped because
it was done in an e cient systematic manner, which does not truly represent
the strong religious undercurrent coming from this message. For this reason we
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start by analysing both the BKE and S&T datasets using the LIWC frequency
analysis as a baseline. Firstly, to gain an understanding of the di↵erence created
from the size of the dictionary (number of words) we do a total word-count
comparison. In Figure 7.2 we see the word count totals for the BKE and S&T
datasets across the time period2. This illustrates the total number of words
counted using each dictionary for each time block.
Figure 7.2: Absolute Count Totals (BKE and ST Datasets)
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Here we observe that while there is a size di↵erence in the absolute count,
which is being driven by the dictionary size, they are highly correlated (r =0.989;
p<0.001) which means that the use of the truncated S&T dictionary should
give results consistent with the much larger LIWC. The S&T dataset peaks
out at about 100,000 words where as the BKE is just fewer than 500,000 in
total. This size di↵erence could have a significant e↵ect on the a frequency
analysis as the overall size of the denominator is much larger with no guarantee
that the numerator is any larger, resulting in very small frequency statistic.
2Note, the BKE dataset only begins at 6:45am.
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Next, we independently investigate the relationships between the three main
categories of interest, namely Positive Emotion (PE), Negative Emotion (NE)
and Religion (RE) using the LIWC frequency analysis methodology. Then
we provide a correlation analysis of the di↵erent categories constructions using
the BKE or S&T dataset and the LIWC or S&T dictionary using the absolute
count methodology. The four main category types are BKE-LIWC, BKE-S&T,
S&T-LIWC and S&T-S&T; we have also included the adjusted categories for
comparison.
While we observe that there is a gap between the LIWC results for both
BKE and S&T in the PE category (see Fig. 7.3), there is a fairly high negative
pair wise correlation (r = -0.528; p = 0.024). The negative pair wise correlation
relationship between the two datasets could be problematic in a frequency set-
ting, but does not appear in the count analysis methodology. This remains true
in a correlation analysis using a time trend with intervals of 30 minutes (BKE is
significantly positive (r = 0.342; p = 0.044) and the S&T is highly significantly
negative (r = -0.641; p = 0.001).
In Table 7.3 we provide the correlation matrix for all the variations of the
PE category using the absolute count methodology. We observe that the high
degree of correlation found in the frequency analysis is maintained and increased
in the absolute counts for all combinations of dictionary and dataset, including
the adjusted dictionary and dataset combinations. Regardless of the dataset or
dictionary pairings we observe that the correlation always remains extremely
high for the PE category.
Table 7.3: Positive Emotion Correlation Matrix (*Adjusted dictionary)
ST- ST- BKE- BKE- ST- BKE-
ST LIWC ST LIWC ST* LIWC*
ST-ST 1.0000
ST-LIWC 0.9964 1.0000
BKE-ST 0.9919 0.9888 1.0000
BKE-LIWC 0.9932 0.9915 0.9995 1.0000
ST-ST* 0.9897 0.9975 0.9794 0.99830 1.0000
BKE-LIWC* 0.9937 0.9925 0.9991 0.9998 0.9845 1.0000
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Figure 7.3: Positive Emotion Category (LIWC Analysis of BKE and ST)
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Next we analyse the LIWC NE category, Figure 7.4 displays the LIWC fre-
quency analysis for the BKE and S&T NE Category (r= 0.233; p<0.353). Here
we observe that while the two dictionaries are much closer in value than PE they
generally move independently of each other, which results in a low, insignificant
pair wise correlation (r = 0.233; p < 0.353). The time trend correlations are in
both cases positive but they di↵er greatly. The BKE correlation is insignificant
(r = 0.059; p = 0.736) while the S&T correlation is positive and highly signifi-
cant (r = 0.835; p < 0.001). This could indicate a large variation between the
datasets, which could create a problem in a frequency analysis setting.
However, the Tables 7.4 and 7.5 present correlation matrices for all the
variations of the Negative Emotion category. The di↵erence we observed in the
frequency analysis (Fig. 7.4) is no longer present in the correlation matrix for
the absolute count models, but we do observe lower correlation levels between
BKE and S&T-LIWC models (see Table 7.4). Table 7.5 present the adjusted
models for the NE category. We observe that the correlation is lower in the
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Figure 7.4: Negative Emotion Category (LIWC Analysis of BKE and ST)
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adjusted cases, eased but remains very high for the majority of the models.
Table 7.4: Negative Emotion Correlation Matrix A
ST-ST ST-LIWC BKE-ST BKE-LWIC
ST-ST 1.0000
ST-LWIC 0.8054 1.0000
BKE-ST 0.9108 0.7254 1.0000
BKE-LWIC 0.9164 0.7636 0.9779 1.0000
Finally, we analyse the LIWC frequency analysis results for the Religion cat-
egory. We see in Figure 7.5 the LIWC frequency analysis of the BKE and S&T
RE category (r = -0.075; p=0.767). Here we observe that again the frequency
analysis results are much closer together, but the pair wise correlation analy-
sis demonstrates that a relationship is virtually non-existent (r = -0.075; p <
0.767). It may be that this result is being driven by the large swing in the first
hour and the drift in the latter section of the results. This in essence highlights
some of the problems associated with open microphone frequency analysis, in
154
Table 7.5: Negative Emotion Correlation Matrix B
ST-ST* ST-LIWC* BKE-ST* BKE-LIWC*
ST-ST* 1.0000
ST-LWIC* 0.7131 1.0000
BKE-ST* 0.9003 0.6287 1.0000
BKE-LWIC* 0.9303 0.7374 0.9641 1.0000
the hours between 7-8am the BKE has two positive hits for religion. While this
is only a small number, there is very little tra c at this time and this can have a
significant impact on the results. However, when we turn to the absolute count
models, this problem is not reflected in the correlation matrix (see Table 7.6).
Here we observe a strong relationship between most of the dataset/dictionary
combinations. These results provide support for the use of the absolute count
methodology and for the adjusted dictionaries, as they demonstrate a strong
correlation between them. The results of the time trend correlation analysis
shows a di↵erent result than those previous demonstrated. Now the BKE out-
put is much more correlated with time (r = 0.616; p < 0.001) than S&T (r =
-0.113; p < 0.519). This result is not surprising given the stable and flat nature
of the S&T output.
Table 7.6: Religion Correlation Matrix
Religion ST- ST- BKE- BKEC- ST- BKE-
ST LIWC ST LIWC ST* LIWC*
ST-ST 1.0000
ST-LWIC 0.6596 1.0000
BKE-ST 0.7871 0.8036 1.0000
BKE-LWIC 0.8685 0.7741 0.9395 1.0000
ST-ST* 0.5579 0.9612 0.7787 0.6964 1.0000
BKE-LIWC* 0.7970 0.8122 0.9903 0.9432 0.8022 1.0000
In the finally analysis, we attempt to determine if there is a di↵erence in
the nature of the messages sent pre- and post-event with those sent during. In
line with the Back et al. (2011) we provide a statistical analysis (t-test) of all
the messages sent before the first aircraft struck the World Trade Centre and
afterwards applying a frequency analysis using the S&T dataset (see Table 7.7).
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Figure 7.5: Religion Category (LIWC Analysis of BKE and ST)
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Here we extend their analysis to include a full hour of messages broken down into
one-minute blocks testing the one-hour prior to the first attack (7:46-8:46am)
with the hour following it (8:46-9:46am) and with the period after the collapse
of the second tower (10:28-11:28am). Additionally, as the messages sent during
the event may be di↵erent from those being sent afterwards we also analyse the
hour during the attack (9:28-10:28am) with the time period after the collapse
of the second tower3.
We observe that there is no statistical di↵erence in the PE category for the
hours before or after 8:45am. However, there is a statistical di↵erence (1% level)
between the hour before 8:45am and the hour after 10:28am and between the
hour 9:28-10:28and after 10:28 (significant at the 5% level). On the other hand,
3Communication Timeline: 8:14 am American Airlines Flight 11 hijacked, between 8:42
8:46 am United Airlines Flight 175 aircraft hijacked. 8:46:40 am American 11 flew into WTC
Tower 1. 8:51 8:54 am American Airlines Flight 77 hijacked. 9:02:59 am United Airlines Flight
175 hits south side of WTC Tower 2. 9:37:46 am, American Airlines Flight 77 crashes into
the Pentagon. 9:28 am hijackers take over United Airlines Flight 93. 9:58:59 am Collapse of
WTC Tower 2. 10:02:23 am Flight 93 crashes into an empty field in Pennsylvania. 10:28:22
am Collapse of WTC 1.
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Table 7.7: T-test Statistics
Category Period 1 Period 2 Obs. t
Positive Emotion 7:45-8:45 8:45-9:45 60 0.4744
9:28-10:28 10:28-11:28 60 2.1727
7:45-8:45 10:28-11:28 60 4.9817
Negative Emotion 7:45-8:45 8:45-9:45 60 2.5364
9:28-10:28 10:28-11:28 60 1.4661
7:45-8:45 10:28-11:28 60 5.9507
Religion 7:45-8:45 8:45-9:45 60 2.0677
9:28-10:28 10:28-11:28 60 1.8918
7:45-8:45 10:28-11:28 60 3.9516
the NE and RE categories in the hour before and after 8:45am are significantly
di↵erent for each other (5%), but are not significantly di↵erent later in the hour
before and after 10:28am for NE but is significant at the 10% for RE. This
results in the hour before 8:45am and the hour after 10:28am being statistically
di↵erent for both categories as well (1% level). These results indicate that PE
communication had a strong relative increase during the later periods (9:28 to
11:28). This is not true for NE or RE ? here we observe an increase once the
event starts which then holds for the duration of the event to end up with a
large change in the hour after the event. This analysis provides strong evidence
to support the use of an alternative dictionary and dataset for comparative
purposes, given the strong correlation between our base and adjusted categories
we can begin the methodological analyses of the three main categories of interest,
PE, NE and RE.
7.3 Results
To demonstrate the di↵erences made from adjusting the dictionaries we present
both the raw and the adjusted analysis in a side-by-side fashion (the adjusted
dictionary is denoted by a *). Note also that we have rescaled the RE variable
to make it more visible, the right hand Y-axis is always used for the RE scale.
We begin by using both the S&T dictionary and dataset. Figures 7.6 and
7.7 displays the count method outcomes for the categories PE, NE and RE
157
content using the S&T dictionary and datasets. Here we must be careful when
interpreting the graphical results, as the count methodology is using absolute
values, which can result in large variations between categories. What’s more
important in this method, is not the only values, but their relative changes over
time (how they develop in relation to the other categories).
Figure 7.6: Raw Counts (ST Dictionary and Datasets)
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Here we see that initially the response is overwhelmingly positive, contrasted
by the negative response, which not only peaks at a lower level but also does not
occur until after the event conclusion (12-1pm). However, one should note that
the overall level between PE and NE is not fully comparable, as the absolute
value is influenced by the composition of categories (e.g., number of words).
Nevertheless, one should also note that both emotions show similar aggregated
values and patterns between 6-8 am and 11-1 am.
Figures 7.8 and 7.9 shows the relationship within the S&T dataset using
the LIWC dictionary. Again, we observe a very similar set of outcomes as
observed in Figure 7.7. While the results are similar, the absolute counts are
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Figure 7.7: Adjusted Counts (ST Dictionary and Datasets)
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much higher; this is primarily due to the much higher number of words in the
LIWC dictionary. However, as discussed in the methodology section we must
also note that we have omitted some terms from the category dictionaries as
these words can be shown to be driving the results from an incorrect context.
However, a visual comparison between Figures 7.7 and 7.9 show very similar
development over time regardless of the dictionary used (excluding the higher
absolute count values driven by the much larger dictionary size).
Figures 7.10 and 7.11 again demonstrates the relationship between the cat-
egories but this time is using the dataset prepared by BKE but using the S&T
category dictionary - we can observe that there is very little structural di↵erence
between the graphs, apart from the absolute size, which is understandable given
the much reduced number of messages in the BKE dataset.
Figures 7.12 and 7.13 demonstrates the BKE prepared data with the LIWC
category dictionaries for PE, NE and RE content. We can visually observe
the similarities between Figures 7.11 and 7.13, the di↵erences between them in
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Figure 7.8: Raw Count (ST Dataset and LIWC)
0
10
0
20
0
30
0
R
el
ig
io
n
0
20
00
40
00
60
00
80
00
Po
s.
 &
 N
eg
. E
m
ot
io
n
5am 10am 3pm 8pm 1am
 
S&T LIWC Neg. Emotion S&T LIWC Pos. Emotion
S&T LIWC Religion
S&T−LIWC Data & Dictionary
Absolute Count Values
absolute count sizes are due to the larger dictionary sizes. While the underlying
relationships between these categories remain consistent across dictionaries and
datasets, it is important to note the vast changes in scale that occur. What
we do observe across the majority of these graphs is the relationship between
the positive to negative emotional categories. This may indicate that positive
emotions can help generate a sense of control in order to increase the probability
of positive survival outcome, which is in line with Spilka et al. (1985).
What we may be able to conclude from the results is that in extreme cir-
cumstances, people do not immediately respond with negative attitudes but
approach such events in a positive and supportive manner, possibly helping to
reduce the occurrences of panic or antisocial behaviour. This could indicate a
pro-social motivation in which individuals attempt to support and assist oth-
ers to alleviate distress, a kind of helping behaviour displayed during common
threat situations that generates we-feelings and a concern for the welfare of
others (see, e.g., Batson et al., 1979).
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Figure 7.9: Adjusted Count (ST Dataset and LIWC)
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Interestingly, we observe that the peak of religious sentiment comes after the
collapse of the towers, which would indicate that after such traumatic events
individuals do turn to their faith and beliefs for support4. This result can
be clearly seen in both Figures 7.7 and 7.9 but the e↵ect is washed out due
to the data preparation methodology in Figures 10-13. This is in line with
Pargament et al. (2005) who believes that religion o↵ers a way to come to
terms with tragedies or su↵ering after times of great crisis. Religious beliefs
appear at later stages when people try to make sense and to understand events
they have witnessed Kelley (1971), while they attempt to restore the meaning-
belief system (Spilka et al., 1985). As Spilka et al. (1985) pointed out that
people seek meaningful explanations of events has a long history: “Aristotle
opened his Metaphysics with the bald assertion that “all men by nature desire to
know.” Dewey (1929) spoke of a “quest for certainty,” Frankl (1963) of a “search
4We believe that the results do indicate a positive swing towards religion and not merely
the use of phrases such as “oh my god” after the event. When this phrase is analysed we find
that it occurs only 14 times through out the day - 12 of which occur between 8am - 11am
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Figure 7.10: Raw Count (BKE Dataset and ST Dictionary)
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for meaning,” and Maslow (1970) of the ”desire to know and understand.”
(p. 4). It may not be surprising that religion becomes so important after a
crisis, given that the crisis itself most likely disrupts the normal structure of
understanding and needs set out in Mawson (2007). In the later stages or after
a disaster or crisis event, religion becomes more accessible, given that the event
has most likely stripped away the everyday structure of modern society. Here
the strong traditional framework of organised religions can come to the fore,
providing clear beliefs, coping mechanisms and social bounds. However, as the
event subsides and life returns to a semblance of normality the need for the
traditional religious framework fades, which may explain some of the ebb and
flow of religious communications in and around crisis events.
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Figure 7.11: Adjusted Count (BKE Dataset and ST Dictionary)
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7.4 Discussion
Understanding human behaviour in times of stress or under extreme circum-
stances requires an understanding of how people choose to act and the manner
in which they make their decisions. In the absence of sure knowledge on the ac-
tions and decisions taken by individuals in these extreme circumstances we rely
on proxies to reveal preferences and decisions. The analysis of communication
provides us with such a proxy for emotion, which is a key factor for individ-
ual decision-making in extreme environments and circumstances. This study
not only allows us to gain greater insight into communication in times of great
stress, but also the evolution of the underlying emotion generated throughout
the event. While the existing literature has provided only limited empirical in-
sights into the interpersonal connections during extreme events, it does provide
a starting point. We show that modern communication mediums and its associ-
ated technologies required a revisiting of the standard methodologies with which
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Figure 7.12: Raw Count (BKE Dataset and LIWC)
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word analysis has previously been carried out. And while personal communica-
tion can be just a one-to-one relationship it is no longer limited to such and the
tools and methods used for analysis must adapt to accommodate it. Overall,
our findings indicate that it is useful to work with a model of behaviour and
decision-making that recognises the social nature of human beings. This vital
understanding of how humans think and how emotions develop and change un-
der extreme conditions can provide us with valuable insights into how humans
will behave during future extreme events. It will be this better understanding
of social interactions and the nature of human beings that will make for better
public policy. This was neatly summed up by Heide (2004), who indicated the
urgent need for this: “Disaster planning is only as good as the assumptions it
is based upon. Unfortunately this planning is often based upon a set of conven-
tional beliefs that have been shown to be inaccurate or untrue when subjected
to empirical analysis. It is more e cient to learn what people tend to do natu-
rally in disasters and plan around that, rather than design your plan and then
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Figure 7.13: Adjusted Count (BKE Dataset and LIWC)
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expect people to conform to it” (p. 340).
Here we have shown that as the September 11 terror attacks unfolded, indi-
viduals reached out for information and support, the emotive (and by extension,
behavioural content) of the initial communication, demonstrated an overwhelm-
ingly positive emotional attitude. This result is important for the study of emo-
tion, especially in a content analysis setting, as it demonstrates that even under
extreme or adverse conditions with large amounts of uncertainty it is human
nature to be supportive and have an outflow of positive emotion towards oth-
ers. However, after the collapse of the second tower, communications became
increasingly negative and shortly thereafter individuals began a strong uptake of
religious terminology within their communications as individuals sought com-
fort and understanding in religion and their belief systems. The initial shift
may be indicative of a short-term instinct to provide and seek support while
trying to solve or address problems (Aspinwall, 1998, 2004) that later gives way
to negative emotions. This supports much of the religious support literature,
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which argues that religion is an important coping mechanism is disaster and
crisis situations. However, this only becomes evident well after the proverbial
dust has settled demonstrating that religion must be o↵ering a form of sup-
port or understanding that is less available in the immediate aftermath of such
event through other channels. In general, the broad range of positive public
responses such as rescue work, volunteering, providing resources, or donating
blood clearly indicates a di↵erent picture from the long-held views that terrorist
attacks would cause mass panic or social disorder (Mawson, 2007).
Another critical point of this study is that one must be aware of the limi-
tations of using any predefined analytical tools, especially if they are designed
for general use (such as a dictionary). While is vital to have a set of generally
accepted tools for such analysis (to maintain comparability between research
projects) the results can be at times misleading because of over-generalization.
In order to answer specific question tools should be specifically designed, or at
the very least modified or adapted to suit the specific research question. While
the purpose was not to create a better dictionary, we have shown that modifying
the general in order to obtain the specific can be a valid and useful concept.
This is not to say that the S&T dictionary is lacking or deficient or even ideal,
but it does demonstrate that some additional thought and vetting needs to be
applied to the general tool if it is to be applied to a “specific purpose.” The
LIWC and the dictionary is a comprehensive and highly useful tool that should
continue to be used for this type of analysis. However, some additional fea-
tures might make this a much more useful tool, e.g., providing the results of
absolute counts with a list of the total counts would enable the researcher to
see if any terms are inadvertently driving the frequency analysis. This alone
would allow the researcher to question the validity of keeping key words such
as “hit” in the analysis, or at the least to run the analysis again with the word
omitted to check the robustness of results. Our S&T dictionary was originally
created to investigate a specific question, i.e. the chronological development of
positive and negative emotions and the emergence of religious sentiment during
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a disaster. What we discovered was that this approach was problematic, as it
did not initially take into account the wider literature that already existed and
the large amount of existing work utilising the psychological dictionary. Once
we became aware of this we backwards checked our dictionary with that of the
LIWC to ensure its validity. While our dictionary is smaller in absolute size, it
does comply with all the category definitions in the LIWC, and we show that
even using the LIWC dictionary we obtain very similar results using the S&T
data.
This analysis does not measure or indicate the religiosity of any one individ-
ual or group, but rather is an aggregate measure of the collective use of religious
terminology and its development over the period of the disaster. This aggregate
measure of religion does have some shortcomings, such as the inability to link
use of religious words in communication to an individual level of religiosity. We
do not know the level of belief or even the denomination of the individuals who
sent/received such messages, meaning we are unable to make any statements
about the meaning-making system of these individuals or how it impacts them
specifically. What the aggregate analysis does allow us to do is to map the
levels of religious communication exhibited during the event and analysis if or
how it changed over the course of the day. The literature in the area of religion
and emotion is still underdeveloped and could benefit from a more concerted
interdisciplinary e↵ort from researchers. While this study has demonstrated
emotional development and emergence of religiosity after a major event, it has
been viewed from an aggregate (macro) perspective and it would be of great
benefit if this could be done at the individual level. Any study that could link
the aggregate back to the individual, and measure religiosity and demographic
states would provide a great leap forward in this field but as such is outside the
current scope of this study.
Beyond these findings, we believe an equally important contribution of this
work is the methodological discussion pertaining to the importance of utilising
both frequency and pure count methodologies in content analysis. Furthermore,
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the preparation of datasets for analysis is hugely influential within this form of
emotional analysis. Small changes in methodology when preparing a dataset
can have large-scale impacts, which can be exacerbated if used in complex two
or three stage analyses (such as frequency). It is also important to contemplate
the meaning of unused or omitted data and as well as the manner or reason
in which it was initially generated. The relationship between messenger sender
and receiver must be further dwelt upon and not dismissed out of hand. Finally,
we argue that utilising absolute word count analysis can be useful in removing
message capture confounds when analysing the evolution of emotions in text
communications. The “open microphone” problem and the possibility of mul-
tiple recipients of a single communication, means that stepping back from the
analysis is important in situations where absolute control of the message source
is impossible.
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Chapter 8
Conclusions
Over the last few decades behavioural economics has progressed from a
barely tolerated fringe subset of economics, to being a recognised and excit-
ing area of mainstream economic study which is growing rapidly1. However,
just like all other areas of study that has under gone rapid growth, large gaps
form within the literature that lay just o↵ the beaten path. One of these areas
is the decision making process in non-normal situations, i.e. high stress situa-
tions and life-and-death environments. There are two primary reasons for this
oversight: Firstly, is the di culty in using laboratory experiments, which has
been the primary tool for behavioural analysis until now. It is very di cult (if
not impossible) to replicate high stress or life-and-death environments in the
lab, this results in behaviour being non-representative of real life situations.
Secondly, it is unethical and potentially dangerous to place participants in such
situations. The physical and psychological harm that could occur is too great
if participants were placed in real or simulated conditions and situations (see
e.g. The Stanford Prison Experiments (Zimbardo and Cross, 1971), The Mil-
gram Experiment (Milgram and van Gasteren, 1995; Milgram, 1963), The Third
Wave Experiment (Ron Jones, 1972)). This creates the need for alternatives
sources to study this area, as discussed in Chapter 2, this is why natural and
field experiments have become so important.
1Evidence of the growing acceptance of behavioural economics into the mainstream would
be the number of recent Noble Prize winners from the behavioural field
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Traditionalist and possibly other behaviourists may argue that as extreme
situations happen so rarely that the study of them is not overly important.
To these criticisms I would respond firstly by agreeing, that individual sorts of
disasters do only happen rarely. For example, the common perception is that
maritime (shipping) disasters happen very rarely. However, since the turn of
the century we have seen: The MS Express Samina (2000), SIEV X (2001), Le
Joola (2002), MV Salahuddin (2002), MV Nasrin (2003), MV Princess of the
Stars (2008), MV Demas Victory (2009), MV Spice Islander (2011), Bulgaria
(2011), MS Costa Concordia (2012), MV Rabaul Queen (2012) and The MS
Shariatpur (2012). This rare occurrence has cost the lives of over 5,7002 men,
women and children and an unknown dollar cost. I agree that these events may
be “rare” and from a stereotypical economic viewpoint the loss of life is of little
aggregate value as research should be focused on the best return to society3.
I personally find the cost is astronomical and the loss of lives is inconceivable,
the cost is “too great” to ignore and “too heart-breaking/devastating” to
not try prevent or reduce. If one was to look at all the other types of disasters,
life-and-death events and high stress environments (stock crashes, GFC, housing
and .com bubbles, terrorism, etc.) we can see that these events can have critical
and long-lasting consequences in an individual’s life as well as an incalculable
global cost. In short, yes I think this research is significant and important.
The common element that ties all these works together is the empirical anal-
ysis of decision making outside of the normal everyday condition. These include
naturally occurring high pressure environments and historical life-and-death sit-
uations. More specifically these papers investigate the factors that may a↵ect or
change the decision making process from a behavioural [economics] perspective.
Towards these ends these papers set out to analyse the revealed behavioural
preferences of decision makers through their actions in di↵erent high pressure
or life-and-death environments with varying shock types. These shocks are
2Calculation made from data available on Wikipedia’s list of Maritime Disasters and only
included event with loss of life.
3This is especially true given the standard economic models for the value of human life
(Schelling, 1978; Thaler and Rosen, 1976; Bellavancea et al., 2009; Savage, 2013).
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naturally occurring within each environment and are either exogenous or en-
dogenous events. The broad picture findings show that behaviour and decision
making in these environments does not strictly follow the traditional homo eco-
nomicus model of self interest. There are many factors that can (and do) a↵ect
and cause deviations such as: Firstly, di↵erences in context are likely to matter
in life-or-death situations, when time is scarce, individual self-interested flight
behaviour predominates, while altruism and social norms and power through so-
cial status become more important if there is su cient time for them to evolve
(see Chapter 3). Secondly, in high pressure working environments the predi-
cable, anticipated and experienced stress factors (routinely experienced stress
determinants) have no significant impact on performance on elite sportsmen.
And in line with prospect theory we observe that being in a position of rela-
tive advantage increases the probability of success. This is asymmetric to the
relative disadvantaged situation, which leads to a decrease of success 2.5 times
greater than that for success (see Chapter 4). Thirdly, that the introduction of
competing social institutions can crowd out existing good pro-social behaviours
and support the rise of less noble anti-social ones through the inability to en-
force social norms. Such that over time individuals become much less impacted
by the deaths of others and less likely to engage in pro-social behaviour (see
Chapter 5). Fourthly, individuals who have su↵ered from the impact of a large
exogenous wealth shock have a much higher propensity to accept risky gambles
(50%) than their immediate neighbours (see Chapter 6). Finally, that in times
of stress or under extreme circumstances with large amounts of uncertainty the
development of positive (pro-social) and negative emotions and religious sen-
timent shows that the initial human reaction is to be supportive and have an
outflow of positive emotion towards others (see Chapter 7). It is only after-
wards that emotions turn to anger (negative) and then individual?s turn to heir
religious systems to make sense of the events.
These experiments demonstrate that there is a range of factors that have a
significant e↵ect the decision making process of individuals in extreme environ-
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ments or high stress situations. My findings support much of the laboratory
work showing that other-regarding preferences do matter, but that it takes time
for these pro-social behaviours to manifest. Additionally, these works show that
the environments in which these events occur are of critical importance to the
behaviour elicited. That is social norms do not exist or occur in a vacuum, as
they are intimately intertwined with the social institution (culture) in which the
individuals interact and the environment in which they take place. Furthermore,
I show that risk attitudes are not predetermined (set) and that environmental
factors (such as losses) can induce a significant change in the decision making
behaviour of individuals by imposing a real loss. Taken together these works
show that the environment in which individuals find themselves has a large and
significant impact upon how they behave and interact with others.
To understand human behaviour requires we have an intimate understanding
of how they choose to act and the manner in which they make their decisions,
this extends to including environmental factors into our decision making models.
In the absence of sure knowledge on the actions and decisions we rely on proxies
to reveal preferences or decisions. For this reason the behavioural approach can
be a very useful tool to redefine the human agent. There is a large weight of evi-
dence showing how common actual behaviour deviates from the standard homo
economicus model, which has for a long time been the workhorse to describe
decisions and actions of individuals. However, the strength of the model is also
one of its shortcomings, simplicity. The model is easy to apply and thus easy
gain predictions about how individuals should behave in a given market, but
once economics expanded into non-standard markets the flaws were exposed.
Kahneman’s (Kahneman et al., 1986b) work on fairness raised serious questions
about how businessmen made decisions, in a situation where homo economicus’
maximizing nature should have been clear. Altruism, reciprocity, retaliation,
spite, greed – the list goes on that demonstrate motivations that have been
shown to elicit deviations away from a utility maximizing position (see e.g., An-
dreoni and Miller, 2002; Becker, 1974b; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000; Camerer
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et al., 2004; Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger, 2004; Elster, 2007; Fehr and Schmidt,
1999; Frey, 1997; Perlow and Weeks, 2002; Rabin, 1993; Sobel, 2005; Torgler,
2007). However, the problem extends beyond just individual interactions, be-
cause the basis for modelling behaviour has changed (at the micro level) then
the aggregate (macro) level interaction needs to change with it. Obviously, if we
change the underlying interactions in the market, the design of policy that stems
from it also needs to be readdressed. This is where behavioural economics steps
in. Herbert Simon once described behavioural economics as an empirical test
for the validity of neoclassical behavioural assumptions and where they were
found lacking, to provide new empirical laws to replace them (Simon, 1987).
It logically follows that if neoclassical models do not accurately describe be-
haviour, then the public policies that have been created from them must also
be inherently flawed. The logical response to this is to create better models of
behaviour, which create better policy.
If greater insight into human behaviour leads to better models, which in turn
lead to the creation of policies which are designed to more accurately reflect ac-
tual human behaviour, they will more often generate better, more desirous,
outcomes. These better outcomes come about because policies that are cor-
rectly incentivised and are in line with real human behaviour, not the simplified
models that have been previously used, are more likely to impact the correct in-
dividuals in the manner required. To achieve this we need more detailed models
of human behaviour or as Thaler states we need to move from homo economi-
cus to homo sapiens, to understand when and why individuals deviate from the
baseline model. Essentially, we need to understand the entire decision process
for the deviant actions. The problem is that motivation and justification are
almost anathema from a “standard” economics viewpoint, being much more in
line the psychological view of how we think rather than the economics how we
act. The issue likely stems from the economists inability (unwillingness), until
recently, to investigate concepts such as emotions or paradoxes like preference
reversals. Things that were not easy to include into standard theory, not mathe-
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matically tractable or di cult to measurable were for the most part, overlooked.
Emotion, or the emotive state, has for a long time been considered a precursor
to action or behaviour and as such could be very useful in determining mo-
tivation, preferences or intentions out of observed behaviour (see e.g., Frank,
1988; Loewenstein, 2007). As such emotion may be a very useful addition to
the development of the new models of individual behaviour from which the new
behavioural policy can be drawn. As I have shown in Chapter 7, the response of
individuals during the World Trade Towers event demonstrated a willingness of
individuals to be pro-social and supportive. Although it requires more study to
solidify the link between emotions and actions, the findings support the results
of the other Chapters where individuals act in a pro-social and helping manner
during such events.
Taken together, all these changes could be of great benefit both the legal
and justice system, where laws designed with the actual behaviour of individ-
uals in mind would be easier to enforce if it followed the natural inclinations
of individuals. Furthermore, a justice system that created deterrents that re-
flected the best modelling rather than the archaic system currently employed
of incarceration. For example, understanding what motivates hate crimes could
be fundamental to deriving a policy to stamp it out. Incarceration or the de-
privation of liberty is a blunt tool, and its e↵ectiveness has been brought into
question since the seminal paper by Becker (1974a) on the economics of crime.
The behavioural advantages do not stop with the legal system, as there are great
gains to be made in understanding the emotional and mental motivation of in-
dividuals during disasters. Clearly, it is better design policy such that they are
instinctual and follow the behaviour individuals would naturally follow, rather
than design a policy and then make individuals remember it during a period
of great stress. This is true for all disaster policy, as the manner in which
the state implements emergency policy would greatly benefit from behavioural
analysis. This includes not only the individual (micro) level decision making
process before, during or after extreme events or natural disasters, but also the
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larger (macro) regional or state level disaster policies. Kunreuther’s (see e.g.,
Kunreuther, 1996; Kunreuther and Roth, 1998; Kunreuther and Pauly, 2005)
many works on the cost (short, medium and long run) of disasters, has covered
many vital aspects for policy and governance, which has included issues such as:
the investment gap in risk mitigation, insurance or planning/zoning systems. In
addition to these issues is the placement of critical systems used to alert, warn
or save individuals during these types of events and the success of their design
or implementation is dependent on our models of human behaviour.
This idea is the motivation behind one of my current research projects into
the public/private provision of disaster systems focusing on tornados. Is it bet-
ter for public or private provision of shelters and/or warning systems? Does the
public provision of early warning systems create a moral hazard problem, such
that it mitigates the obligation for individuals to be alert to danger? Does the
lack of enforceable building regulations (code) lead to greater property destruc-
tion and potentially a greater loss of life caused during the easy disintegration
of buildings? When it comes to public policy in a disaster (or life and death)
environment, behavioural analysis can allow for greater sensitivity4 to the ac-
tual behaviour of individuals which should create the better survival outcomes.
Furthermore, by knowing how individuals are likely to behave in such events
the cost to the state to provide services could be greatly decreased across a mul-
titude of areas such as: search and rescue, evacuations, funding of emergency
services and reconstruction. “Disaster plans are only as good as the assump-
tions they are based upon” (Heide, 2004, p.340) and a better set of assumptions
creates a better set of policies.
The question remains how we are to study human behaviour in these types
of environments (disasters) and in extreme situations (life-and-death) without
reliable laboratory data. Fortunately we are able to utilise natural and field
experiments, which provide us with the most viable and reliable way forward.
4If policy is derived from a behavioural focus rather than an aggregate one, it would be
easier to hone in on specific types of behaviour and specific types of individuals. It is hoped
that this specificity of targeting would lead to stronger positive outcomes with less collateral
impact that can be caused from a generalized policy deployment.
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However, we must be aware that natural, quasi-natural and field experiments
do have limitations and should be used as one of the many “tools” available to
researchers. The way forward should include parallel works between laboratory,
field and natural experiments to isolate the e↵ect in the lab while testing it
with the realism of the field. Furthermore, to improve our understanding of hu-
man behaviour in all circumstances it will become increasingly more important
reach out to other researchers in the wider behavioural and social sciences and
to become more collaborative and accepting of alternative theories and method-
ologies. While economists may find it di cult to come to grips with some of
the chaos in other social science disciplines, as only economics has an under-
lying theory that attempts to tie all others together (i.e. utility theory), with
some e↵ort many of these theories can be brought into mainstream behavioural
economics. Conversely, other disciplines may have problems adopting the math-
ematical rigour expected in economics and have fundamental problems with a
single underlying theorem. I believe that the e↵ort of such collaboration will
yield great leaps forward in the understanding of human behaviour and a solid,
universally consistent methodology.
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